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ARTICLE
ETHICAL AND AGGRESSIVE APPELLATE
ADVOCACY: THE DECISION TO PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI IN CRIMINAL CASES
J. THOMAS SULLIVAN*
Over the past six decades, United States Supreme Court decisions have dramatically
reshaped the criminal justice process to provide significant protections for defendants
charged in federal and state proceedings, reflecting a remarkable expansion of due process
and specific constitutional guarantees. For criminal defendants seeking relief based on
recognition of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure, application of existing rules
or precedent to novel factual scenarios, or in some cases, enforcement of existing precedent,
obtaining relief requires further action on the Court’s part. In those situations, the Court’s
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is the exclusive remedy offering an avenue for reversal
of conviction or order vacating the sentence. Petitioning for review by writ of certiorari is
essential to the defendant’s chances for obtaining relief and is what might be characterized
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law;
Founding Editor, The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. Support for this article was provided by a
generous grant from the William H. Bowen School of Law.
This article is dedicated to
Professor Emeritus Kenneth S. Gould, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law, who
opened the door to the author to teaching law in the wonderful position afforded a tenured faculty
member.
This is the third in a series of articles addressing appellate practice from a different perspective
than that usually taken by appellate courts with respect to counsel’s duty in representing the client. It
differs from Chief Justice Warren Burger’s approach to attorneys serving as an officer of the court, as
he expressed while writing for the majority in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). For the author’s
prior articles addressing a more aggressive approach to appellate advocacy than that taken by the Jones
majority, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy: Confronting Adverse Precedent,
59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341 (2005), and J. Thomas Sullivan, Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy: The
“Ethical” Issue of Issue Selection, 80 DENV. U.L. REV. 155 (2002).
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as the “final tool” in the appellate lawyer’s “toolbox.” There are at least five scenarios in
which the petition for writ of certiorari is critical, and counsel must be aware of
circumstances dictating strategic decisions that need to be made in order to protect the
client’s options for relief in the direct appeal and post-conviction processes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For many criminal defendants, the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari
to challenge an adverse decision on direct appeal or in the post-conviction
process offers the final chance to avoid the consequences of the conviction
or sentence imposed at trial. Unfortunately, counsel representing criminal
defendants on the direct appeal or in post-conviction process often fail to
appreciate the need to petition the Supreme Court for review of an adverse
decision rendered by a lower court on claims of constitutional error and,
consequently, do not pursue this potential avenue for relief. Yet, the Court
has positioned itself as the ultimate arbiter of issues arising in interpretation
and application of federal constitutional protections afforded the accused,
and failure to pursue review of federal constitutional claims by writ of
certiorari will result in default of claims that might otherwise have proved
to be meritorious.1
The enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA)2 made notable changes to federal habeas practice
and reinforced the significance of certiorari practice. This “reform” of
federal habeas practice, directed primarily at state court defendants pursuing
federal constitutional claims, effectively defused federal habeas corpus as a
1. Margaret and Richard Cordray offer this particularly apt observation:
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has gained virtually complete control over its own
agenda. Once a relatively passive institution which heard all appeals that Congress authorized,
the Court is now a virtually autonomous decisionmaker with respect to the nature and extent of
its own workload. . . . [T]he Court’s muscular authority over case selection in the modern era
now gives it the unchallenged prerogative in almost every instance to choose whether to resolve
or to bypass important controversies that are brought before it in particular cases.
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations
in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 389 (2004).
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214.
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realistic alternative to direct certiorari review by the Supreme Court when
relief from the state trial court’s conviction or sentence would require novel
thinking or expansion of then-existing precedent.3
AEDPA dramatically limited the authority of federal habeas courts to
provide relief to state inmates asserting violations of federal constitutional
protections in state court proceedings. Habeas relief is no longer available
unless the state court’s disposition of the federal claim results in a ruling
contrary to or reflects an unreasonable determination or application of existing
Supreme Court precedent.4 The imposition of this standard effectively
requires the federal habeas court to defer to state court decision making on
issues of fact and interpretation of federal constitutional protections.5
Thus, the effect of AEDPA is to restrict the power of federal habeas
courts to grant relief from state court convictions by requiring the petitioner
to prove that the state court acted unreasonably by failing to apply federal
constitutional protections. Further, the federal habeas courts and courts of
appeal are strictly limited in evaluating the unreasonableness of state court
determinations of Supreme Court precedent, barring the lower federal
courts from expanding upon existing precedent through analogous
reasoning or an extension of precedent to novel factual scenarios.6 Because
federal habeas relief is so unlikely, federal habeas corpus does not afford an
alternate route for relief for state court defendants who must argue for new
rules or interpretations of federal constitutional protections in order to
avoid adverse state court decisions. Certiorari is not the preferable
alternative; it is the necessary process for arguing for relief on theories or
factual scenarios requiring creative constitutional interpretation.7
3. See id. (limiting state court defendants applying for habeas relief to a few qualifying situations,
such as a new constitutional right made retroactive).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (2018). Section 2254(d)(1) expressly provides that relief may be
granted only when the state court ruling on a federal constitutional claim has “resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .” Id. § 2254(d)(1).
5. In Schriro v. Landrigan, the majority succinctly explained: “The question under AEDPA is not
whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,
473 (2007) (emphasis added).
6. See, e.g., Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120–21 (1995) (per curiam) (holding federal habeas
courts cannot announce new rules of constitutional criminal procedure).
7. In Lackey v. Texas, after the Court had initially stayed Lackey’s execution to permit
consideration of his Eighth Amendment claim that his seventeen-year confinement awaiting execution
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II. THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER AND THE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Typically, defendants are bound by their counsel’s judgment respecting
the conduct of an appeal following conviction.8 They are also bound by
violated his constitutional protections, Justice John Paul Stevens issued a memorandum respecting the
denial of certiorari. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). Justice Stevens did not dissent but
explained:
Often, a denial of certiorari on a novel issue will permit the state and federal courts to “serve as
laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court.”
Petitioner’s claim, with its legal complexity and its potential for far-reaching consequences, seems
an ideal example of one which would benefit from such further study.
Id. at 1047 (citation omitted).
AEDPA, however, ended the “laboratory” approach that permitted different federal circuits to
experiment with novel issues or claims before the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
conflicting approaches in the respective cases. While state courts might engage in such
experimentation, a more promising approach for litigants has been to rely on state constitutional
provisions that may hold greater procedural protection for criminal defendants than existing
Supreme Court precedent. Justice William Brennan explained in his seminal article:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which
has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective
force of state law—for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491
(1977).
The practical approach to using these alternative sources of law is examined in J. Thomas Sullivan,
Developing a State Constitutional Law Strategy for New Mexico Prosecutions, 39 N.M. L. REV. 407, 410–11
(2009), and Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on
Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 664–76 (1987). See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1041 (1983) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their
state constitutions.” (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940))).
8. The majority in Jones v. Barnes deferred to counsel’s professional experience in assessing the
potential merits of claims that could be presented on appeal, concluding that “the accused has the
ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,
751 (1983). Instead, the majority explained: “Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have
emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central
issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.” Id. at 751–52. The Court rejected the argument that
appellate counsel’s refusal to argue a colorable point of error on appeal constituted ineffective
assistance, despite the defendant’s instruction that the issue be included. Id. at 753. However, the
Court later recognized that counsel’s failure to raise a meritorious issue on appeal constitutes ineffective
assistance if the accused demonstrates that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome
had counsel included the issue, resulting in reversal on appeal. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285
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counsel’s errors,9 except when counsel’s error rises to the level of ineffective
assistance,10 which is the case only when the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel is applicable.11
Defense counsel’s decision not to file a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court may result from a perception that review will be unlikely, a
(2000) (“[The defendant] must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable
failure to file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his appeal.”); see also, e.g., Gantt v. State,
209 A.3d 812, 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018) (adopting Jones in holding no constitutional violation
occurred when appellant’s counsel failed to include a non-frivolous argument for strategic reasons).
9. For instance, in Taylor v. Illinois, defense counsel committed misconduct when he failed to
disclose the identity of witnesses whom he intended to call at trial, in violation of the trial court’s
discovery order. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988). When the trial court excluded the witnesses,
the accused complained that his lawyer’s misconduct violated his right to compulsory process under
the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 406. The Taylor majority recognized the problem posed when counsel’s
decisions are imputed to the client, but explained:
The argument that the client should not be held responsible for his lawyer’s misconduct strikes
at the heart of the attorney–client relationship . . . . Putting to one side the exceptional cases in
which counsel is ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer’s decision to forgo
cross-examination, to decide not to put certain witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to disclose
the identity of certain witnesses in advance of trial. In this case, petitioner has no greater right to
disavow his lawyer’s decision to conceal [the witness’s] identity until after the trial had commenced
than he has to disavow the decision to refrain from adducing testimony from the eyewitnesses
who were identified in the Answer to Discovery. Whenever a lawyer makes use of the sword
provided by the Compulsory Process Clause, there is some risk that he may wound his own client.
Id. at 417–18 (emphasis added).
10. For instance, in a Virginian state post-conviction action, a petitioner sentenced to death
sought to raise constitutional challenges that had not been preserved at trial or on direct appeal.
Coleman v. Thompson, 895 F.2d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1990). When the Supreme Court of Virginia
reviewed the denial of relief in the post-conviction process based on procedural default, the court held
that Thompson’s counsel failed to timely file the required notice of appeal and dismissed the appeal.
Id. at 142. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, when Thompson subsequently petitioned for federal habeas
corpus to assert constitutional claims, he argued that counsel’s failure to perfect the appeal from denial
of post-conviction relief amounted to ineffective assistance and warranted relief. Id. at 144. The
Supreme Court rejected the ineffective assistance claim, holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantee
extends only to assistance rendered by trial and appellate counsel in the first step of the appellate
process, and not to representation in discretionary appellate or post-conviction representation.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756–57 (1991).
11. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (declining to interpret an
Eighth Amendment right to assistance of counsel for post-conviction relief to indigent state court
defendants sentenced to death); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–56 (1987) (reaffirming the
Court has never held an indigent litigant has a Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel in a
collateral attack on a conviction or sentence); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618–19 (1974) (finding no
Fourteenth Amendment violation if a state does not afford counsel to an indigent defendant for the
purpose of petitioning for discretionary review once counsel has provided representation in the initial
appeal).
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reasonable assessment given the small number of petitions granted by the
Court every year.12 This assessment turns on three assumptions. First,
some of the most pressing cases heard by the Court involve national interest
issues, such as the continuing criminalization of consensual homosexual
activity. As one might reasonably have expected, the Court granted
certiorari review in Lawrence v. Texas,13 ultimately voiding state sodomy
statutes. Apart from issues of significant social or political interest, it is far
harder to predict which cases will be reviewed, with the notable exception
of issues arising in the context of capital sentencing.14 Over the years, the
Court has regularly reviewed cases in which a death sentence has been
imposed, addressing issues of procedural regularity;15 Eighth Amendment
limitations upon the exercise of state power in the use of capital

12. The Court itself provides the relevant data on its website: “The Court receives
approximately 7,000–8,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari each Term. The Court grants and hears
oral argument in about 80 cases.” Frequently Asked Questions, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supreme
court.gov/about/faq_general.aspx [https://perma.cc/N9PF-EMHQ].
13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14. The Court’s continuing concern with capital sentencing has been evident since it began
regulating the sentencing process. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam)
(holding that the death penalty in the cases reviewed violated due process). It has recognized the
constitutionality of most post-Furman statutes that rationalize capital sentencing as punishing the
most—arguably—deserving capital offenders. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–98 (1976)
(affirming constitutionality of capital sentencing scheme which specifies narrow “class of murderers”
along with statutory jury instruction for aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (“Texas’ capital-sentencing procedures, like those of Georgia and
Florida, do not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
259–60 (1976) (holding that, while unlike Jurek and Gregg due to bench review of capital sentence,
Florida’s post-Furman legislation ensures “informed, focused, guided, and objective inquiry” following
sentencing).
15. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 165 (2013) (concluding the Fourth Amendment
requires warrant for the seizure of blood from a suspect); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122–23
(2006) (rejecting State’s argument that consent of one co-tenant of jointly occupied residence is
sufficient for consent to search); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187–88 (2005) (remanding for
reconsideration of death sentence where prosecutor used inconsistent theories in pursuing death
penalty against co-defendants); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 632–34 (2005) (determining a
defendant shackled during capital sentencing need not demonstrate actual prejudice to survive a due
process challenge); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266 (2005) (holding prosecutor’s exercise of
peremptory challenges in capital prosecution demonstrated racial discriminatory intent, despite
contrary findings of state and lower federal courts); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390–93 (2005)
(concluding trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to examine file on defendant’s prior
conviction admitted at capital sentencing hearing).
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punishment;16 and physical circumstances of execution.17
Second, the lack of adequate compensation available for retained or
appointed counsel continuing representation may also frustrate lawyers who
may have provided aggressive representation to a client. Even when
working on certiorari proceedings for fair compensation,18 counsel
appointed in federal cases, including federal habeas corpus actions brought
by state court defendants, may often find themselves drained by their efforts

16. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 445–47 (2008) (explaining that, even with
aggravating circumstances, “the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the rape of a
child”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were
committed.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
405 (1986)) (restricting state power to execute a mentally retarded capital defendant); Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (emphasizing that a capital defendant must be afforded the opportunity to
offer evidence and have a jury consider mitigating factors of a mental defect or retardation);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (barring execution of juvenile offender aged 15 or
under at time of offense); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156–58 (1987) (addressing culpability
standard for imposing death sentence on accomplices who do not effectuate a victim’s death in the
commission of capital murder); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (“For purposes of
imposing the death penalty, [the defendant’s] criminal culpability must be limited to his participation
in the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt.”);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1980) (holding capital sentence unconstitutional if the only
evidence of aggravating circumstances existing during commission of the murder were “outrageously
or wantonly vile”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–600 (1977) (stating Eighth Amendment
prohibits execution for offense of rape of adult woman); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976)
(holding mandatory death penalty unconstitutional due to a “lack of focus on the circumstances of the
particular offense and the character and propensities of the offender”); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 292–94 (1976) (reasoning the “evolving standards of decency respecting the imposition
of punishment in our society” demands the prohibition of mandatory death penalty statutes).
17. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62–63 (2008) (rejecting challenge to Kentucky’s execution
protocol); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 642–43 (2004) (permitting death row inmate habeas
corpus relief in action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the means by which Alabama’s
statutory execution method would be administered through venous access).
18. In Austin v. United States, the Court considered whether counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006(A) to represent a federal defendant wanting to petition for a writ of certiorari had a duty to file
the petition, despite counsel’s assessment that the petition would be frivolous. Austin v. United States,
513 U.S. 5, 7 (1994) (per curiam). Under the Fourth Circuit’s plan for implementing the statute, counsel
was under an obligation to “prepare and file a timely petition.” Id. at 6–7. The Court granted counsel’s
motion for leave to withdraw, despite the mandatory wording of the rule, while encouraging the circuit
courts to craft rules to permit counsel to assess the merits of a certiorari petition and withdraw in the
event the claims asserted are deemed meritless. See id. at 7 (“[T]his Court’s Rule 42.2 allows an award
of damages or costs against [counsel] if he were to file a frivolous petition.”).
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to exhaust available remedies.19 Exhaustion of remedies is the key
procedural step in preserving the criminal defendant’s options of petitioning
the Court for review on federal constitutional claims or raising those claims
in the federal habeas corpus process. With respect to either of these
alternatives, neither the Court20 nor a federal habeas court21 will address a
state court defendant’s claims on the merits unless they have been presented
to the state courts for resolution first.

19. The requirement that federal constitutional claims be exhausted in state proceedings is
critical to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court and federal habeas courts. Rule 10 of the
Rules of the Court provides that certiorari may be granted under what are generally precisely-defined
circumstances:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a
writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The following, although neither
controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court
considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last
resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s
supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts
with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous
factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.
SUP. CT. R. 10 (emphasis added). The Court’s rule, interestingly, does not expressly limit its exercise
of certiorari jurisdiction, as the highlighted language indicates.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2018).
21. Section 2254(b)(1) provides that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State[.]” In O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel the Court explained further:
Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his
remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an
opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas
petition.
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).
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Third, some lawyers make an assessment that the probability of success
on an issue has been foreclosed due to existing precedent and are thus not
inclined to challenge adverse authority from the Court.22 While there might
be legitimate concern for advancing a frivolous argument in a certiorari
petition, counsel is entitled to make an argument for challenging existing
precedent if done in good faith. Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules for
Professional Conduct provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless
so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be
established.23

Still, many lawyers do not petition for review by certiorari or—assuming
they considered the option at all—even decide not to do so. The decision
not to pursue review in the Supreme Court may actually be a reasoned one
based on the lack of prospects for success. Regardless, courts typically
afford deference to the decision not to petition for certiorari. In
Jones v. Barnes,24 former Chief Justice Warren Burger concluded the right to
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment25 does not
require appellate counsel to raise every non-frivolous, colorable issue despite
the client’s express request that counsel do so.26 This conclusion prompted
a vigorous response from Justice Brennan, who argued:
22. But see J. Thomas Sullivan, Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy: Confronting Adverse
Precedent, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341, 355 (2005) (recommending counsel consult dissenting opinions to
bolster arguments to overrule existing precedent).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (emphasis added).
24. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
25. The accused’s Sixth Amendment right to “Assistance of counsel for his defense” has been
construed to be the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST., amend. VI; McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
26. Jones, 463 U.S. at 751–54. Almost every legal authority opining on brief writing offers the
same advice; appellate counsel best serves the client by arguing only the most promising issues on
appeal and discarding those that appear to have less merit or suggest a complete lack of merit.
See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) (noting the “process of ‘winnowing out weaker
arguments on appeal and focusing on’ those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of
incompetence,” reflects competent appellate advocacy (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 751–52));
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The Court, subtly but unmistakably, adopts a different conception of the
defense lawyer’s role—he need do nothing beyond what the State, not his
client, considers most important. In many ways, having a lawyer becomes one
of the many indignities visited upon someone who has the ill fortune to run
afoul of the criminal justice system.
I cannot accept the notion that lawyers are one of the punishments a
person receives merely for being accused of a crime.27

In terms of the conduct of the appeal, the discretion afforded to counsel
may result in a failure to pursue certiorari otherwise necessary in order to
reverse a conviction or sentence potentially tainted by federal constitutional
error.28
The Court has recognized that appellate counsel, like trial counsel, may
render ineffective assistance in the first instance of the appeal. This may
involve a failure to comply with a procedural requirement for perfecting the
appeal, as in Evitts v. Lucey,29 or a failure to pursue a meritorious claim, as in

John W. Davis, The Argument of An Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 895 (1940), reprinted in 3 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 745, 747 (2001) (“I shall assume that these briefs are models of brevity . . . .”);
John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes—Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 8 SW. L.J. 801, 809
(1976) (“[C]ounsel must select with dispassionate and detached mind the issues that common sense
and experience tell him are likely to be dispositive. He must reject other issues or give them short
treatment.”); Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 115, 119
(1951) (“The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower court
committed an error. Bet receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity
hints at lack of confidence in any one . . . . [E]xperience on the bench convinces me that multiplying
assignments of error will dilute and weaken a good case and will not save a bad one.”). For a different
view of appellate counsel’s role and argument for including issues urged by the client and those
requiring a court to overrule, change, or modify existing law, see generally J. Thomas Sullivan, Ethical
and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy: The “Ethical” Issue of Issue Selection, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 155 (2002).
27. Jones, 463 U.S. at 763–64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. For instance, in Caldwell v. Mississippi, appellate counsel argued that, because the prosecutor’s
closing argument advised jurors they need not worry about making an error in imposing death because
the case would be reviewed on appeal, an issue not included on appeal nonetheless required reversal.
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985). Trial counsel had, in fact, objected to the closing
argument. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ordered the death sentence vacated because the
argument was designed to basically relieve jurors of concern that the death penalty be imposed
appropriately in their deliberations. Id. at 341. The Court heard the case only because the state supreme
court addressed the issue sua sponte on the direct appeal. Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 813–14
(Miss. 1983) (Broom, P.J, sentencing phase).
29. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 389, 396–97 (1985) (concluding appellate counsel’s failure
to file statutory statement of appeal violated his indigent client’s right to effective assistance of counsel).
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Smith v. Robbins.30 The test in Smith is that generally applied to ineffective
assistance claims under the Court’s ruling in Strickland v. Washington,31 which
requires the appellant to show that counsel’s performance was defective and
there was “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different.”32 An
interesting problem in the application of the Strickland test involves the
threshold showing a petitioner must make in order to obtain relief.
In the context of trial counsel’s representation, the petitioner does not
have to demonstrate that effective performance would have necessarily
brought about a different result, only that there was a reasonable probability
of a different result. The question then is, What degree of prejudice must
be shown when the defective performance concerns counsel’s failure to
raise a meritorious argument on appeal?
For example, in Wooten v. State,33 the Arkansas Supreme Court, while
citing Strickland as the controlling standard for claims of ineffective
assistance, explained that in order to prevail in the post-conviction process,
the petitioner must show:
[T]hat there could have been a specific issue raised on appeal that would have
resulted in the appellate court’s declaring reversible error. It is petitioner’s
responsibility in a Rule 37.1 petition to establish that the issue was raised at
trial, that the trial court erred in its ruling on the issue, and that an argument
concerning the issue could have been raised on appeal to merit appellate relief.
The failure to make a meritless argument on appeal does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.34

Determining the likelihood that, with reasonable probability, a different
outcome would have resulted had counsel performed effectively typically
requires a retrospective assessment of the error and its probable prejudice
in light of the totality of the record of the proceedings. On appeal, however,
the claim appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness can be assessed by the

30. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (“With a claim that counsel erroneously
failed to file a merits brief, it will be easier for a defendant-appellant to satisfy the first part of the
Strickland test . . . . [H]owever, the prejudice analysis will be the same.”).
31. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
32. Smith, 528 U.S. at 286 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
33. Wooten v. State, 502 S.W.3d 503 (Ark. 2016).
34. Id. at 508.
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reviewing court in terms of existing precedent.35 In the absence of
controlling precedent, the strength of the argument that could have been
asserted typically turns on an argument for adopting a new rule of either
substance or procedure; extending existing precedent as a means to afford
relief on the defaulted claim; or considering the issue of prejudice or
harmless of the error in light of the totality of the evidence.
But the petitioner’s conclusion that counsel’s failure to raise a claim
demonstrates ineffective assistance and thus requires reversal is simply not
consistent with the precise standard recognized in Smith. There, the Court
explained that in the context of a no-merits brief filed by appellate counsel,
the petitioner “must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s
unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his
appeal.”36
In Neill v. Gibson,37 the Tenth Circuit applied the less absolutist formula
as articulated by the Arkansas courts and explained that its previous standard
requiring petitioner to demonstrate appellate counsel failed to argue a
“dead-bang” error requiring reversal was inconsistent with the Court’s
position in Strickland.38 In a footnote, the en banc court explained:
This court has expressed this test in terms of appellate counsel’s omitting a
“dead-bang winner,” often defined in part as a claim that “would have resulted
in a reversal on appeal.” To the extent this language can be read as requiring
35. Accord Burnside v. State, 537 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017) (“The petitioner must
show that there could have been a specific issue raised on appeal that would have resulted in the
appellate court’s declaring reversible error.” (citing Wooten, 502 S.W.3d at 508 (Ark 2016))).
36. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added). In Smith, the Court referenced the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Gray v. Greer, which explained its view of the proper application of Strickland in assessing
appellate counsel’s performance:
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on failure to raise viable issues, the
district court must examine the trial court record to determine whether appellate counsel failed
to present significant and obvious issues on appeal. Significant issues which could have been
raised should then be compared to those which were raised. Generally, only when ignored issues
are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel
be overcome.
Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986).
37. Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2001).
38. In United States v. Cook, the Tenth Circuit defined “dead-bang winner” as “an issue which
was obvious from the trial record” that it “must have leaped out upon even a casual reading of the
transcript.” United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Matire v. Wainwright,
811 F.2d 1430, 1438 (11th Cir. 1987)).
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the defendant to establish that the omitted claim would have resulted in his
obtaining relief on appeal, rather than there being only a reasonable
probability the omitted claim would have resulted in relief, this language
conflicts with Strickland. The en banc court, therefore, expressly disavows the use
of the “dead-bang winner” language to imply requiring a showing more onerous
than a reasonable probability that the omitted claim would have resulted in a
reversal on appeal.39

Finally, although appellate counsel’s performance may give rise to a claim
of ineffectiveness, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance
extends only through the first-step appeal in the state’s appellate process.
Because the Court limited the right of post-trial review to the initial step in
the direct appeal,40 ineffectiveness on the part of appellate counsel in
representation beyond the first step in the appeal does not violate the
Sixth Amendment.41
III. THE COURT’S CERTIORARI JURISDICTION
For defendants whose claims are rejected in the direct appeal or
post-conviction process after federal criminal trials,42 or for state court
39. Neill, 278 F.3d at 1057 n.5 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
40. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–56
(1987); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 619 (1974). In Griffin v. Illinois, the Court held that, as a matter
of Equal Protection, an indigent criminal defendant had a right to the appellate record, or a reasonable
substitute, as it was essential to arguing claims of error on appeal in a manner comparable to the
position afforded to appellants with financial resources. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956).
Later, in Douglas v. California, the Court expanded this reasoning to require states to provide indigent
appellants with representation by counsel through the first level of the appellate process. Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963). However, in Ross, Finley, and Giarratano, the Court drew the
line on the Equal Protection guarantee by holding that states are not required to afford indigent
defendants assistance of counsel beyond the first appeal, including discretionary petitions,
post-conviction proceedings, or challenges to death sentences, respectively.
41. Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction Counsel: Cutting
the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 350 n.20 (2003). In Coleman v. Thompson,
post-conviction counsel failed to timely file a perfected appeal from denial of relief. The petitioner’s
ineffective assistance claim was rejected because there is no right to counsel in such proceedings and
therefore, no right to effective assistance of counsel. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 751–52
(1991). But, in the capital case Maples v. Thomas, the Court held that procedural default barring review
of a claim in federal habeas corpus would be excused where pro bono counsel abandoned their client
in state post-conviction proceedings, resulting in the default. Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 271
(2012).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018). Section 2255(a) provides:

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/2

14

Sullivan: Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy

2020]

ETHICAL AND AGGRESSIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY

599

defendants pursuing federal habeas process, petitioning for certiorari in the
Supreme Court will offer a narrow possibility for review and, ultimately,
relief from a conviction or sentence imposed at trial. In the direct appeal
process afforded federal defendants, certiorari offers the possibility for
review of circuit court decisions rejecting constitutional claims,43 or
non-constitutional claims arising from interpretation of federal statutes,44
procedure,45 or evidentiary rules.46
The statutory basis for the Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction for a
decision rendered by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals provides a
procedural device for claims rejected in federal criminal proceedings or
decisions of circuit courts rendered in federal habeas corpus proceedings
brought by state court inmates. Section 1254 provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right
to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or
that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
Id. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). The language of Section 2255 does not limit consideration of
post-conviction claims asserted by defendants convicted in federal trials to claims arising under the
Constitution.
43. E.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding that reversal of conviction on
appeal based on insufficient evidence supporting conviction bars retrial as a matter of double jeopardy
protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment).
44. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011–12 (2015) (requiring prosecution to prove
accused intended for wire communication to constitute a threat or that accused knew that recipient
would interpret communication as an actual threat to commit an act of violence); Burrage v. United
States, 571 U.S. 204, 218–19 (2014) (holding prosecution must strictly prove death of drug user caused
by specific illegal substance provided by accused, rather than the combination of drugs, in order to
warrant enhanced sentence of life imprisonment for drug trafficker).
45. E.g., Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1906 (2018) (directing federal circuit
courts to apply Rule 52(b), permitting review for plain error when considering unpreserved claims of
trial court error in sentencing proceedings and rejecting standard requiring proof of “manifest injustice”
for review of unpreserved claims).
46. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990) (permitting prosecution to use
extrinsic evidence of robbery even though defendant had been acquitted because evidence did not
unequivocally demonstrate acquittal based on defendant’s innocence and the two offenses were
sufficiently similar for Rule 404(b) purposes); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1984)
(recognizing broad right to impeach witness despite lack of specific reference to “impeachment” in
Federal Rules of Evidence). In Abel, the defendant’s witness was a member of prison gang. The gang’s
tenets included killing and lying to protect other gang members and evidence relating to the prison
gang was admissible to impeach testimony by showing the defense witness’s lack of credibility. Abel,
469 U.S. at 56.
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Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the
following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil
or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree;
(2) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law
in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon
such certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or
require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in
controversy.47

The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is also defined by Section 1257 which
provides the statutory basis for review of federal constitutional claims raised
and rejected by defendants in state criminal proceedings concluded on direct
appeal or in state post-conviction proceedings. It provides:
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where
the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or
where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set
up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any
commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “highest court of a State”
includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.48

Review by the “highest court of a state” means the state court defendant
must have exhausted the available process by which the claim can be
presented before review by the highest court,49 whether review is afforded
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
48. Id. § 1257 (emphasis added).
49. E.g., Hinkston v. State, 10 S.W.3d 906 (Ark. 2000). Trial counsel in Hinkson offered the
expert testimony of a psychologist who opined that the defendant lacked the ability to form the
required level of intent for capital murder. The trial court excluded the argument and had the discretion
to determine whether the expert testimony would assist the jury or, holding that as a matter state
evidence law, would possibly confuse jurors. On appeal, counsel argued the exclusion of the expert
testimony, expressly admissible under ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-303, violated the Sixth Amendment
right to present a defense as a matter of compulsory process. The Arkansas Supreme Court declined
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in the direct appeal or state post-conviction process.50 If the state provides
for appellate review on the federal constitutional issue in an intermediate
court of appeals, the defendant must typically seek review of the issue by
the state supreme court or its equivalent.51
However, the “highest court” reference in Section 1257(a) is modified by
the phrase “in which a decision could be had.”52 Thus, the petition for
certiorari may be filed to review a decision rendered by a lower court in rare
instances. In Brown v. Texas,53 for instance, the Court reversed a conviction
on a charge that the accused failed to properly identify himself to a police
officer.54 After being convicted in municipal court, he sought a trial
de novo in the El Paso County Court where he was convicted and
fined $45, plus court costs. Because Texas law did not authorize an appeal
beyond the county court level unless the defendant was fined at least $100,
the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the case because the county
court was the “highest court” under Texas procedure “in which a decision
could be had.”55 In contrast to the jurisdictional limitation exception
imposed by Texas in Brown, the Court has consistently held that a petitioner
who did not seek review in the highest court of a state “in which a decision

to consider appellate counsel’s argument on the Sixth Amendment claim on the merits, explaining
“[w]e do not consider arguments, even constitutional ones, raised for the first time on appeal.” Id.
at 909.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
51. See Howell v. Mississippi, 543 U.S. 440, 443 (2005) (per curiam) (quashing certiorari when
record revealed federal constitutional claim had not been presented to state courts); Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127, 133 (1992) (refusing to consider claim that forced medication of capital defendant
asserting insanity defense, rendering him competent for trial, violated his right to have jury observe
him in same mental state as that existing at time of crime because the argument had not previously
been presented to the state supreme court); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87 (1985) (rejecting claim
that Alabama courts lacked jurisdiction because defendant had already been prosecuted for capital
murder in Georgia and failed to present claim in Alabama direct appeal).
52. The “court of last resort,” is the highest court in a judicial system. Court: Court of Last Resort,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). In state court systems, that court is not always designated,
or known as, the state supreme court. For instance, in Texas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is
the court of last resort having jurisdiction over criminal matters. The Texas Supreme Court is the court
of last resort in civil matters.
53. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
54. Id. at 49–50.
55. Id. at 50 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)).
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could be had” cannot seek review of the adverse ruling by a lower state court
through certiorari review.56
IV. PRESERVATION OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Perhaps in a perfect world—at least for appellate lawyers—trial lawyers
would always consult appellate counsel about the need to preserve error so
that issues would always be properly preserved for an appeal on the merits.
But the world is not perfect. What is clear from the Court’s decisions is that
it will not review constitutional claims that have not been preserved in
federal or state court proceedings.
The Court has consistently rejected review by certiorari of otherwise
arguably meritorious claims not litigated in the highest court in a state court
system, even though that lower court has otherwise rendered a decision in
the case.57 The Court’s jurisdiction is based on review of the claim actually
presented in the certiorari petition, not by the fact that the case has been
heard on other claims in the highest court of the state which could have
reviewed the claim. In contrast, in Caldwell v. Mississippi,58 the Court
reversed the state supreme court’s ruling on an issue preserved by objection
at trial but not urged on direct appeal. It found that a prosecutor’s argument
that jurors should not be unduly worried about erring in imposing a death
sentence because the case would be reviewed on appeal invited jurors to
treat the sentencing decision with less gravity.59
However, when a litigant has presented a federal constitutional claim in
the state direct appeal, including a petition for review in the state supreme
court, and the reviewing court declines to consider the federal claim on the
merits, that refusal will be deemed a rejection unless the court rules that the
56. In Banks v. California, the Court explained:
Petitioner did not ask the Supreme Court of California to review the judgment entered by the
Court of Appeal in this case. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeal is not a ‘[f]inal
judgment . . . rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had . . .’ and
we lack jurisdiction to review it. The writ of certiorari is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Banks v. California, 395 U.S. 708, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257); accord Sandquist v.
California, 419 U.S. 1066, 1066 (1974) (dismissing petition for writ of certiorari for “lack of
jurisdiction”).
57. Howell, 543 U.S. 440; Riggins, 504 U.S. 127; Heath, 474 U.S. 82; Sandquist, 419 U.S. 1066;
Banks, 395 U.S. 708.
58. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 432 U.S. 320 (1985).
59. Id. at 327.
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claim procedurally defaulted.60 For instance, in Ylst v. Nunnemaker,61 the
Court explained:
State procedural bars are not immortal, however; they may expire because of
later actions by state courts. If the last state court to be presented with a
particular federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal-court
review that might otherwise have been available.62

The consequence is state appellate courts cannot preclude federal review
of properly preserved constitutional claims by inadvertently failing to
acknowledge them or deliberately declining to review them. Only by
applying reasonable procedural bars to a review on the merits can state
courts escape further review on those claims.63
Similarly, review of a state court defendant’s federal constitutional claims
brought under the federal habeas corpus process requires exhaustion of
state remedies before the federal habeas court will review a claim on the
merits.64 Prior to the Court’s decision in O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,65 there was
a circuit split as to whether the exhaustion requirement included filing a
petition for discretionary review for purposes of federal habeas
jurisdiction.66 The Supreme Court’s holding in Boerckel resolved the conflict
60. In Harris v. Reed, the Court held that where the state court in post-conviction proceedings
rejected the federal constitutional claim on the merits, that holding provided a basis for federal review
on the merits where the state court had not held that the claim was waived and, consequently,
procedurally defaulted. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 258, 266 (1989).
61. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991).
62. Id. at 801 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 262); accord Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011)
(“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may
be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication
or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 265)).
63. E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 740–42 (1991).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2018).
65. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999).
66. Boerckel v. O’Sullivan, 135 F.3d 1194, 1199 n.2 (7th Cir. 1998). Compare Dolny v. Erickson,
32 F.3d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting discretionary review in Minnesota Supreme Court is not
necessary for exhaustion of claim); Buck v. Green, 743 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1984) (determining
the Georgia Supreme Court’s limited jurisdiction in discretionary appeals does not obligate state
inmates to present a claim in a discretionary petition in order to assert a claim in federal habeas
petitions), with Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding exhaustion of New York claims
requires petition for discretionary review of claims subsequently asserted in federal habeas petition);
Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (reasoning petitioner’s “right
to raise before the Arizona Supreme Court the issue he seeks to raise in federal habeas” creates a
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while leaving undisturbed the circuit court’s characterizations of state
appellate process for purposes of determining prerequisites for exhaustion
of federal claims ultimately asserted in federal habeas petitions.67
Boerckel argued that the language in Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 315(a)68 expressly discouraged the filing of petitions for discretionary
review when raising routine issues.69 Based on this language, he argued that
he should not be required to exhaust state court process when the state
supreme court itself discouraged that process.70 The Supreme Court,
however, read the language of Section 2254(c) as strictly requiring
exhaustion of any process made available under state law, regardless of
whether the exhaustion might be futile in terms of seeking to overturn state
court precedent on a federal constitutional claim.71 When confronted by
this concern of increased state court filings, the Court seemingly dismissed
the issue as insignificant:
We acknowledge that the rule we announce today—requiring state prisoners
to file petitions for discretionary review when that review is part of the
ordinary appellate review procedure in the State—has the potential to increase
the number of filings in state supreme courts. We also recognize that this
increased burden may be unwelcome in some state courts because the courts
do not wish to have the opportunity to review constitutional claims before
those claims are presented to a federal habeas court.72

prerequisite for exhaustion); Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he
exhaustion doctrine requires that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals be given an opportunity to
review and rule upon the petitioner’s claim before he resorts to federal courts.”).
67. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847–48.
68. ILL. S. CT. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). Subsection (a) of the rule provides in pertinent part:
[A] petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the Appellate Court may be filed by
any party, including the State, in any case not appealable from the Appellate Court as a matter of
right. Whether such a petition will be granted is a matter of sound judicial discretion. The
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court’s discretion, indicate the
character of reasons which will be considered: the general importance of the question presented;
the existence of a conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the
Supreme Court, or of another division of the Appellate Court; the need for the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s supervisory authority; and the final or interlocutory character of the judgment
sought to be reviewed.
69.
70.
71.
72.

O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845–46.
Id. at 846–47.
Id. at 847–48.
Id. at 847.
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The Court’s willingness to force state litigants to exhaust seemingly futile
state court remedies, and the concomitant burden imposed on state courts
of last resort, stems from its overriding concern with comity. It explained:
“By requiring state prisoners to give the Illinois Supreme Court the
opportunity to resolve constitutional errors in the first instance, the rule we
announce today serves the comity interests that drive the exhaustion
doctrine.”73
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CERTIORARI PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN CRIMINAL CASES
The Supreme Court has historically been the most important institutional
actor in the development of criminal procedure and—at least with respect
to minimal constitutional requirements for notice—the regulation of
substantive criminal law. Typically, federal constitutional protections are
considered in the context of procedural matters. Thus, procedural
protections governing the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases
are predicated on rights set forth in the Fourth, Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. With the exception of the Fifth Amendment right to
indictment by grand jury in federal prosecutions,74 these rights extend to
criminal defendants in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Substantive Protections Afforded by the Constitution
Notwithstanding the foregoing, other protections afforded by the
Constitution do not involve matters of procedure, but rather serve as
substantive limitations on the general authority afforded the states to define
and punish criminal conduct. The Court expressly recognized this

73. Id. at 846. There is, of course, some inconsistency in ordering state courts to consider
marginally colorable claims presented in petitions for discretionary review in order to respect the notion
of comity, in light of the Court’s explanation:
Because “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to
upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional
violation,” federal courts apply the doctrine of comity, which “teaches that one court should defer
action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with
concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon
the matter.”
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982) (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)).
74. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884).
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delegation of power in Patterson v. New York.75 In Patterson, the Court
reviewed its holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur,76 and rejected its previous
position concerning the constitutionally required construction of murder
under Maine’s homicide law.77 The Mullaney Court held the prosecution
could not rely on a defendant’s failure to raise an issue of justification to
establish the essential element of malice to prove the defendant deliberately
committed murder.78
However, in Hankerson v. North Carolina,79 the Mullaney Court’s holding
was held retroactive based on the conclusion that the error compromised
the integrity of the fact-finding process.80 This line of cases demonstrates
the substance–procedure distinction in operation: substantive limitations
involve the authority of the state to criminalize, while procedural limitations
implicate the means by which the criminal action is investigated and
prosecuted. While states are granted latitude in the criminalization decision,
as Patterson confirms,81 the implementation of their substantive law may
nevertheless be subject to review because the process accorded fails to
satisfy Fourteenth Amendment due process protections.
In Miller v. Alabama,82 the Court held that sentencing authorities must
consider the age of an accused juvenile convicted of homicide as a mitigating
circumstance factored into mandatory life-sentencing determinations. The
Court applied its holding retroactively to juvenile offenders serving
mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole.83 Subsequently,
in Montgomery v. Louisiana,84 the Court decided that decisions announcing

75. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
76. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
77. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205–06.
78. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 701 (finding the burden of proof had been shifted from the
prosecution to the defendant to prove that he did not act with malice in the commission of murder).
79. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
80. Id. at 240.
81. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201–02.
82. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
83. Id. at 489.
84. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). The Montgomery Court, like Miller,
considered whether or not its decision limiting sentencing authority for juvenile homicide offenders
applied retroactively in state post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 732.
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new rules of substantive law must indeed be applied retroactively by states
in post-conviction actions,85 explaining:
The Court now holds that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law
controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral
review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule. Teague’s conclusion
establishing the retroactivity of new substantive rules is best understood as
resting upon constitutional premises. That constitutional command is, like all
federal law, binding on state courts.86

At least five general examples of substantive, rather than procedural
guarantees, can be identifiably traced to federal constitutional protections:
(1) the protection against successive prosecution afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment87; (2) the prohibition
against imposition of cruel and unusual punishment found in the
Eighth Amendment88; (3) the proscription of criminalization of
fundamental rights—such as religion, assembly, and speech—protected by

85. Id. at 729 (“This Court’s precedents addressing the nature of substantive rules, their
differences from procedural rules, and their history of retroactive application establish that the
Constitution requires substantive rules to have retroactive effect regardless of when a conviction
became final.”).
86. Id.
87. In fact, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause differs markedly from purely
procedural protections. In Abney v. United States, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment protects
the accused not only against successive verdicts, but against successive prosecutions, such that an
accused asserting a colorable claim of prior jeopardy is entitled to proceed by interlocutory appeal.
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); see Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 321 (1984)
(determining defendant raised colorable claim of prior jeopardy in challenging legal sufficiency of
evidence in trial terminated by mistrial due to jury’s inability to reach unanimous verdict, but jury’s
failure to reach verdict resulted in no final judgment from which appeal could be taken considering
sufficiency of evidence).
88. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (stating execution of an insane inmate
violates the Eighth Amendment). In Ford, the Court essentially held that this claim invoked the first
exception to the Teague v. Lane retroactivity bar. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989). It did not
find that the claim lies outside the scope of Teague’s scheme of regulation because execution of an
insane individual did not relate to a rule of criminal procedure, but rather, involved a substantive
constitutional limitation on the criminalization authority. For other examples of substantive rights not
strictly governed by retroactivity policies, see, for example, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010),
which barred the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders
convicted of non-homicide offenses.
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the First Amendment,89 or freedom to engage in consensual sexual activity
between adults90; (4) the prohibition against ex post facto application of law
found, not in the Bill of Rights, but in Article I, Section 1091; and (5) the
due process-based conclusion that a criminal conviction must be predicated
on proof of all elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable
doubt.92 These protections are essentially substantive, not procedural, and
do not implicate the type of rules that are given limited retroactive
application by the Court in Teague v. Lane.93
B. The Griffith Retroactivity Rule
One of the critical questions addressed in the incorporation process
involved the determination of exactly when a rule or application of a federal
constitutional criminal procedural protection recognized by the Court
would apply to state court litigation. The Court essentially provided
definition in two decisions, Griffith v. Kentucky,94 and later in Teague.95 In
89. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (striking down Ohio statute
prohibiting speech advocating overthrow of government that is “not directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
90. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
91. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (indicating a law that punishes an innocent
and previously committed act makes a punishment more burdensome for a crime or “deprives one
charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed,
is prohibited as ex post facto.”).
92. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998) (determining a post-conviction
challenge to statute requiring strict proof of “use” of firearm in commission of drug offense, rather
than mere possession, was not barred by Teague). The challenge in Bousley was based on the underlying
principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Accord Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (requiring prosecution to establish every element of criminal offense with
proof sufficient to satisfy reasonable doubt standard when evidence viewed from perspective of a
rational trier of fact). The Court declined to apply Teague to bar review of the claim, holding that in
applying only to “procedural rules,” Teague’s new rule doctrine did not preclude review of claims based
on the Court’s interpretation of a “criminal statute enacted by Congress.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620.
93. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315 (1989).
94. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
95. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for a plurality of the Court;
Justice White concurred in the judgment only; Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion concurring
in part and in the judgment in which Justice Stevens concurred, while also concurring in a separate
opinion written by Justice Stevens. Id. at 317–18. Justice Stevens specifically noted his agreement with
a critical part of Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, in which Justice Marshall joined. Id. at 326.
Justice Brennan was especially critical of the Court’s disposition of the case without oral argument and
full briefing on the dispositive point. Id. at 330. It is somewhat difficult to explain how so thinly
supported a new rule could dominate the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence with respect to the very

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/2

24

Sullivan: Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy

2020]

ETHICAL AND AGGRESSIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY

609

Griffith, the Court held that all new rules announced by the Court would
apply to benefit those state and federal litigants that preserved similar claims
in pending litigation at the time the “new” rule is announced.96 In so doing,
Griffith held that the direct appeal process for state court prosecutions would
extend through the conclusion of the certiorari process in the Court.97
Griffith, thus, adopted a very straightforward basis for adopting a policy
favoring the filing of the certiorari petition in the Supreme Court for review
of adverse rulings on federal constitutional issues by state courts. The Court
drew a bright line distinction in holding that decisions announced by the
Court adopting new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure would
be applied retroactivity to cases in which the same decision, properly
preserved, has been litigated prior to the conclusion of the direct appeal
process.98
That process includes the denial of the certiorari petition in which the
issue is being litigated or upon disposition of the case by the Court when
the petition is granted. Once the state court’s decision in a pending case
becomes final, the Griffith doctrine does not require retroactive application
of a new rule announced by the Court, as the Court explained: “By ‘final,’
we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari
elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.”99 And, once the state
court’s decision becomes final, the Teague limitation on retroactivity bars
application of a favorable new rule to a state defendant petitioner’s claim
that the federal constitutional violation was improperly rejected by the state
court or courts considering the issue.100

critical importance of “new” rules in the development of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine
and for disposition of claims raised by individual litigants.
96. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323. Griffith’s retroactivity principle extends application of new rules to
those cases remaining in the direct appeal process and not final at the time the rule is announced and
includes the pendency of a petition for certiorari or time for filing for review by certiorari.
Id. at 321 n.6.
97. Id.
98. Teague, 489 U.S. at 328 (“We therefore hold that a new rule for the conduct of criminal
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not
yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.”).
99. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321 n.6 (1987).
100. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final
before the new rules are announced.”).
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The favorable policy for retroactive application of new rules adopted in
Griffith requires that appellate counsel be aware not only of new decisions
issued by the Supreme Court, but also aware of issues pending in lower
courts that could eventually be decided favorably for other clients.
However, part of the problem posed by Griffith is that potential issues that
may benefit from retroactive application of the Court’s new rulings must be
preserved for appellate review in the trial process. This means that trial
counsel must be cognizant of potential avenues for relief not just based on
common sense, but on the state of litigation nationally in which identical or
similar issues are already being considered in state and federal appellate
courts.
When the Court announces a new rule that will be applied retroactively
in all pending cases before the Court which preserved the same or similar
issue, the Court will typically grant the petition, vacate the judgment
rendered in the court below, and remand the cause for reconsideration in
light of the decision announcing the new rule. This process, commonly
referred to as “GVR” permits it to dispose of a number of pending cases
without having to apply its new rule to the discrete facts of each case, relying
on the lower court to complete the process of review.101 The remand,
however, does not require the lower court to simply apply the new rule, but
101. The “GVR” process, while seemingly an efficient way for the Court to address pending
cases involving issues identical or similar to ones it has decided in a prior case, is not without
controversy. For a discussion of this process, see Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 194–98 (1996)
(per curiam), referencing the per curiam order issued the same day in Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163
(1996), and signed opinions by Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, all of whom discuss the appropriate use of the GVR process. In Stutson, the Court
explained its rationale for using the process:
[T]his is a case where (1) the prevailing party below, the Government, has now repudiated the
legal position that it advanced below; (2) the only opinion below did not consider the import of
a recent Supreme Court precedent that both parties now agree applies; (3) the Court of Appeals
summarily affirmed that decision; (4) all six Courts of Appeals that have addressed the
applicability of the Supreme Court decision that the District Court did not apply in this case have
concluded that it applies to Rule 4 cases; and (5) the petitioner is in jail having, through no fault
of his own, had no plenary consideration of his appeal. While “we ‘should [not] mechanically
accept any suggestion from the Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the
Government by a United States Court of Appeals was in error,’” this exceptional combination of
circumstances presents ample justification for a GVR order. It appears to us that there is at least
a reasonable probability that the Court of Appeals will reach a different conclusion on remand,
and the equities clearly favor a GVR order.
Stutson, 516 U.S. at 195–96.
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rather, the lower court reviews the case again in light of the new rule. For
instance, in McKoy v. North Carolina,102 the Court reversed a death sentence
because jurors had been instructed that they could only consider the effect
of mitigating evidence when weighing aggravating against mitigating
circumstances if they had unanimously found the evidence supported
mitigation.103 The Court found the sentencing process flawed because:
Although the jury may opt for life imprisonment even where it fails
unanimously to find any mitigating circumstances, the fact remains that the
jury is required to make its decision based only on those circumstances it
unanimously finds. The unanimity requirement thus allows one holdout juror
to prevent the others from giving effect to evidence that they believe calls for
a “sentence less than death.”104

McNeil v. North Carolina105 was pending in the Court when it issued its
decision in McKoy, leading to the following order in McNeil: “The motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of
certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to
the Supreme Court of North Carolina for further consideration in light of
McKoy v. North Carolina.”106
The order vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina did not go unnoticed, as Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O’Connor and Scalia dissented from
the Court’s disposition.107 While noting that the state supreme court’s
decision had been issued following the Court’s holding in McKoy and
affirmed by that court based on a decision reversed by the
Supreme Court,108 Justice Kennedy pointed to a factual distinction in the
two cases. McNeil’s trial jury had not been instructed on the same unanimity
requirement held unconstitutional in McKoy, nor been instructed to find that

102. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
103. Id. at 435 (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)).
104. Id. at 439.
105. McNeil v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 1050 (1990). The Court issued its order on
March 26, 1990, while McKoy was argued on October 25, 1989, and the decision was delivered on
March 5, 1990.
106. Id. at 1050.
107. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108. See id. (referring to the state supreme court’s affirmance of McNeil’s sentence on the basis
of its holding in State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1 (1988), subsequently reversed by the Court in McKoy).
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it could not consider mitigation unless found unanimously.109 He noted
that on remand, the North Carolina Supreme Court would be “free to
consider these facts, or any others that may affect the determination whether
our opinion in McKoy requires alteration of its judgment.”110
On remand, however, after ordering supplemental briefing,111 the state
supreme court held that McNeil’s death sentence was impermissibly tainted
because jurors potentially would not have given effect to mitigation
evidence based on the overall impression created by the unanimity
instruction concerning their sentencing verdict.112 On retrial, McNeil plead
guilty to the capital charges and was again sentenced to death, which was
upheld on the direct appeal.113 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.114
Griffith implicates the significance of petitioning for certiorari in the
Supreme Court. Using Griffith as the controlling rule for retroactive
application of Supreme Court holdings,115 state supreme courts have used
Griffith to articulate state policies concerning new rules of state criminal
procedure.116

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Order, State v. McNeil, 391 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. 1990) (No. 37A87).
112. McNeil, 395 S.E.2d 106, 110 (N.C. 1990).
113. McNeil, 518 S.E.2d 486, 513 (N.C. 1999).
114. McNeil, 529 U.S. 1024 (2000).
115. In Danforth v. Minnesota, the Court held that state courts were not bound to apply the
retroactivity limitations recognized in Teague v. Lane as a matter of federal constitutional law and were
within their authority to apply decisions announcing new rules of federal constitutional criminal
procedure retroactively to in state litigation. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 267–69, 291 (2008)
(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), construed in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406
(2007)). See generally J. Thomas Sullivan, Danforth, Retroactivity and Federalism, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 425
(2008) (analyzing Danforth in light of the Court’s decision in Whorton v. Bockting, holding
Crawford v. Washington was not subject to retroactive application in federal habeas actions).
116. Charles v. State, 326 P.3d 978, 979 (Ala. 2014) (applying the Griffith approach to retroactive
application of new rules arising under state law); Richmond v. State, 59 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Nev. 2002)
(adopting Griffith retroactivity rule for state cases announcing new rules under state law);
State v. Tierney, 839 A.2d 38, 42–44 (N.H. 2003) (following Griffith rationale in holding that decision
expanding severance right to joined criminal charges should apply retroactively as a matter of state
law); State v. Guard, 371 P.3d 1 (Utah 2015) (adopting Griffith retroactivity rationale as rule governing
decisions announced on issues of state law). Most recently, the Supreme Court of Utah explained:
“While we recognize that Griffith does not apply directly to non-constitutional changes in criminal
procedure, we find its logic equally persuasive in the non-constitutional context. Even in the
non-constitutional context, new rules of criminal procedure may implicate a defendant’s right to a fair
trial.” Guard, 371 P.3d at 17.
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For example, in Fetterly v. State,117 the Idaho court applied a state
retroactivity rule paralleling Griffith in addressing a retroactivity question
arising from a change in state law with respect to the decision to impose a
death sentence.118 In State v. Charboneau,119 the court changed state law by
requiring a trial court considering the imposition of a death sentence to
reweigh all mitigating circumstances against each aggravating circumstance.
The court could only impose the capital sentence if each aggravator
outweighed the totality of mitigation.120 Fetterly’s death sentence was
upheld throughout the post-trial process, including appeal,121 state,122 and
federal post-conviction proceedings,123 before the announcement of the
new rule in Charboneau.124 He then filed a second petition for
post-conviction relief in state court, arguing retroactive application of the
Charboneau rule required his sentence to be vacated.125 The court denied
relief and refused to apply the new rule retroactively, noting it had not
applied Charboneau retroactively to final judgments before its announcement,
but that it applied the rule to cases that were still open for sentencing on
this date.”126 The Fetterly court’s approach was wholly consistent with
Griffith’s retroactivity doctrine.127
Some criticize Griffith because of its arbitrary “bright line” cut-off for
retroactivity and departing from an approach which considers the potential
significance to litigants with finalized cases, but its bright line approach does
ensure a measure of consistency in retroactivity decisions. It recognizes the
benefit of counsel’s—or a pro se litigant’s—perception of potential changes
in the law by timely preservation of error, while rather coldly explaining that
finalized cases will not benefit from an earlier appreciation of the same
potential.128
117. Fetterly v. State, 825 P.2d 1073 (Idaho 1991).
118. Id. at 1074–75.
119. State v. Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1989).
120. Id. at 323.
121. State v. Fetterly, 710 P.2d 1202 (Idaho 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 870 (1986).
122. State v. Fetterly, 766 P.2d 701 (Idaho 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).
123. Fetterly v. Paskett, 747 F. Supp. 594 (D. Idaho 1990).
124. Fetterly v. State, 825 P.2d 1073, 1074–75 (Idaho 1991).
125. Id. at 1073.
126. Id. at 1074.
127. Id. at 1075.
128. The application of Griffith may result in a procedurally complicated issue regarding finality,
as illustrated in the divided en banc decision of the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Kilgore,
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C. The Importance of Teague for Certiorari Practice
The Court’s decision in Teague is critical to understanding why certiorari
often remains a necessary option for attempting to obtain relief for
defendants whose preserved federal constitutional claims have been rejected
on the merits by state appellate courts. Teague addressed retroactive
application of decisions favorable to defendants, changing the landscape of
federal constitutional criminal procedure litigation.
1.

Retroactivity Prior to Teague

Prior to the Court’s decision in Teague, the Court utilized a three-part test
established in Linkletter v. Walker129 and Stovall v. Denno130 to determine
retroactivity: “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards,
and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application
of the new standards.”131
This approach afforded flexibility in the retroactivity determination, but
at some cost to certainty and, often, fairness in the application of new
constitutional doctrine.
This concern prompted Justice Harlan’s
criticism132 of the flexible approach to retroactivity taken in Linkletter and
216 P.3d 393, 396–401 (Wash. 2009). There, the defendant had successfully challenged his sentence
on appeal and the case was remanded, but only for review on certain questions. While pending remand,
the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004), where the
Court held that, under the Sixth Amendment, enhanced sentencing imposed under state law for
offenses committed with “deliberate cruelty” required notice and proof of the enhancement element
by reasonable doubt. The divided Court addressed the question of whether the possible continuing
exercise of the state trial court’s jurisdiction to re-sentence following remand from the direct appeal
required a finding that the conviction was not “final,” for purposes of retroactive application of Blakely,
with the majority concluding that Kilgore’s conviction was, in fact, final prior to announcement of
Blakely. Kilgore, 216 P.3d at 401. Kilgore had not preserved the Blakely claim in his appeal in the state
courts. See id. at 396 (“Kilgore appealed but did not challenge his exceptional sentence.”).
129. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
130. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
131. Id. at 297.
132. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 701 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (asserting majority’s denial of tax rule retroactivity to set aside petitioner’s tax evasion
sentence as “so grossly erroneous as to amount to the perpetration of an inexcusable inequity against
[petitioner] in these circumstances”); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“I have in the past joined in some of those opinions which have, in so short a time,
generated so many incompatible and inconsistent principles. I did so because I thought it important
to limit the impact of constitutional decisions which seemed to me profoundly unsound in principle.
I can no longer, however, remain content with the doctrinal confusion that has characterized our effort
to apply the basic Linkletter principle. ‘Retroactivity’ must be rethought.”).
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supported the adoption of the more restrictive approach in Teague. There,
Justice O’Connor observed:
[W]e believe that Justice Harlan’s concerns about the difficulty in identifying
both the existence and the value of accuracy-enhancing procedural rules can
be addressed by limiting the scope of the second exception to those new
procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished. Because we operate from the premise that such procedures
would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we
believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet
to emerge.133

Teague supplanted Linkletter’s flexibility with a fixed principle subject to
only limited exceptions. In a sense, Teague complemented Griffith by
providing the necessary corollary to Griffith’s bright-line rule for retroactive
application of new rules to benefit all litigants presenting preserved claims
in the direct appeal process. While Teague acknowledged that retroactivity
should apply in two circumstances, these are clearly limited in application.
The first exception barring retroactive application of new rules does not
involve issues of constitutionally-protected procedural rights at all, but
rather “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”134 This
exception embraces substantive rights afforded to criminal defendants by
the Constitution.135 The second exception recognizes that if a procedural
rule is “implicit in the concept of an ordered liberty,” even those defendants
whose cases are final at the time the rule was announced should benefit from
it.136 Yet, while accepting the necessity for retroactive application of such
a rule, the majority clearly expressed its view that such rules were not likely
to be discerned in the future.137
133. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989).
134. Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
135. See supra Section V.A.
136. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
137. Id. Perhaps the most likely development of a procedural rule that would qualify for
retroactive application would relate to admissibility of newly-discovered scientific evidence of the
convicted defendant’s factual or legal innocence, such as DNA evidence exculpating the defendant, or
raising a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of another individual. The substantial number of exonerations
resting on newly-discovered or newly-available DNA evidence would seem to demonstrate the
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In contrast to the Griffith bright-line rule for retroactivity for pending
cases when the “new” rule of constitutional criminal procedure is
announced, a far less favorable rule applies to retroactive applications of
new rule decisions for individuals whose cases concluded with a direct
appeal. Thus, Teague held that new rules, those that break with established
precedent,138 are not applied retroactively for the benefit of defendants
whose cases have been finalized through the direct appeal process at the
time the new rule is announced.139
2.

“New” Rules and Rules Dictated by Precedent

Moreover, procedural protections applied through existing
Supreme Court precedent are subject to retroactive application when an
issue before a court requires resolution that essentially cannot be
distinguished from those circumstances in which a rule has already been
announced. For instance, in Maynard v. Cartwright,140 the Court considered
whether a statutory aggravating circumstance which was “especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel”141 was appropriately limited in its wording to warrant
the sentencer to distinguish between non-capital offenses and capital

procedural rules exception to Teague, essential to an “accurate determination of guilt or innocence.”
Id. at 313. To date, the Court has not recognized a procedural or evidentiary rule as necessitating
retroactive application, perhaps because the power of such exculpatory evidence has been addressed
through clemency or lower court litigation not reaching the Supreme Court.
138. See id. at 301 (“[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction was final.”).
139. Id. at 310. Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality concluded: “Unless they fall within an
exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to
those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” Id. Some state courts have
adopted the Teague retroactivity approach in applying new rules recognized under state constitutional
interpretations or judicial decisions as matters of state law. See Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701
(Miss. 2013), cert. granted, 285 So. 3d 626 (2019) (“This Court expressly has adopted Teague’s ‘very limited
retroactive application standard.’”); In re New Hampshire, 103 A.3d 227, 236 (N.H. 2014) (concluding
that, pursuant to the Teague framework, the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama constitutes a new
substantive rule of law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review); Ex parte Maxwell,
424 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[W]e follow Teague as a general matter of state habeas
practice.”). States remain free, however, to reject or adopt Teague retroactivity analysis as a matter of
state law. See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (“[I]n the years since Teague, we have
rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status.” (emphasis added)).
140. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
141. The aggravating circumstance was authorized by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 701.12(2), (4)
(1981).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/2

32

Sullivan: Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy

2020]

ETHICAL AND AGGRESSIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY

617

offenses justifying the imposition of a death sentence.142
In Godfrey v. Georgia,143 the Court held the use of a statutory aggravating
circumstance authorized the imposition of a death sentence based upon
similar language. There, the jury was permitted to impose a capital sentence
upon finding that the offense “was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim,”144 phrasing which could reasonably be applied to
The Cartwright Court held that Godfrey
virtually any murder.145
controlled146 and remanded for further proceedings to determine the
appropriate sentence.147
Subsequently, in Stringer v. Black,148 the Court considered a Mississippi
death row inmate’s claim that his sentence should be set aside where state
law permitted the prosecution to rely on a statutory aggravating
circumstance substantially the same as those held unconstitutional in Godfrey
and Cartwright.149 The Court concluded that the relief claimed did not
constitute reliance on new rule because reasonable jurists would have
anticipated the rule as either dictated by or a logical extension of existing
precedent. The statutory reference to the capital murder being “especially
heinous,”150 the same ill-defined concept condemned in Godfrey,151 was
critical to the decision, even though the language of the Mississippi statutory
aggravator was not identical to the language of Georgia’s statutory
aggravator. The Court explained:

142. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363–65. Oklahoma argued that the statutorily authorized aggravating
circumstance did not suffer from the same imprecise terms of affording notice to an offender of which
offenses would result in a capital sentence, because the state court had limited its application to cases
in which the victim had been tortured. The Court noted that the state court referred to “torture” as
an evidentiary factor, demonstrating that whether the offense was “especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel” did not expressly limit the aggravating circumstance to cases in which torture had been
demonstrated. Id.
143. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
144. Id. at 422 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)).
145. See id. at 428–29 (“A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every
murder as “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.”).
146. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363–64.
147. Id. at 365–66.
148. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
149. Id. at 228.
150. The statutory aggravating circumstance supported a death sentence if the jury found that:
“The capital murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.” Id. at 226.
151. Godfrey, 466 U.S. at 428–29.
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In the case now before us Mississippi does not argue that Maynard itself
announced a new rule. To us this appears a wise concession. Godfrey and
Maynard did indeed involve somewhat different language. But it would be a
mistake to conclude that the vagueness ruling of Godfrey was limited to the
precise language before us in that case. In applying Godfrey to the language
before us in Maynard, we did not “brea[k] new ground.” Maynard was,
therefore, for purposes of Teague, controlled by Godfrey, and it did not
announce a new rule.152

Thus, the Teague Court’s differentiation between those cases resting on
precedent and those requiring announcement of a new rule of constitutional
criminal procedure proved critical in the dispositions in Maynard and Stringer
because rules dictated by precedent are not new and, thus, not subject to
Teague’s restrictive retroactivity doctrine.153
3. Exceptions to Teague’s General Rule Precluding Retroactivity and
Effective Assistance of Counsel
In Teague, the Court recognized two classes of exceptions to the usual
operation of the non-retroactivity principle generally attending the
articulation of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure. The first
accords retroactive application to new rules that restrict the authority of
government to proscribe particular types of conduct or impose specific
forms of punishment against defendants based on their status or the nature
of the offense.154 For instance, certain mentally retarded individuals155 or
juveniles under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense156 cannot be
executed consistently with the commands of the Eighth Amendment,157
and require retroactive application. The second exception, provides for
retroactive application of new rules that are said to be “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”158 The Court explained that the class of rules

152. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 228–29.
153. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
154. E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1990).
155. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
156. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides in pertinent part: “. . . nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”
158. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/2

34

Sullivan: Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy

2020]

ETHICAL AND AGGRESSIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY

619

fitting within this exception are those which ensure fundamental fairness
and accuracy in the fact-finding process.159
Bearing Teague in mind, counsel must consider whether the case involves
correction of an error based on existing precedent, requires the reviewing
court to expand upon that precedent, or necessitates the issuance of a new
rule to resolve the issue in the client’s favor. Teague is always an essential
consideration when a petitioning defendant must rely on federal courts to
overcome a state court decision on the merits of the federal constitutional
claim of error. If the issue, or the state court’s disposition of the issue,
requires expansion of existing precedent or announcement of a new rule,
then petitioning for certiorari in the Supreme Court is a necessary
consideration for appellate counsel in providing the most effective
representation possible for the client. While the indigent client has no
Sixth Amendment right to representation by appointed counsel in the
certiorari process under Ross v. Moffitt,160 circuit policy may dictate that
counsel pursue meritorious claims through the certiorari process.161
VI. PROCEDURAL CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE CERTIORARI PETITION
IS CRITICAL
There are at least five circumstances in which the decision to petition for
review by writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court may prove
critical for advancing the right of a criminal defendant convicted or
sentenced in a state court proceeding for resolution of the claims of federal
constitutional violations arguably tainting the fairness of the criminal
prosecution. In each situation, certiorari offers either the only, or best,
opportunity to obtain relief on the alleged constitutional violation. The
alternative option for litigating those claims through federal habeas corpus
offers little or no potential for relief for state petitioners.

159. Id. at 312–13.
160. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610–11 (1974).
161. In Wilkens v. United States, the Court noted that, pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, all
circuits had adopted policies requiring appointed counsel to assist the indigent litigant in petitioning
for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Wilkens v. United States, 441 U.S. 468, 469 (1979) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A). Subsequently, in Austin v. United States, the Court recognized counsel’s difficulty in being
obligated to file certiorari petitions that lack merit. Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5, 7–9 (1994); See
supra text accompanying note 18.
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A. Securing the Retroactive Application of New Rules under Griffith
The Griffith retroactivity doctrine offers relief to those criminal
defendants whose cases were decided under then-existing procedural rules
that were subsequently altered by the Supreme Court’s announcement of a
new rule of constitutional criminal procedure. Batson v. Kentucky162 is an
example of Griffith in operation. In Batson, the Court changed the process
for challenging claims of racially discriminatory usage163 of peremptory
challenges in criminal trials.164 Previously, in Swain v. Alabama,165 the
Court required defendants to demonstrate a pattern of discriminatory
peremptory strikes by a prosecutor’s office in removing minority
venirepersons from jury service,166 a requirement that had proved
extremely difficult to meet for defendants in individual cases.167
The Batson Court adopted an approach that required the defendant to first
show membership in a “cognizable racial group” and that the prosecutor
had used peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors from
service.168 Second, the prosecutor must then respond with a racially neutral
basis for the exercise of the peremptory strike.169 Finally, once the
defendant has made the threshold showing that a reasonable inference of
racially discriminatory intent explains the prosecutor’s use of their
peremptories and the prosecutor has offered an arguably racially neutral
basis for their strike, the trial court must decide whether the defendant has
met the burden of proving “purposeful discrimination.”170
Adoption of the Swain approach addressed the difficulty posed for
defendants lacking information to demonstrate a systematic use of
peremptory strikes by prosecutors to exclude eligible minority jurors from
service. Following Batson, the use of a peremptory strike to exclude even a
162. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
163. The Court had long held that racial discrimination in excluding jurors on the basis of race
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
164. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94–98, 100; Martin, 200 U.S. at 321; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
165. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
166. Id. at 203–04.
167. Batson, 476 U.S.at 92–93 (describing Swain procedure as “crippling”).
168. Id. at 96.
169. Id. at 97. Mere denial of racially discriminatory intent, however, is not sufficient to
demonstrate bias on the prosecutor’s part. Id. at 94 (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632
(1972)).
170. Id. at 90–91.
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single minority juror in an individual criminal case may be challenged.171
Moreover, subsequent decisions have expanded reliance on Batson based on
its theoretical foundation in the equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteen Amendment, addressing the right of venirepersons not to be
excluded from jury service.172 The Court has extended Batson to provide
for challenges by white defendants as to the exclusion of minority jurors173;
behalf of third parties in civil actions174; based on race of prospective jurors
by defendants in criminal cases175; and to use of peremptories in
discriminatory fashion based on gender.176
The functional application of the Griffith retroactivity rule is illustrated by
two decisions ultimately relying on Batson for the precedent controlling their
disposition. In Texas capital case Miller-El v. State,177 the appeal of a death
penalty sentence was pending in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals some
two years after the court issued its decision in Batson. Miller-El raised a
Batson claim in the direct appeal, arguing of the exclusion of minority jurors
based on ethnicity in the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges. The

171. Id. at 96 (“These principles support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the
prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial.”). In United States v. Moore, the
court expanded on its rationale for extending Batson to military trials:
The en banc Court of Military Review in this case simplified the inquiry into just one part,
adopting a per se rule as establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Upon the
Government’s use of a peremptory challenge against a member of the accused’s race and upon
timely objection, trial counsel must give his reasons for the challenge. Today, we adopt a per se
rule for all the services.
We do so in order to simplify this process for members of courts-martial and, more
importantly, to make it fairer for the accused. In military trials, it would be difficult to show a “pattern”
of discrimination from the use of one peremptory challenge in each court-martial. As a matter of
judicial administration, the per se rule has become recognized as the superior procedure for Batson
challenges.
United States v. Moore, 28 M.J. 366, 368 (1989), reversed, 30 M.J. 162 (1990) (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (“The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends
beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection
procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the
fairness of our system of justice.”).
173. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415–16 (1991).
174. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628–30 (1991).
175. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992).
176. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
177. Miller-El v. State, 748 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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state court noted178 that it previously recognized the applicability of Batson
in another capital case, DeBlanc v. State179:
The ruling in Batson has been deemed to have retroactive effect to those cases
pending on direct review or not yet final at the time of the ruling. So although
the instant case was tried prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson,
because it was pending on direct appeal at the time of the ruling, Batson is
applicable.180

The critical question before the court was whether Miller-El had
preserved the Batson claim. In order to obtain the benefit of a new rule,
relying on the Griffith retroactivity principle, the litigant must have preserved
the error in order to claim relief from the new rule. A failure to properly
preserve error and frame the issue to bring it within the ambit of the new
rule theoretically might preclude its retroactive application.181 But the
178. Id. at 460.
179. DeBlanc v. State, 732 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
180. Id. at 641.
181. For instance, in Whiteside v. State the Arkansas Supreme Court considered whether the
appellant’s life-without-parole sentence imposed for a capital murder, committed while he was
seventeen years old, was unconstitutional based on Miller v. Alabama. Whiteside v. State (Whiteside I),
383 S.W.3d 859 (Ark. 2011), vacated, 567 U.S. 950 (2012), remanded to Whiteside v. State (Whiteside II),
426 S.W.3d 917 (Ark. 2013); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). Whiteside I was pending on
certiorari at the time the Court issued its decision in Miller, and the Court ordered Whiteside’s sentence
vacated and remanded to the state court for reconsideration in light of the decision in Miller. Whiteside I,
383 S.W.3d 859.
On remand, the State argued that Whiteside was not entitled to the benefit of Miller because the
Court concluded that imposition of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence under state law violated
the Eighth Amendment and Whiteside, rather than challenging the mandatory sentencing, argued a
life-without-parole sentence was inapplicable when the offender was a juvenile at the time of the
offense. Whiteside II, 426 S.W.3d at 919. The court rejected this line of argument, explaining:
We disagree that Whiteside failed to properly preserve this issue, as he argued, both at trial and in
Whiteside I that a life sentence without parole under the circumstances of his case was unusual,
excessive, and in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
However, regardless of whether Whiteside properly preserved his Miller claim, we agree with
his assertion that the imposition of a void or illegal sentence is subject to challenge at any time.
Sentencing in Arkansas is entirely a matter of statute, and where the law does not authorize the
particular sentence imposed by a trial court, the sentence is unauthorized and illegal. According
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, the mandatory life-without-parole sentence that
Whiteside received pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(c) is illegal under the
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Texas court ruled the Batson claim had effectively been preserved based on
trial counsel’s pre-trial motion to quash the indictment based upon
“exclusion of blacks from the jury panel,”182 explaining:
After the hearing, the trial court refused to quash the indictment. In this
cause, it can be argued that appellant had a Batson, hearing on his motion to
quash the jury that heard his case. However, given the fact that Batson was
not decided until after the case at bar had been tried to completion in the trial
court, and given the testimony that transpired at the hearing, we believe such
an argument would border on being specious.
We find that on the facts of this case, appellant sufficiently raised the issue
of the State’s use of its peremptory strikes at trial to invoke Batson protections
on appeal.183

Once the court concluded that the Batson claim was preserved by
sufficient objection at trial,184 the record supported its ordered remand
permitting the trial court to determine whether the prosecution had offered
race-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges of minority jurors or
whether the evidence demonstrated purposeful discrimination by the State
in the use of any of its strikes.185
The litigation in Batson and subsequent decisions demonstrates how the
Court’s announcement of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure
may expand the potential for relief afforded to criminal defendants whose
defenses may arguably fare better under that change in the law during the
pendency of those cases. Thereafter, of course, the new rule will apply to
criminal actions filed or prosecuted after its announcement and will serve as
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, because the issue in this case
involves a void or illegal sentence, it can be addressed for the first time on appeal.
Furthermore, by its argument that we should not address Whiteside’s Miller claim, the State
ignores precedent holding that when a Supreme Court decision results in a “new rule,” that rule
applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review.
Id. at 919 (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2014)).
182. Miller-El, 748 S.W.2d at 460.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. See id. (“[A]ppellant clearly objected to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes. After
the hearing to quash the indictment, the trial court overruled the appellant’s motion on the jury
selection issues by noting that the appellant failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion of black
veniremen by the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office.”).
185. Id. at 460–61.
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binding precedent on all lower courts. For those litigants urging preserved
claims falling within the ambit of the new rule, the Griffith retroactivity
principle serves to benefit those defendants whose cases have not been
finalized prior to its announcement. It also rewards diligent lawyering by
counsel who have preserved claims ultimately decided favorably in other
cases when new rules can be relied upon to benefit their clients.
Importantly, for counsel making the decision to petition for certiorari, in
Greene v. Fisher186 the Court explained that the Griffith retroactivity doctrine
was not codified in the federal habeas revisions requiring petitioners to
overcome a presumption of regularity in state court rulings on federal
constitutional claims.187 While a petitioner may expect full retroactive
application of a new rule with respect to the same issue properly preserved,
while the case is still alive in the direct appeal process,188 the starting point
for federal habeas relief requires a showing that the state court decision fails
to qualify for deference in the federal habeas process.
Thus, in a Section 2254 action, the state court defendant petitioning for
relief from a rejection of his federal constitutional claim in state proceedings
must show that either the state court ruling resulted in a determination
contrary to or reflecting an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent, or unreasonable in light of the factual record.189 Even though
Griffith affords retroactivity while a case remains active, the federal habeas
standard for relief does not apply to state court decisions preceding the
announcement of the new rule.190
Thus, in deciding whether to file the certiorari petition seeking to benefit
from a potentially favorable decision from the Court that would provide
relief for the individual litigant, counsel cannot assume that the same option
for obtaining relief would later be available in a federal habeas action.
Greene v. Fisher clearly authorizes federal habeas relief if the state court
determination was unreasonable in light of “clearly established Federal law,
186. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011).
187. Id. at 39–40.
188. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 (1987).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2018). For text of Subsection (d)(1), see supra note 4.
190. “[R]eview under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that
adjudicated the prisoner’s claim on the merits. We said that the provision’s ‘backward-looking language
requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made.’” Greene, 565 U.S. at 44
(quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011)); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
71–72 (2003) (discussing the unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s new rule on
proportionality of sentences announced in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)).
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as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[’]”191
then-existing precedent at the time of the state court’s issuance of its
ruling.192 If the state court ruling preceded the issuance of a decision
announcing a new rule favorable to the litigant, the state court determination
must be shown to have been unreasonable in light of existing precedent.
Virtually by definition, the fact that it is the new rule that provides relief, the
previously issued decision of the state court based upon prior precedent
would likely not be unreasonable, so long as it reasonably reflected
then-existing state law.
While retroactivity under Griffith would provide relief on the same claim
as that previously rejected by the state court, relief is only available if the
claim is preserved and presented through later action in the direct appeal
process, including the certiorari petition filed in the Supreme Court. A
decision to delay presentation of the claim in a later-filed federal habeas
corpus action will almost certainly forfeit the relief that would have been
available had the certiorari petition been pursued to complete the direct
appeal process.
B. Relief Requires Recognition of a New Rule of Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Not only did the Court draw a line in determining retroactive application
of its holdings based on whether a rule applied in a decision was “new” or
one dictated by existing precedent in Teague, it also reserved the
development of constitutional criminal procedural rules for itself, rather
than permitting lower federal courts to articulate new rules or applications
in the federal habeas process.193 Thus, a constitutional claim requiring
191. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
192. Greene, 565 U.S. at 44 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
193. See, e.g., Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120–21 (1995) (discussing the idea that federal
habeas courts cannot announce new rules of constitutional criminal procedure following Teague).
However, the Court’s authority to announce new rules has not always been absolute. In Estelle v. Smith,
the Court upheld the federal habeas court’s decision that found admission of a court-appointed
forensic psychiatrist’s testimony of the accused’s “future dangerousness” a key issue in the Texas capital
sentencing process, violating Smith’s right to counsel. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 456 (1981).
Smith’s lawyer had not been notified that the forensic evaluation, purportedly made for the purpose of
assessing competency for trial, would involve a determination on the question for imposing the death
sentence. Id. at 461. The federal habeas court found the failure to notify counsel to be a violation of
Smith’s rights to remain silent and to assistance of counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Id. at 469. This idea was affirmed in Texas state courts, as well as the Fifth Circuit. Smith v. Estelle,
445 F. Supp. 647, 655, 665 (N.D. Tex. 1977), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 926 (1980), aff’d, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)
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application of a new rule must be announced by the Supreme Court.
Certiorari, rather than federal habeas, is the vehicle for pursuing relief that
requires recognition of a change in the law expressed in the adoption of a
new rule.194
The New Rules doctrine also precludes federal circuit and district courts
from expanding upon rules announced by the Court or applying existing
rules to novel situations. For instance, in Caspari v. Bohlen,195 the Court held
that the Eighth Circuit violated the principle that a failure of proof in a
non-capital sentencing proceeding would bar imposition of a greater
sentence in a remanded re-sentencing proceeding.196 In reversing, the
Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s articulation of what amounted to a new
rule by adopting a position—still in controversy among courts—that
considered whether the non-capital re-sentencing process should logically
parallel the protections afforded in capital cases under
Bullington v. Missouri.197
Perhaps ironically, the process of analogical reasoning—the most
common tool for building precedent and deriving new legal theory—
precludes federal circuit courts of appeal from contributing to the
development of constitutional doctrine. The Court’s reasoning in Caspari
(characterizing use of psychiatrist’s testimony as “surprise” and “cloak and dagger”); cf. Reese v.
Wainwright, 600 F.2d 1085, 1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding competent appellant failed “to meet
his habeas burden of producing facts that positively, unequivocally and clearly generate a real,
substantial and legitimate doubt as to his actual competency during trial” because trial court did not
deny procedural due process right to psychological evaluation prior to sentencing), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
983 (1979). The issue of whether the habeas court had authority to announce a new rule—assuming
the rule regarding the limited authority given federal circuit courts—was not addressed, perhaps
because Smith pre-dated Teague.
194. In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court explained that “[u]nder Teague, new rules will not be applied
or announced in cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of two exceptions.”
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). The two exceptions are those found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).
195. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994), rev’g 979 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1992).
196. Id. at 396–97. The Eighth Circuit reasoned it would only be a “short step” to extend the
Bullington rule to successive non-capital sentences; such an extension would demand that double
jeopardy preclude courts from re-sentencing a defendant to greater terms in non-capital cases where
the initial sentence is reversed based upon failure of proof. Bohlen v. Caspari, 979 F.2d at 113.
197. Caspari, 510 U.S. at 393–96 (noting the court of appeals admitted it was a “stretch” to
extend the rule applied in capital sentencing process to non-capital sentencing contexts). Subsequently,
in Monge v. California, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Caspari and held that
Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protections do not bar an increase in a non-capital sentence on
remand following a failure of proof in the original sentencing proceeding. Monge v. California,
524 U.S. 721, 734 (1998).
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effectively denies intermediate federal courts from developing new common
law theories. Inasmuch as the Court actively protects its preeminence in the
development of federal constitutional law, in Michigan v. Long198 the Court
followed a similar approach to experimentation in the federal courts in the
habeas corpus process.199 The Court’s authority to discern the limits of
federal constitutional protections at issue in state criminal prosecutions has
notably contributed to the development of state constitutional law; this
reservation of authority has influenced the expansion of state constitutional
law theory as an independent option for claims subject to review under
either federal or state constitutional provisions, as well as protections
afforded to criminal defendants under state law or rules.200
The importance of certiorari for the development of novel legal theory is
aptly illustrated by the revolution in pleading reflected in the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,201 and its lesser-known
precedent, Jones v. United States.202 Under the New Jersey statute reviewed
in Apprendi, commission of a criminal offense with the purpose of
intimidating others “because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation or ethnicity”203 would expose the accused to an
enhanced sentence of ten to twenty years.204 The Court addressed whether
the imposition of the enhanced penalty required a jury or bench finding of
the accused’s intent based on evidence sufficient to prove the intent beyond
a reasonable doubt.205

198. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
199. The Court adopted a peremptory approach in the assertion of certiorari jurisdiction in
response to reliance on “adequate and independent” state law grounds as the basis for a state court’s
decision.
[I]n determining, as we must, whether we have jurisdiction to review a case that is alleged to rest
on adequate and independent state grounds, we merely assume that there are no such grounds when
it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent
state ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal
law.
Id. at 1042 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
200. See supra Part III.
201. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
202. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
203. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 n.20 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e)).
204. See id. at 552 (discussing the sentencing impact of the New Jersey statute on individuals
convicted of unlawful weapons possession).
205. Id. at 469.
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The Apprendi Court relied on Jones,206 issued the year before, in which the
Court explained: “[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.”207
The Apprendi Court extended this requirement to state prosecutions,
effectively expanding the basic concept of the Sixth Amendment notice
requirement208 beyond the traditional rule that the charging instrument
need only establish the jurisdiction of the trial court; afford the accused
notice of the accusation in broad terms; and sufficient to permit the accused
to plead the judgment of conviction or acquittal in bar of a successive
prosecution. In Hamling v. United States,209 an obscenity prosecution, the
Court explained:
Our prior cases indicate that an indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the
elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge
against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal
or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. It is generally
sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute
itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly,
without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to
constitute the offence intended to be punished.’ Undoubtedly the language
of the statute may be used in the general description of an offence, but it must
be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will
inform the accused of the specific offence, coming under the general
description, with which he is charged.210

206. Id. at 476.
207. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6 (emphasis added).
208. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the . . . right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.”
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
209. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The significance of Hamling arose from the
petitioner’s claim that the definition of ‘obscenity’ was so vague it deprived him of notice and,
therefore, he could not have known the material he possessed was in fact obscene prior to a judicial
determination. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27, 32–33 (1973). The Hamling Court also noted that
Miller would retroactively apply to cases still pending on direct appeal, predating adoption of the formal
rule regarding retroactivity announced in Griffith. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 102.
210. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117–18 (citations omitted).
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Otherwise, the Court had apparently spent little energy considering the
notice requirement under the Sixth Amendment.
However, in
211
Lankford v. Idaho,
the Court held that with respect to capital cases, the
accused was entitled to notice that he faced the prospect or possibility of a
death sentence upon conviction. There, the prosecution expressly indicated
it would not seek a death sentence and there was no formal notice regarding
the possibility of capital sentencing,212 but the trial court proceeded to
impose a death sentence upon conviction. The majority concluded that
reversal was required because the lack of notice “created an impermissible
risk that the adversary process may have malfunctioned in this case.”213
An interesting aspect of the Hamling formulation lies in its reference to
the Court’s prior decision in United States v. Hess,214 where the Court also
pointed out that the charging instrument, “must be accompanied with such
a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the
specific offense.”215 It is unclear whether the Hess Court’s concern with
sufficiency of fact pleading continues to be reflected in the general approach
to sufficiency of the charging instrument.
For instance, in
United States v. Wyatt,216 the Eighth Circuit explained:
The criteria we use to assess the adequacy and clarity of an indictment have
been repeatedly expressed in our cases:
“An indictment is legally sufficient on its face if it contains all of the
essential elements of the offense charged, fairly informs the defendant of
the charges against which he must defend, and alleges sufficient
information to allow a defendant to plead a conviction or acquittal as a bar
to a subsequent prosecution.”217

211. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991).
212. Id. at 111–12.
213. Id. at 127. The majority did not, however, reference the notice requirement of the
Sixth Amendment in reaching its conclusion.
214. United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888).
215. Id. at 487.
216. United States v. Wyatt, 853 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 2017).
217. Id. at 457 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Fleming, 8 F.3d 1264, 1265
(8th Cir. 1993)); see also Estes v. State, 442 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Ark. 1969) (discussing the need for
information setting forth title of prosecution, name of court, county in which alleged offense
committed, and name of defendant sufficient despite absence of factual allegations); State v. Jackson,
980 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ohio 2012) (“An indictment meets constitutional requirements if it ‘first,
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Notice of the factual basis for the charge may not be charged with
specificity, but instead is supplied through the filing of a motion requesting
a “bill of particulars,”218 seeking greater specificity from the prosecutor in
pleading her theory of the case and facts supporting the charging
instrument.219 It does not serve to provide a means for discovery, however,
but only expands upon the information necessary to render the charging
instrument legally sufficient.220 Otherwise, indictment law does not address
the defendant’s interest in obtaining information about the prosecution’s
evidence in order to prepare the defense as a matter of the
Sixth Amendment’s notice guarantee, leaving investigations supporting the
development of the defense to the discovery process.221
Apprendi does not address sufficiency of factual pleading in terms of the
defendant’s need for discovery in order to prepare the defense, except to
the limited extent the accused is afforded notice that the prosecution will
seek an enhanced sentence upon conviction based on a prohibited
motivation for the offense. Instead, the decision and its line of cases focus
on the prosecution’s burden of proof of the enhancement allegation. The
Apprendi Court’s notice demand deals with the nature of the accusation,
specifically when the accusation itself involves an enhanced punishment
once the prosecution meets its burden of proving the defendant acted with
the prohibited motivation—as opposed to the criminal intent or degree of

contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which
he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future
prosecutions for the same offense.’” (quoting State v. Childs, 728 N.E.2d 379, 386 (Ohio 2000))).
218. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f) (“The court may direct the government to file a bill of particulars.
The defendant may move for a bill of particulars before or within 14 days after arraignment or at a
later time if the court permits. The government may amend a bill of particulars subject to such
conditions as justice requires.”).
219. E.g., United States v. Salazar, 485 F.2d 1272, 1278 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[P]rincipal function of
a bill of particulars is to apprise defendant of the essential facts of the crime for which he has been
indicted, especially in instances where the indictment itself does little more than track the language of
the statute allegedly violated.”).
220. E.g., United States v. Ordaz-Gallardo, 520 F. Supp. 2d 516, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“A
bill of particulars is not an investigative tool, or a tool of discovery, but rather ‘is meant to apprise the
defendant of the essential facts of a crime and should be required only where the charges of an
indictment are so general that they do not advise a defendant of the specific acts of which he is
accused.’” (quoting United States v. Perez, 940 F. Supp. 540, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1996))).
221. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Rule 16 governs the discovery process in federal prosecutions. There
is no general discovery process afforded to the defense as a matter of Sixth Amendment protection.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
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culpability required for commission of the offense.222 A greater statutorily
imposed penalty is warranted when an offender acts with the prescribed
motivation.
Apprendi announced a new rule of federal constitutional criminal
procedure because it shifted the responsibility for determination of
sentencing enhancement facts arising in the context of the proof of the
offense itself, as opposed to habitual sentencing enhancement. Instead of
the trial court making this determination as the sentencing authority in most
jurisdictions,223 the responsibility is assigned to the trier of fact on the
question of guilt, whether the jury or trial court. For instance, in Jones, the
Court explained that the enhancement issue must be submitted to the jury,
although the court otherwise imposes sentence in a federal prosecution.224
The Jones–Apprendi rule reflected an approach not dictated by the Court’s
precedent. The statutory peculiarities in the two cases proved significant,
particularly in terms of the ruling in Apprendi. The Jones Court addressed the
question of proof required to impose a sentence authorized under the
federal carjacking statute225 when the facts show a statutory aggravating
factor included in the definition of the offense. The Court opened the door
to the discussion of sentencing authority that would ultimately lead to the
Apprendi rule:
Much turns on the determination that a fact is an element of an offense rather
than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must be charged in the
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a
222. The Model Penal Code recognizes a hierarchy of criminal intent with the highest degree
of culpability, or criminal responsibility, being that the individual acted “purposefully,” “knowingly,”
“recklessly,” or with “negligence,” demonstrating the degree to which the accused intended the results
of their act or acted without regard to the consequences of the act done. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(a)–(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
223. Six states employ systems of jury sentencing in non-capital cases: Arkansas, Kentucky,
Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-103 (West 2017); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.055 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 926.1 (West 2003); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295
(West 2007). Melissa Carrington, Applying Apprendi to Jury Sentencing: Why State Felony Jury Sentencing
Threatens the Right to a Jury Trial, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1360 n.2 (2011). However, jury sentencing,
whether mandatory or at the accused’s option, is now required in cases in which the death penalty may
be imposed upon conviction. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621 (2016) (concluding capital
sentencing which allows a state judge, rather than a jury, “to find the facts necessary to sentence a
defendant to death” violates Apprendi and the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial).
224. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243–44 (1999).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2018).
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reasonable doubt. Accordingly, some statutes come with the benefit of
provisions straightforwardly addressing the distinction between elements and
sentencing factors.226

In Jones, the question was framed as to whether the carjacking statute
“defined three distinct offenses or a single crime with a choice of three
maximum penalties, two of them dependent on sentencing factors exempt
from the requirements of charge and jury verdict.”227 Justice Souter,
writing for the five vote majority, opted for the “three distinct offense”
approach.228 The statutory scheme defines the gravamen of the criminal
offense generally, with the respected sections setting forth the specific
elements which, if satisfied, determine the degree of the offense and the
applicable increasing levels of punishment. Thus, the taking of a motor
vehicle by “force and violence or by intimidation” defines the basic offense,
punishable by a fine or imprisonment of not more than fifteen years, or
both.229 If the evidence shows the defendant caused “serious bodily injury”
in committing the offense, the punishment range is increased to a fine or
imprisonment for not more than twenty-five years, or both.230 And, if
death results from the forceful, violent, or intimidating taking of the motor
vehicle, the penalty range extends to imposition of a fine or imprisonment
“for any number of years up to life,” or both.231 Thus, recognition of
aggravation in the commission of the basic offense of carjacking—forcibly
taking a motor vehicle—is built-in to the basic statute, with separate
provisions reflecting the increasing degrees of injury possible in the
commission of the basic offense.
Critical in the majority’s characterization of this hierarchy of injury in
determining punishment is that the three different levels of injury inflicted
are deemed to constitute elements of the charged offense, or lesser-included
offenses within the hierarchy that must be pleaded and proved to the trier

226.
(1974)).
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Jones, 526 U.S. at 232 (citations omitted) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117
Id. at 229.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2119(1).
Id. § 2119(2).
Id. § 2119(3).
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of fact beyond a reasonable doubt,232 rather than the trial judge determining
the degree of offense during sentencing. This binds the prosecution to the
jury’s assessment of the degree of injury inflicted in the offense, whether
proven exclusively through evidence of the victim’s response to the
perpetrator’s threat or use of force against him, or through proof that the
victim has either suffered serious physical injury, or the worst case scenario,
death.
Apprendi, in contrast to Jones, did not deal with the extent of injury or
degree of force or violence used in assessing the severity of the offense. Nor
did it focus on the traditional requirement for proof of criminal intent,
manifested in terms of the hierarchy of culpable mental states recognized in
the Model Penal Code,233 or Code-incorporating state statutory scheme
approaches and terminology.234 Instead, the decision focused on the
accused’s motivation in the commission of the offense. Consequently, the
Court announced a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure.235 In
addressing motivations for the offense, the New Jersey statutory scheme
authorizes increased punishment applicable to any degree of the generic
offense charged, such that an individual committing a simple battery or an
aggravated battery could suffer enhanced punishment based on a racially
discriminatory motivation.
Other statutory schemes have adopted the general Apprendi principle in
which proof of a particular fact arising in the commission of the offense
warrants greater punishment than the basic offense.
Thus, in
236
the Court held that where the quantity of illegal
United States v. Cotton,
drugs may determine the level of punishment, the indictment must include
an allegation of the quantity of drugs possessed or used in trafficking as an
232. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) (“In short, Winship presupposes as an
essential of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made
to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary
to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.”).
233. See supra text accompanying note 222.
234. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202 (West 2017). Arkansas adopted the Model Penal Code
in 1975. Preface to Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated, ARKANSAS CODE REVISION COMMISSION VOL. B,
at iii (1995).
235. In Jones, the Court observed that many states address the issue of increased culpability
arising in the context of the facts of the generic offense, such as robbery, which is defined as aggravated
robbery when the facts would warrant a finding that the perpetrator threatened or inflicted violence or
used a deadly weapon in the commission of the robbery. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 236–37
(1999).
236. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002).
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element of the charge.237
Apprendi has affected other sentencing schemes, including the
Washington Sentencing Reform Act,238 which permitted the judge to
impose a higher sentence than the “standard range” based upon proof of an
aggravated circumstance.239 Apprendi required proof of an aggravating
circumstance for the imposition of a death sentence in a capital
prosecution.240 Additionally, under the previously mandatory federal
sentencing guidelines,241 the Court held that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.”242
Finally, Apprendi represented a break with existing precedent in requiring
specific pleading of facts or circumstances warranting increased
punishment. In Alleyne v. United States,243 the Court unequivocally asserted
that these facts or circumstances constitute elements of the offense that must
be pleaded and proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to authorize the
imposition of the statutorily contemplated increased punishment.244
237. Id. at 632.
238. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.010 (West 2019).
239. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004).
240. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 609 (2002). Ring foreshadowed the requirement that
death sentences be imposed by juries, rather than judges, unless jury sentencing is waived in schemes
permitting waiver.
241. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243–44 (2005).
242. Id. at 244. The Court applied the same reasoning in Cunningham v. California, related to the
state’s sentencing scheme permitting treatment of some sentences aggravated, with greater punishment
imposed, based on the circumstances of the offender and offense. See Cunningham v. California,
549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007) (“[O]ur decisions from Apprendi to Booker point to the middle term specified
in California’s statutes, not the upper term, as the relevant statutory maximum. Because the DSL
[determinate sentencing law] authorizes the judge, not the jury, to find the facts permitting an upper
term sentence, the system cannot withstand measurement against our Sixth Amendment precedent.”).
243. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
244. The only exception to the Alleyne rule remains proof the defendant has a prior conviction
qualifying for enhanced sentence. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–28 (1998).
Brent E. Newton has criticized the Court’s inconsistent treatment of felon status:
In Almendarez-Torres, over a vigorous dissent, a bare majority of the Court held a criminal
defendant’s prior conviction subjecting him to a greatly enhanced prison sentence as a recidivist
is not an “element” of the “enhanced” crime charged in a subsequent case. Therefore, the Court
concluded, nothing in the Constitution requires a defendant’s prior conviction to be alleged in an
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Because the Court announced a New Rule of constitutional criminal
procedure, under Griffith it would apply to all non-final or pending cases
where the specific pleading of the aggravating circumstance demanded
increased punishment,245 and thus, defendants in such cases would enjoy
preservation of their claims. But, under Griffith’s prospective applicability
approach, Apprendi did not apply retroactivity to cases finalized prior to the
announcement of the New Rule. Nor was Apprendi applied retroactively, as
Justice Thomas noted in his dissenting opinion in Harris v. United States.246
In Harris, the Court continued to draw a distinction between “sentencing
factors” and “elements”247 that provided a basis for imposing increased
punishment upon conviction through statutory minimum sentences.
Requiring proof of facts limited the authority of the judge to order a lesser
punishment within the range, thus warranting increased punishment within
the overall statutory range.248 The Alleyne Court overruled Harris, holding
that the attempt to distinguish between the two would be “inconsistent”
with Apprendi.249
The history of Apprendi rests on the Court’s review of the claim that
evidentiary facts increase punishment or the range of punishment.
Subsequent decisions building upon the Apprendi rationale established a
indictment or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt—as “elements” of an offense must
be—for an enhanced sentence to be imposed. Rather than being an “element,” the Court held a
defendant’s prior conviction is a “sentencing factor” that a trial judge may find by a mere
preponderance of the evidence. However, in a series of cases beginning in 2000, a total of
five members of the Court—including Justice Thomas, who had joined the five-Justice majority
in Almendarez-Torres—have since stated that it was wrongly decided. Yet, despite countless
opportunities to do so since 2000, the Court has not granted certiorari to reconsider
Almendarez-Torres.
Brent E. Newton, Almendarez-Torres and the Anders Ethical Dilemma, 45 HOU. L. REV. 747, 751–52
(2008).
245. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
246. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 581 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“No Court of
Appeals, let alone this Court, has held that Apprendi has retroactive effect.”).
247. See id. at 549 (“Yet not all facts affecting the defendant’s punishment are elements.”).
248. Id. at 550–51, 567 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which imposed a statutory
minimum sentence upon offenders brandishing a firearm in the course of committing a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime, with the basic sentence for using or carrying a firearm set at a
five year minimum, but that minimum being increased to seven years upon proof that the defendant
brandished the firearm).
249. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 104 (2013) (“Mandatory minimum sentences increase
the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, Harris is overruled.”).
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cohesive doctrine developing the Sixth Amendment guarantee of notice
afforded to the accused; it requires that the charges against the defendant,
as well as any allegations that necessarily increase punishment or the range
of punishment the defendant faces—or results in the increase of mandatory
punishment minimums—be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. None of
this could have happened had the Court not granted certiorari to consider
the issue initially raised in Apprendi,250 because the Court alone retains
authority to construe federal constitutional protections.251 Apprendi and its
significant progeny can be traced to counsel’s decision to petition the Court
to review the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision, which denied relief in
a split decision.252
C. Relief Requires Overruling an Existing Rule or Precedent
When relief for a client requires a change in federal constitutional law, the
route for seeking review of an existing rule, or precedent, lies in petitioning
for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Because the Court’s authority in the
interpretation of constitutional protections is ultimate, the change in existing
law does not necessarily have to occur in certiorari in the direct appeal
process, but it typically will.253 While the Court may announce a new rule
of constitutional criminal procedure on certiorari review either after
conclusion of state post-conviction,254 federal post-conviction,255 or
federal habeas corpus process,256 certiorari in the direct appeal process
remains the most important option for counsel representing clients whose
claims would otherwise be foreclosed by existing rules or precedent. In any
250. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 474 (2000) (discussing the constitutional
component of the lower court’s ruling).
251. E.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001). In response to the state court’s
interpretation of Fourth Amendment privacy protection disregarding the decision on point in Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Court summarily and emphatically reversed: “Because
the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision on rehearing is flatly contrary to this Court’s controlling
precedent, we grant the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse.” Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771
(emphasis added).
252. State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999).
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2018) (authorizing the Court to review decisions rendered by the
federal courts of appeals by writ of certiorari in “any civil or criminal case”).
254. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 11.07–11.071 (stating post-conviction
remedies for Texas defendants convicted in non-capital and capital cases, respectively).
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (detailing post-conviction relief remedy for defendants convicted in
federal criminal trials).
256. Id. § 2254.
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event, the Court has explained that any “departure from [the doctrine of
stare decisis] demands special justification.”257
Clearly, only the Court retains authority to reconsider or overrule its prior
decisions in announcing a new rule, as it reminded lower courts in
Bosse v. Oklahoma:258 “It is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of
consistent
with
its
explanation
in
its
precedents,”259
Hohn v. United States,260 where the Court held, “[o]ur decisions remain
binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether
subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality.”261
The Court has cautioned lower courts not to respond to critiques of
precedent, suggesting that it has impliedly departed from its prior reasoning
in holding that a precedent has been overruled by implication.262
There are at least three situations in which the Court has overruled
precedent to announce new rules of constitutional protections that will
apply to federal and state prosecutions in which certiorari has played a key
procedural role in the change in the law.
1.

Distinguishing Long-Standing Precedent

First, the Court may overrule precedent undisturbed over time by
significant challenges to existing rules, as reflected in the recent decision in
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado.263 There, the majority recognized an exception
to the traditional prohibition regarding use of juror testimony as a means of
impeaching a conviction,264 when the issue relates to racially biased
257. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S.
203, 212 (1984)).
258. Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1 (2016).
259. Id. at 2.
260. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
261. Bosse, 137 S. Ct. at 2 (quoting Hohn, 524 U.S. at 252–53).
262. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (admonishing lower courts against
“conclud[ing the Supreme Court’s] more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier
precedent”).
263. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
264. The Court had consistently affirmed the principle that jury verdicts could not be
impeached with evidence from individual jurors regarding their deliberations in convicting the accused,
or from challenging a civil verdict based upon a juror’s misconduct in lying in response to questioning
during voir dire. Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 52 (2014); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
126-27 (1987). In federal trials, evidentiary rules limit the use of juror testimony to impeach the jury’s
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references interjected in the jury’s deliberations.265 Justice Kennedy,
relying on precedent reflecting the singular importance attached to
combating the effect of racial prejudice historically acknowledged by the
Court,266 wrote for the five-member majority:
[T]he Court now holds that where a juror makes a clear statement that
indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal
defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give
way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s
statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.267

2.

Overruling Recent, Narrowly-Decided Precedent

Second, the Court has shown a willingness to reconsider more recent

reasoning in reaching a verdict. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). An exception permits the use of juror testimony
when the claimed misconduct involves a matter involving introduction of “evidence” or influence from
an outside source that is authorized by the court when it conducts the trial. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2).
265. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867–69.
266. The Court, however, has not always been willing to subordinate substantive complaints
concerning racial prejudice tainting criminal prosecutions. In Buck v. Thaler, for instance, it denied
certiorari seeking review of a claim that the Texas capital defendant’s death sentence was tainted by
expert testimony—offered by the defense—who expressed his opinion that the prospect for
commission of future acts of criminal violence was greater for African–Americans than whites.
Buck v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 1022 (2011). Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Breyer, filed a
statement respecting the denial of certiorari, explaining that the issue of impermissible racial
classification was defaulted because defense counsel had essentially opened the door to this testimony.
Id. at 1022–25. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, dissented from the denial
of certiorari, arguing that Buck’s claim should have been heard on the merits, rather than deemed
procedurally defaulted. Id. at 1030. Buck’s death sentence was later commuted after the Court agreed
to review the denial of federal habeas relief based on both substantive and procedural grounds.
Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2017). Significantly, this time the Court found that Buck’s trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance, explaining: “No competent defense attorney would introduce
such evidence [expert opinion that African-Americans more likely than whites to commit additional
violent crimes in future] about his own client.” Id. at 775; Alex Arriaga, Texas Death Row Inmate Duane
Buck has Sentence Reduced to Life After Supreme Court Orders Retrial, TEX. TRIBUNE (5:00 PM, Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/03/high-profile-death-row-case-comes-end-guilty-plea/
[https://perma.cc/BD9T-2VG7]. For discussion of the complicated history of Buck’s case in light of
other cases in which the same expert testified as to his opinion that there is a higher probability that
Hispanic– and African–American defendants would commit future acts of dangerous criminal
violence, see J. Thomas Sullivan, The Abyss of Racism, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 92, 110–15 (2012).
267. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
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decisions in light of changing composition268 or rejection of majority
reasoning contested in dissenting opinions in the earlier decision. In
Payne v. Tennessee,269 for example, the Court overruled two then-recent
decisions in Booth v. Maryland270 and South Carolina v. Gathers,271 which held
that victim-impact statements were not properly admitted at state capital
sentencing proceedings. But, as Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, Booth
and Gathers had been decided on 5–4 votes:
Applying these general principles, the Court has during the past 20 Terms
overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous constitutional decisions. Booth
and Gathers were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents
challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions. They have been
questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions, and have defied
consistent application by the lower courts.272

The majority thus eschewed deference to the principle of stare decisis,
holding that narrow decisions based on reasoning generating significantly
diverging views is subject to reversal, particularly when those narrow
holdings do not reflect long-standing precedents.273 The tendency to
overrule recent decisions decided narrowly and with strong, sometimes

268. The Court is sensitive to the suggestion that its changing composition will justify change
in the law. In concurring in Alleyne, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan,
responded to Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in which he attributed the majority’s position in
overruling precedent as the result of changing composition of the court. Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S. 99, 118 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor wrote:
Justice Alito is therefore mistaken when he suggests that the Court overrules Harris because “there
are currently five Justices willing to vote to” do so. No doubt, it would be illegitimate to overrule a
precedent simply because the Court’s current membership disagrees with it. But that is not a plausible account
of the decision today. The Court overrules McMillan and Harris because the reasoning of those
decisions has been thoroughly undermined by intervening decisions and because no significant
reliance interests are at stake that might justify adhering to their result.
Id. at 121 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
269. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
270. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
271. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
272. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828–30. Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices White and Kennedy,
reiterated her opposition in Booth. Id. at 830, 832 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496, 515 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)).
273. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828–30.
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caustic, dissents,274 appears in recent history to have served to restrict
procedural rights or limitations afforded to criminal defendants,275 while
expanding substantive constitutional protections.276
In some cases, the Court has overruled prior decisions based on
what appears to be changing public consensus regarding the wisdom or
fairness of criminalization. Bowers v. Hardwick,277 upholding criminalization
of even consensual sodomy among adults in 1986 with four justices
dissenting on due process grounds,278 was overruled in Lawrence v.
Texas,279 with the majority citing Payne for the proposition: “The doctrine
of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the

274. See, e.g., J. Lyn Entrikin, Disrespectful Dissent: Justice Scalia’s Regrettable Legacy of Incivility,
18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 201, 220, 229–30 (2017) (arguing Justice Scalia’s caustic barbs may have
lost him support for his legal reasoning).
275. The 5–4 decision in Pena-Rodriguez may prove to be an obvious candidate for a fairly rapid
overruling and retrenchment by the Court in light of the fact that Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion and has been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh. Justice Kavanaugh is generally assumed to be
more conservative in his views than Justice Kennedy.
276. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010) (barring the imposition of a life sentence
without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted of non-homicide offenses);
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 445 (2008) (barring capital punishment for the rape of a child
even under aggravating circumstances); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (explaining that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded capital defendant).
277. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
278. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Powell concurred but explained that he
believed the imposition of a sentence of up to twenty years would pose a significant issue of excessive
punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment, an issue that he noted had not been raised during
litigation. Id. at 197–98 (Powell, J., concurring).
279. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, blaming the change in the Court’s position on
criminalization of homosexual sodomy on the nation’s law schools:
Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that
has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted
by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally
attached to homosexual conduct. I noted in an earlier opinion the fact that the
American Association of Law Schools (to which any reputable law school must seek to belong)
excludes from membership any school that refuses to ban from its job-interview facilities a law
firm (no matter how small) that does not wish to hire as a prospective partner a person who
openly engages in homosexual conduct.
Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas filed a separate dissent in which he argued that the criminalization of homosexual
sodomy by the Texas legislature was “silly,” but not unconstitutional. Id. at 605–06 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable
command.”280
3.

Dramatic Rejection of Precedent

Perhaps the most dramatic overruling of long-standing precedent without
significant intervening litigation seeking change, is the Court’s 1972 decision
in Furman v. Georgia,281 which effectively struck down all state death penalty
statutes a year after the Court had upheld capital sentencing in
McGautha v. California, and its companion case, Crampton v. Ohio.282 The
changing positions taken by Justices Stewart283 and White284 voting in the
plurality, whose objections to capital sentencing reflected a view that its
infrequent and erratic imposition undermined the credibility of the
punishment, led to the plurality determination condemning existing state
statutes authorizing use of death sentences.
Interestingly, while
President Nixon’s four appointments during the intervening period
contributed to the changing political composition of the Court, the
appointments did not save the death penalty at the time with Chief
Justice Warren Burger, Justice Harry Blackmun, Justice Lewis Powell, and
Justice William Rehnquist, all dissenting in Furman’s 5–4 plurality
decision.285
The dramatic reversal in the Court’s position on capital sentencing could
have only been accomplished by the Court itself in Furman, demonstrating
the need to use the certiorari process even in light of the most recent adverse
precedent that would appear to foreclose immediate further review. But,
the Court’s decision to reconsider the structure of the capital sentencing
process in light of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment considerations in
Furman created a substantial body of jurisprudence that still marks the
Court’s caseload in virtually every term.

280. Id. at 577 (majority opinion) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
281. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
282. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated sub nom., Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S.
941 (1972) (remanding to the Supreme Court of Ohio insofar as the imposition of the death penalty
was undisturbed, to be disposed of in light of Furman).
283. Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
284. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
285. Chief Justice Burger dissented, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. Id.
at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The other three dissenting Justices each wrote separate opinions. Id.
at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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And, apart from the reversal of its position on capital sentencing, perhaps
the most emphatic example of the Court rejecting reasoning supporting a
prior decision lies in the majority opinion in Crawford v. Washington.286
There, Justice Scalia, reflecting his adherence to the historical significance
of the roots287 of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause,288 wrote:
“[W]e view this as one of those rare cases in which the result below is so
improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure on our part to interpret the
Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial
discretion.”289
The Crawford decision reset the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
protection to restore the right of the accused to test the credibility of the
witnesses against him through cross-examination, typically conducted
before the fact-finder at trial.290
The Sixth Amendment confrontation right was first made expressly
applicable in the context of state prosecutions in Pointer v. Texas.291 Pointer
involved the question of admission of sworn, prior testimony given during
a preliminary hearing at which time the accused presumably had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Pointer Court rested its
holding on the existence of “an adequate opportunity” for
cross-examination.292 But, without assistance of counsel, Pointer did not
have that opportunity and, thus, the admission of the witness’s prior
testimony at trial was contrary to the Sixth Amendment confrontation
286. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
287. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority includes extensive historical analysis of
confrontation, focusing on English common law traditions—particularly with respect to the
significance of the absence of cross-examination raised as an issue in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh—
and early American precedents. Id. at 43–57.
288. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. CONST.,
amend. VI.
289. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67.
290. Confrontation typically demands that the witness be cross-examined in the presence of the
jury. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
291. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
292. Id. at 406–08. Subsequent decisions emphasized the meaningful opportunity for
cross-examination in the evaluation of admissibility of prior testimony. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204, 213 (1972) (“Before it can be said that Stubbs’ constitutional right to confront witnesses was not
infringed, however, the adequacy of [the victim’s] examination at the first trial must be taken into
consideration.”) (emphasis added); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165–68 (1970) (holding
the preliminary hearing testimony admissible at trial, regardless if the witness was made unavailable,
because the respondent had an opportunity for cross-examination).
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guarantee. Consequently, the Court grounded its confrontation analysis in
the existence of a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination for the
accused at some point in the criminal proceedings.
On the same day, the Court held the Confrontation Clause applied to the
state proceedings in Pointer.293 The Court also considered the nature of
confrontation in Douglas v. Alabama.294 The constitutional preference for
cross-examination was unequivocally demonstrated in Douglas when the
Court rejected the prosecutor’s use of an accomplice’s statement as a basis
for cross-examining the declarant, who had refused to testify at trial.295 The
prosecutor had simply read the statement before the jury, over defense
counsel’s objection, asking the uncooperative witness to affirm each portion
of its contents.296 The prosecutor then called three law enforcement
officers to testify that the statement was, in fact, made by the accomplice,
but the statement itself was never offered, nor admitted into evidence.297
Thus, the prosecutor succeeded in using the statement without the defense
being afforded any meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the accomplice
as to the accuracy of the confession or his credibility.298
Douglas expressed the Court’s uncompromising view of the constitutional
significance of cross-examination as essential to the confrontation
guarantee299 until the Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts,300 issued fifteen
years after Douglas. The Court’s abrupt shift from recognition of
cross-examination as the heart of confrontation served to accommodate
common law evidence concepts within the Sixth Amendment guarantee. In
Roberts, the majority effectively integrated confrontation and principles
underlying the traditional prohibition against admission of hearsay, and
more importantly, its many exceptions. In doing so, the majority introduced
293. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407.
294. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
295. Id. at 416–17.
296. The Court had long recognized, however, that under certain circumstances, the
confrontation right did not necessarily depend upon the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness
who was not available to testify at trial. For instance, in Mattox v. United States, the Court recognized
the common law rule admitting dying declarations as an exception to the usual requirement for
cross-examination based upon their presumed inherent reliability, being made under perception of
impending death. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892).
297. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 417.
298. Id. at 419–20.
299. The Douglas Court found that “a primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is
the right of cross-examination.” Id. at 418.
300. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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a confrontation doctrine in which the actual process of confrontation
through cross-examination was itself subject to exception when, in the
Court’s view, cross-examination seems unlikely to afford significant benefit
in searching for truth.301
The factual context of Roberts suggests that the majority unnecessarily
departed from established principles guiding construction of the
confrontation guarantee in fashioning the new doctrine ultimately
repudiated in Crawford. In Roberts, the witness testified at the preliminary
hearing, was subjected to cross-examination, and was shown to be
unavailable to testify at trial despite the prosecution’s diligent efforts to
procure her attendance.302
Consistent with the Court’s traditional holdings, the Court could have
simply reaffirmed the principle that previously cross-examined testimony is
generally admissible when the prosecution cannot reasonably secure the
attendance of the witness for trial.303 Instead, the Roberts Court held that
cross-examination before the jury is not required if a statement bears
sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its admission. Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority, concluded:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable.
Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of
reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.304

301. The Roberts Court explained the relationship between the operation of the hearsay rule and
its exceptions and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause: “Reflecting its underlying purpose to
augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test
adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that ‘there
is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’” Id. at 65.
302. Id. at 58–59.
303. For example, the Court recognized that the prior testimony of a deceased witness is
admissible in Mattox, despite the potential lost benefit to the accused of not being able to cross-examine
the witness before the jury. The Mattox Court noted that despite the accepted value of
cross-examination in this context “general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their
operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy
and the necessities of the case.” Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
304. Ohio, 448 U.S. at 66.
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Thus, the reliability requirement, according to Roberts, is met when the
statement falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” traditionally
recognized as justifying admission or the statement has “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.”305 This approach effectively opened the
door to admission of hearsay without the accused being afforded an
opportunity to engage in meaningful cross-examination to test the
declarant’s credibility, or conclusions, once the trial court has determined
that absence of cross-examination would not compromise the fact-finding
process.
Two decisions issued after Roberts, however, undermined its apparent
breadth. In Lee v. Illinois,306 the majority applied the Roberts confrontation
formulation307 in a case involving inculpatory confessions made by
co-defendants that arguably “interlocked,” thereby arguably establishing the
reliability of the non-testifying co-defendant’s admission against Lee at
trial.308 The majority found that the statement did not demonstrate
sufficient particular guarantees of trustworthiness to warrant admission in
light of the traditional suspicion with which accomplice statements are
viewed309 because of the incentives affecting the credibility of accomplices,
who may minimize their own culpability by shifting blame to others.310
However, the majority did not repudiate the rationale of Roberts, which
supplanted the requirement for cross-examination for co-defendant
confessions inculpating the accused in Douglas.311 Instead, it accepted the

305. Id.
306. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
307. Id. at 543–44.
308. Id. at 543 (“Illinois contends that Thomas’s statement bears sufficient ‘indicia of reliability
to rebut the presumption of unreliability that attaches to codefendants’ confessions, citing as support
our decision in Ohio v. Roberts. While we agree that the presumption may be rebutted, we are not
persuaded that it has been in this case.”).
309. Id. at 541 (“Over the years since Douglas, the Court has spoken with one voice in declaring
presumptively unreliable accomplices’ confessions that incriminate defendants.”).
310. The Lee majority observed:
[T]he arrest statements of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion.
Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant’s
statements about what the defendant said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence.
See id. (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
311. The Lee majority described the holding in Douglas:
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validity of the Roberts test, while holding that the accomplice’s statement in
Lee failed to meet the Roberts standard for admission without
cross-examination.
Later, in Lilly v. Virginia,312 the Court issued another decision suggesting
a limitation on the prosecution’s reliance on the Roberts rule for admission
without cross-examination. The prosecution offered the statement of an
accomplice, the defendant’s brother, inculpating the defendant in the
commission of the murder. When called to testify at trial, the brother
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify. The
prosecution then offered the statement as a declaration against his penal
interest and, thus presumably reliable and admissible without affording the
defense any meaningful opportunity for cross-examination. The defendant
was convicted of multiple charges, including capital murder, and sentenced
to death.313
The state court affirmed, holding that the declaration against penal
interest exception to admission of hearsay based on unavailability of the
declarant was “a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule” under
Virginian law.314 In a fragmented decision reflecting multiple views of the
Court, the Justices all agreed that the penal interest exception did not
provide a sufficient basis for admission for purposes of analysis of the
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation protection:
We assume, as we must, that Mark’s statements were against his penal interest
as a matter of state law, but the question whether the statements fall within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes is a
question of federal law.315

The finding that the declaration against the penal interest exception—
excluding admission of hearsay at the criminal trial—possibly foreshadowed
This holding, on which the Court was unanimously agreed, was premised on the basic
understanding that when one person accuses another of a crime under circumstances in which
the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the accusation is presumptively suspect and
must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination.
Id. at 541.
312. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
313. See id. at 121–22 (providing the assailant’s charges, such as the murder of DeFilippis and
that the witness used his Fifth Amendment right).
314. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va. 1998).
315. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 125.
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the Court’s changing views regarding the wisdom of the departure from
cross-examination initially taken in Ohio v. Roberts.316
From Douglas through Lee and Lilly to Crawford, the critical issue in the
admission of jointly inculpatory statements made by a declarant unavailable
for cross-examination at trial lies in the incentive for the declarant—whether
co-defendant or accomplice—to use their inculpatory statement to
minimize their own culpability, thereby implicating the accused as the more
culpable participant in the offense. Accomplice statements are considered
inherently suspect due to the accomplice’s self-interest,317 “which may be
promoted by cooperating with authorities or, more aggressively, by
supplying information sought by authorities that may not be truthful.”318
Even if the non-testifying declarant is not motivated by self-interest based
on culpability, and the out-of-court statement is not tainted for that reason,
if the statement was given in anticipation of its use as testimony, lack of

316. See, for instance, Crawford v. Washington, where the majority observed:
The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated
capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude. Despite the plurality’s speculation in Lilly, that it was “highly unlikely” that accomplice
confessions implicating the accused could survive Roberts, courts continue routinely to admit
them.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–64 (2004)
317. See, e.g., Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (concluding
such statements “have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion”).
318. J. Thomas Sullivan, Crawford, Retroactivity, and the Importance of Being Earnest, 92 MARQ. L.
REV. 231, 244, 244 n.82 (2008) (“A particularly poignant story reflecting the self-interest of a suspect
implicating another individual involves the confession by Christopher Ochoa, who admitted to a rape
and murder he did not commit, and his implication of a friend, Richard Danziger, in the same crime.
Ochoa was motivated by fear of the death penalty. Some twelve years after both men were convicted
and sentenced to life terms, they were exonerated by the confession of another individual whose
responsibility was corroborated by DNA evidence. Ochoa testified against Danziger at trial, later
admitting that he lied under oath in order to obtain the life sentence promised in return for his own
plea of guilty. Both men were ultimately released on the basis of the true killer’s confession made in a
letter to the Travis County, Texas, district attorney and the recovery of DNA evidence demonstrating
that this confession was accurate. Ochoa completed his education, including graduating from the
University of Wisconsin School of Law, the institution whose Innocence Project had championed the
case, and now practices criminal law. Danziger, however, was assaulted in prison, suffering a severe
brain injury that has left him permanently impaired and living with assistance paid for from the
settlement of his civil suit against the City of Austin and Travis County.” (internal citations omitted)
(citing Diane Jennings, A Shaken System, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, IA (Feb. 24, 2008))).
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cross-examination may result in the accused’s inability to demonstrate
inaccuracy in allegations or assertions of the accused’s culpability.319
Thus, the Sixth Amendment promise of confrontation resurfaced in
Crawford where the Court was asked to reconsider the approach taken in
Roberts, again in the context of admitting an accomplice’s statement
inculpating the accused without affording him the opportunity for
cross-examination.320 Michael Crawford was charged with the murder of
an individual whom he apparently believed had attempted to rape his wife,
Sylvia. Without affording Michael any opportunity to cross-examine Sylvia,
who did not testify at trial, Sylvia’s recorded statement was admitted into
evidence, and the state supreme court upheld its admission, finding that it
bore the requisite indicia of reliability to warrant admission without
cross-examination.321
On certiorari, the Court reversed, finding that admitting Sylvia’s
statement to police without affording Michael the opportunity to
cross-examine her at trial, violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation.322 In the process, the majority expressly rejected the
alternative theory for satisfaction of the confrontation guarantee adopted by
the Roberts majority. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, eloquently
noted: “Roberts’ failings were on full display in the proceedings below.”323

319. For example, the affidavit given to police investigating a domestic violence call by the
victim would be testimonial in nature and inadmissible without the opportunity for cross-examination
of the declarant at trial, despite that they were not made by an accomplice with motivation to implicate
the accused. See Hammon v. State, 853 N.E.2d 477, 478 (Ind. 2006) (providing established rules on
testimonials and their nature in criminal cases). In the companion case, Davis v. Washington, however,
the emergency 911 call reporting a domestic assault was not deemed “testimonial,” precisely because
it was not made for the equivalent purpose of giving testimony in a legal proceeding.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817, 828 (“She simply was not acting as a witness; she was not
testifying. What she said was not ‘a weaker substitute for live testimony’ at trial.” (quoting
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986))).
320. Id. at 40.
321. See State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 658 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (noting that the trial court
admitted the taped hearsay statements that defendant’s spouse made to police officers). The state court
relied on the “interlocking” nature of statements taken from Michael and Sylvia Crawford, relying on
Lee v. Illinois, and concluding: “Because Sylvia’s and Michael’s statements are virtually identical,
admission of Sylvia’s statement satisfies the requirement of reliability under the confrontation clause.”
Crawford, 54 P.3d at 664.
322. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
323. Id. at 65.
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He explained:
Sylvia Crawford made her statement while in police custody, herself a
potential suspect in the case. Indeed, she had been told that whether she
would be released “depend[ed] on how the investigation continues.” In
response to often leading questions from police detectives, she implicated her
husband in Lee’s stabbing and at least arguably undermined his self-defense
claim. Despite all this, the trial court admitted her statement, listing several
reasons why it was reliable. In its opinion reversing, the Court of Appeals
listed several other reasons why the statement was not reliable. Finally, the State
Supreme Court relied exclusively on the interlocking character of the
statement and disregarded every other factor the lower courts had considered.
The case is thus a self-contained demonstration of Roberts’ unpredictable and
inconsistent application.324

Justice Scalia provided a masterful argument in defense of
cross-examination as the heart of the confrontation guarantee, tracing the
history of the right to confrontation to Roman times,325 focusing on the
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted on the basis of an uncrossed
allegation of treason made by his purported accomplice, Lord Cobham.326
He continued his historical analysis through development of English law,327
American colonial law, and the practices of the states in requiring
cross-examination as a predicate for admission of testimony.328
In focusing on the rationale for expanding admission of testimony not
subjected to cross-examination adopted by the Roberts majority, adopting
“reliability” of the statement as the touchstone for admissibility329—

324. Id. at 65–66.
325. See id. at 43 (“The right to confront one’s accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman
times.”).
326. Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603).
327. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (noting that after Raleigh’s conviction, “[t]hrough a series of
statutory and judicial reforms, English law developed a right of confrontation that limited these abuses.
For example, treason statutes required witnesses to confront the accused ‘face to face’ at his
arraignment”).
328. See id. at 45–50 (“Several authorities also stated that a suspect’s confession could be
admitted only against himself, and not against others he implicated.”).
329. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred only in the judgment.
Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). He disagreed with the majority’s rejection of the Roberts
rationale, arguing:
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recognizing either the historical basis for admission of the hearsay as an
exception to the rule rooted in the common law or tested by determining
whether the statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability, reflecting
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness—Justice Scalia argued:
The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary
process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability. It thus replaces
the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly
foreign one.330
Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding:
Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only
where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine.331
Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our
rationales.332

Justice Scalia’s direct assault on Roberts in Crawford was eloquently phrased
in his conclusion: “The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is
not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core
testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude.”333
Clearly, the decision in Crawford was grounded in the successful petition
for certiorari that opened the door for Justice Scalia and the Crawford
majority to bar admission of testamentary hearing at trial when the accused

I dissent from the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts. I believe that the Court’s adoption
of a new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is not backed by sufficiently persuasive
reasoning to overrule long-established precedent. Its decision casts a mantle of uncertainty over
future criminal trials in both federal and state courts, and is by no means necessary to decide the
present case.
Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist had previously argued that Lee overruled Douglas based on Lee’s adoption
of the rationale of Roberts, in his concurring opinion to the Court’s remand in New Mexico v. Earnest, in
which the majority vacated the reversal of Earnest’s murder conviction and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Lee. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 649–50 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
330. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (majority opinion).
331. Id. at 59.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 63.
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has not been afforded a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant and test the credibility of assertions inculpating the defendant,
even when the testimony arguably is against the declarant’s penal interest.
D. Relief Requires a New Rule Applied to a Fourth Amendment Claim Not
Subject to Review in Federal Habeas Corpus Following Stone v. Powell
For state defendants whose convictions rest on evidence seized as a result
of a search that has been challenged and found lawful in the pre-trial
process, certiorari affords the only realistic remedy for relief. In
Stone v. Powell,334 the Supreme Court effectively barred review of
Fourth Amendment-based claims of illegal search and seizure of evidence
that had been litigated in state court proceedings without success.335
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded:
In sum, we conclude that where the State has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in
an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.336

Consequently, the Court established itself as the only option for obtaining
relief on a search and seizure claim, regardless of whether that claim relies
on recognition of a new rule of criminal procedure arising from
Fourth Amendment protection that would require exclusion of the seized
evidence. Even when the defendant’s claim that the state court failed to
exclude evidence that should have been excluded under existing Supreme
Court precedent is meritorious, the federal habeas corpus process offers no
potential for relief except in the extremely rare situation in which the state
courts have failed to engage in fair adjudication of the defendant’s
suppression motion.
The rationale underlying Stone v. Powell is not difficult; the function of
federal habeas corpus is to address the problem of imprisonment resulting
from proceedings in which the conviction or sentence has been obtained in

334. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
335. Id. at 494.
336. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020

67

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2020], No. 3, Art. 2

652

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:585

violation of a federal constitutional right.337 But infractions relating to
illegal seizure of physical evidence differ from other constitutional violations
because “the physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and
often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.”338 And because the suppression of evidence is the remedy
for the illegal seizure of physical evidence—thus preventing the prosecution
from using the evidence against the accused at trial339—the exclusion of the
suppressed evidence enhances the prospect that the criminal judge must
either be dismissed for lack of admissible evidence or that the prosecution’s
case will be compromised if tried.340
In contrast to the fundamental purpose of federal habeas corpus, which
addresses the problem of unjust incarceration, certiorari is primarily devoted
to the development of federal constitutional interpretation,341 including the
process of ensuring that lower courts do not engage in decision-making
undermining a consistent application of federal constitutional

337. The Court framed the issue in terms of the distinction to be drawn between review on
direct appeal and in the federal habeas process:
We turn now to the specific question presented by these cases. Respondents allege violations of
Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth Amendment. The question
is whether state prisoners who have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair consideration
of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at
trial and on direct review may invoke their claim again on federal habeas corpus review. The
answer is to be found by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending
it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims.
Id. at 489.
338. Id. at 490.
339. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961) (“Federal-state cooperation in the solution of
crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual
obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approach”). In Stone v. Powell, the Court
explained that Mapp had applied the exclusionary rule to illegally seized evidence to state prosecutions
to further the goal of deterring police illegality. It went on to explain:
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that
violates Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a
personal constitutional right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim
of the search or seizure, for any “[r]eparation comes too late.” Instead, “the rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect . . . .”
Stone, 428 U.S. at 485–86.
340. See supra text accompanying note 329.
341. See supra Sections V.A–C.
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protections.342 In Michigan v. Long, the majority observed over thirty years
ago:
The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation in this country.
In 1982, more than 12 million criminal actions (excluding juvenile and traffic
charges) were filed in the 50 state court systems and the District of Columbia.
By comparison, approximately 32,700 criminal suits were filed in federal
courts during that same year. The state courts are required to apply federal
constitutional standards, and they necessarily create a considerable body of “federal law” in
the process. It is not surprising that this Court has become more interested in
the application and development of federal law by state courts in the light of
the recent significant expansion of federally created standards that we have
imposed on the States.343

The Long Court adopted a presumption that decisions rendered on claims
concerning state courts’ interpretation or application of federal
constitutional law were within the Court’s jurisdiction on certiorari; allowing
the Court to review such claims encourages uniformity in the application of
federal constitutional protections in state criminal proceedings.344
Stone v. Powell furthers the Court’s goal of ensuring a relatively uniform
application of Supreme Court precedent in defining Fourth Amendment
protections while reserving the authority to determine when those
protections should be reconsidered.345 What is not true, however, is the
suggestion that the Court has refused to engage in further discussion of
privacy issues, or declined to expand Fourth Amendment protections, even
though the Court’s docket is relatively limited due to the small number of
cases in which certiorari is granted each year.346

342. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (“[A] State . . . may not impose such
greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when the United States Supreme Court
specifically refrains from imposing them.”); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (reversing
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, thereby indicating that lower court’s may not have
the power to act where higher courts have purposefully avoided in order to establish protections).
343. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 n.8 (1983) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
344. Id. at 1042; see supra text accompanying note 199.
345. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 480–82 (1976) (concluding the nature and purpose of the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule “does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was
introduced at his trial”).
346. See supra text accompanying note 12.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020

69

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2020], No. 3, Art. 2

654

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:585

A brief review of the Court’s decisions in Fourth Amendment cases
illustrates the point that, while certiorari affords the only basis for arguing
for expansion of privacy protection, the virtual elimination of these claims
in the federal habeas process has not foreclosed development of the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area. For instance, in 1980, the Court decided
Payton v. New York,347 determining that law enforcement officers may only
enter a suspect’s residence to effect an arrest upon the issuance of a warrant,
thereby upholding the expectation of privacy in the home.348 More
recently, in the 2018 case of Collins v. Virginia,349 the Court reversed a state
court ruling and held that the automobile exception does not permit
warrantless entry by officers into a home or its curtilage for the purposes of
searching a vehicle located on the property.350 The search involved a
motorcycle partially parked beneath an overhang of the home’s roof, which
the Court determined was within the home’s curtilage.351
The development of Fourth Amendment protections concerning the
home has also been marked in recent years by decisions rendered in the
certiorari process when initiated by the state, as in Georgia v. Randolph.352
There, the Court held that an occupant’s refusal to consent to a search of a
shared residence precluded a warrantless search even when another
occupant with standing has consented to the search.353 The petitioner in
Fernandez v. California354 sought to extend the Randolph rationale following
his conviction, which was based on evidence seized after a present occupant
of the residence consented to the search, while the petitioner was not
present and did not object until after the search; the Court rejected the
argument offered by the non-consenting, non-present occupant.355 The
347. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
348. Id. at 602–03.
349. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018).
350. See id. at 1670 (“When a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to
gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Such conduct
thus is presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant.”) (citation omitted).
351. See id. at 1668 (“Upon further investigation, the officers learned that the motorcycle likely
was stolen and in the possession of petitioner Ryan Collins.”).
352. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), aff’g State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835
(Ga. 2004).
353. Id. at 115–16. The majority distinguished the case from United States v. Matlock, where the
objection of one occupant was not made contemporaneously with the search but was only raised after
the seizure leading to the defendant’s arrest. Id. at 111–12.
354. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292 (2014).
355. Id. at 294.
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Fernandez decision demonstrated the very narrow factual circumstances
underlying Randolph, with the majority explaining that police investigating a
violent crime encountered a woman and her child at a nearby residence who
displayed evidence of an assault.356 When Fernandez appeared at the front
door and told officers they had no basis to enter the home, they arrested
him for assault and placed him in a patrol car.357 The woman identified
Fernandez as her assailant and consented to the officer’s search of the
residence.358
In decisions addressing the scope of Fourth Amendment protection of
an individual’s home,359 certiorari affords litigants, whether the state360 or
the accused, the process for advancing claims for expansion or restriction
of privacy interests recognized for individuals under the Constitution. In
Kyllo v. United States,361 the Court extended protection of the home to
advanced technological search practices when thermal imaging was used to
measure heat production inside the home, thereby permitting detection of
marijuana cultivation from outside the home.362 The majority observed:
“The present case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than
naked-eye surveillance of a home. We have previously reserved judgment
356. Id. at 295.
357. Id. at 296.
358. See id. at 296 (“Lopez identified petitioner as his initial attacker, and petitioner was taken
to the police station for booking.”). The search produced evidence of the petitioner’s involvement in
an armed robbery and multiple weapons, resulting in him being charged with felon in possession, as
well as the assault charges. See id. at 296–97 (listing the items that were recovered by the officers).
359. Generally, police may not enter a home to search without a warrant.
See
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (“Searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.” (quoting Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004))). In Brigham City, the Court held that entry without a warrant was permissible
when officers “have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured
or imminently threatened with such injury.” Id.
360. For instance, in California v. Greenwood, the Court refused to find that the defendant had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his garbage that had been removed from his home, explaining:
It may well be that respondents did not expect that the contents of their garbage bags would
become known to the police or other members of the public. An expectation of privacy does not
give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, however, unless society is prepared to accept that
expectation as objectively reasonable.
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988); see also, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213–14 (1986) (holding no privacy interest precluded seizure of evidence observed from an airplane
flying over 1,000 feet above defendant’s property).
361. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
362. Id. at 29–30, 40.
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as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from
such a vantage point, if any, is too much.”363
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, succinctly characterized the impact
of technological development on the necessity of dealing with traditional
notions of Fourth Amendment protection of the home:
On the other hand, the antecedent question whether or not a
Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred is not so simple under our
precedent. The permissibility of ordinary visual surveillance of a home used
to be clear because, well into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.
....
It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.364

Kyllo thus not only resulted in a line being drawn regarding authority of
police to observe, then search, but also did so in terms of emerging
technology. Emerging technology will continue to influence Fourth
Amendment interpretation, as other recent decisions demonstrate,
reflecting the significance of Stone v. Powell in making certiorari a necessary
option for criminal defendants whose prospects for relief depend on the
Court’s singular authority for interpretation of the constitutional protection.
Thus, in Riley v. California,365 a near-unanimous Court366 confronted the
need for a novel interpretation of the Fourth Amendment required by the
cellular phone367—the most significant source for interpersonal
communication, as the Court observed:
These cases require us to decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine
applies to modern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent

363. Id. at 33.
364. Id. at 31–34.
365. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
366. Id. at 377. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court, with Justice Alito
concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 403 (Alito, J., concurring).
367. Id. at 378 (majority opinion). Chief Justice Roberts phrased the issue as: “whether the
police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who
has been arrested.”
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part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they
were an important feature of human anatomy. A smart phone of the sort
taken from Riley was unheard of ten years ago; a significant majority of
American adults now own such phones.368

The Court thus held that police generally may not lawfully search the
informational contents contained on a cell phone without a warrant, even if
the accused in possession of the phone has been properly placed under
arrest.369
In Carpenter v. United States,370 the Court, in a more fragmented decision,
extended the underlying principle of privacy relating to cell phone usage to
data collected and held by service providers tracking the location of phones
and, inadvertently, the very individuals using those phones—known as
“cell-site location information (CLSI).”371 The government relied on
information obtained from cell-phone service providers to corroborate
evidence of the involvement of individuals in a series of armed robberies of
electronics stores, coupled with a cooperating accomplice identifying
Carpenter as the leader.372 Carpenter challenged the government’s use of
data obtained without issuance of a search warrant supported by probable
cause; however, the data was admitted and established the location of his
cell phone during the robberies.373
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority that included
the liberal members of the Court, again reminded readers how the
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy has evolved: “For much of our
history, Fourth Amendment search doctrine was ‘tied to common-law
trespass’ and focused on whether ‘the government obtains information by
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.’”374
Although the data sought by the government was collected by private,
non-governmental entities, the Carpenter majority held that factor did not
368. Id. at 385. Significantly, of course, the Court’s history of interpreting Fourth Amendment
privacy protections was closely tied to the technological innovation of its time, such as in
Katz v. United States, which held that electronic surveillance constitutes a search. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 353–59 (1967).
369. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before
searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).
370. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
371. Id. at 2211–12, 2217.
372. Id. at 2212.
373. Id. at 2212–13.
374. Id. at 2213 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)).
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deprive the individual of his interest in personal privacy subject to the
warrant requirement.375 The majority concluded:
Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones
or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical
movements as captured through CSLI. The location information obtained
from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search.376

Carpenter, Riley, and Kyllo are examples of the exclusive importance of
certiorari in the development of Fourth Amendment doctrine addressing
the intersection of traditional privacy expectations and technological
innovation dramatically altering daily life. With the factual scenarios
underlying these decisions, which could not have been contemplated by the
Framers or those ratifying the Constitution and its Fourth Amendment,
certiorari also affords criminal defendants the only route to challenge less
technologically-profound searches, such as forced withdrawal of blood from
a driver suspected of driving while intoxicated. The question of forced
withdrawal of blood without a warrant was addressed in
Schmerber v. California.377 There, the Court upheld the seizure of the
suspect’s blood where delay in obtaining a warrant could reasonably have
resulted in destruction of evidence.378
Subsequently, the Court addressed the underlying rationale for
withdrawal of blood or other bodily substances without consent. In
Missouri v. McNeely,379 the state supreme court upheld the suppression of
blood alcohol evidence.380 In reaching this conclusion, the court
considered the then-existing disagreement among jurisdictions concerning
whether dissipation alone meets the exigency requirement, and rejected the
position that it did.381 The Supreme Court upheld the Missouri court on
375. Id. at 2217.
376. Id.
377. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
378. Id. at 770–71.
379. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).
380. State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 75 (Mo. 2012). The state court framed the issue: “The
issue before this Court is whether the natural dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence is alone a sufficient
exigency to dispense with the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 68.
381. Id. at 73 (“Wisconsin, Oregon, and Minnesota have adopted the rationale that the
rapid dissipation of alcohol alone constitutes a sufficient exigency to draw blood without a warrant.”).
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appeal, requiring consideration of the circumstances supporting the seizure
without a warrant on a case-by-case basis:382 “We hold that in drunk-driving
investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood
test without a warrant.”383
In Birchfield v. North Dakota,384 the Court addressed two important
unresolved issues implicated by McNeely. First, the majority differentiated
between breath and blood tests used to determine alcohol intoxication in
terms of the level of intrusion required for testing and the effect on the
individual’s privacy interests.385 It concluded that because the intrusion
inherent in breath testing is relatively slight, and breath tests are valuable for
enforcing the law prohibiting intoxicated driving, warrantless testing is
permitted under the Fourth Amendment.386 However, with respect to the
far greater intrusion involved in obtaining blood samples, Justice Alito,
writing for the majority, explained:
We reach a different conclusion with respect to blood tests. Blood tests are
significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light
of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test. Respondents
have offered no satisfactory justification for demanding the more intrusive
alternative without a warrant.387

The majority then concluded that the State’s reliance on the exception to
the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment based on searches
conducted incident to arrest could not save the seizure of the Petitioner’s
blood. It held:
Petitioner Birchfield was criminally prosecuted for refusing a warrantless
blood draw, and therefore the search he refused cannot be justified as a search
These state court decisions were overruled by implication by the Court’s decision in McNeely. Missouri,
569 U.S. at 165.
382. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 158.
383. Id. at 165.
384. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), rev’g 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015).
385. Id. at 2184–85.
386. See id. at 2184 (“Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need
for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to
arrests for drunk driving. The impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing
is great.”).
387. Id. at 2184.
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incident to his arrest or on the basis of implied consent. There is no indication
in the record or briefing that a breath test would have failed to satisfy the
State’s interests in acquiring evidence to enforce its drunk-driving laws against
Birchfield.
And North Dakota has not presented any case-specific
information to suggest that the exigent circumstances exception would have
justified a warrantless search. Unable to see any other basis on which to justify
a warrantless test of Birchfield’s blood, we conclude that Birchfield was
threatened with an unlawful search and that the judgment affirming his
conviction must be reversed.388

The Court then addressed a factually different problem arising in the
context of blood alcohol testing, providing evidentiary support for driving
while intoxicated or driving under the influence prosecutions in
Mitchell v. Wisconsin.389 At the conclusion of its 2018 Term, a plurality, again
led by Justice Alito, concluded that the unconscious state of the suspected
driver provided the additional case-specific factor supporting blood seizure
without a warrant.390 Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment while
arguing McNeely was wrongly decided.391
The development of blood seizure law is the product of the certiorari
process. The questions left open in Schmerber have allowed the Court to
refine its analysis in light of generally-applied Fourth Amendment
doctrine.392 These questions could not otherwise have been answered in
the federal habeas corpus process. Moreover, certiorari was the only remedy
available to Missouri to challenge its supreme court’s interpretation of
Fourth Amendment protections, permitting the argument for reversal based
on an overly-expansive view of privacy protections made by a state court.
This was cognizable in light of Long’s reservation of final authority for
388. Id. at 2186 (citation omitted).
389. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
390. Id. at 2539.
391. See id. at 2541 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the lack of a per se rule in McNeely ignored
that “a certain, dispositive fact is always present in some categories of cases.”). Justice Gorsuch
dissented, complaining that the Court should not have taken the case at all because the issue addressed
was not argued in the court below. Id. at 2551 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor, joined by
Justices Ginsberg and Kagan, also dissented, asserting that the Fourth Amendment protections
required securing a warrant whenever possible, and when not possible, police must justify their
warrantless search under a heavy burden of urgent need. See id. at 2550–51 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
392. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (“We thus conclude that the present
record shows no violation of petitioner’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures. It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on
the facts of the present case.”).
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interpretation of federal constitutional provisions by the Court itself.393 As
such, after Stone, certiorari remains the only procedural vehicle for
protecting the autonomy of the individual when state courts reject claims
urged by criminal defendants in state proceedings. For defendants and their
counsel, it is the process that must be considered in seeking expansion of
Fourth Amendment protections.
E. Relief Requires an Expansion of Existing Precedent in the Post-Conviction
Process
Finally, a fifth circumstance in which writ of certiorari addressed to the
Supreme Court is critical arises when a new rule or new interpretation or
application of precedent is required in order to obtain reversal of an adverse
ruling in post-conviction proceedings. Certiorari provides the only route to
remedy federal constitutional error that has been raised only in collateral
proceedings following the conclusion of the direct appeal.394 These claims
typically involve challenges to the effectiveness of counsel’s representation
at trial or on direct appeal.395 They may also include claims arising
or disclosed only after the trial or time for filing for new trial, such as
failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to the
defendant,396 jury misconduct during trial,397 or jury misconduct during

393. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983).
394. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-410(1) (West 2013) (“[E]very person convicted of a
crime is entitled as a matter of right to make applications for post-conviction review.”).
395. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“The defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.”).
396. E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring prosecutor to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense).
397. Juror misconduct may arise in the course of trial when jurors fail to disclose information
or respond falsely to questions raised in voir dire which are material to the defendant’s exercise of
peremptory challenges. See Ex parte Burgess, 21 So. 3d 746, 749 (Ala. 2008) (providing examples of
information the defense counsel was unaware of when able to exercise peremptory strikes). Burgess
was convicted of capital murder and initially sentenced to death, but after reversal and remand he was
sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 747. The intermediate court concluded that the claims of juror
misconduct were not cognizable in state post-conviction proceedings under ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32
because they could have been discovered through investigation and raised in a motion for new trial,
permitting review on direct appeal. Id. at 750. The supreme court reversed, finding that Burgess could
not reasonably have discovered the juror misconduct in time to include these allegations in his motion
for new trial or appeal. Id. at 754.
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deliberations.398
With respect to ineffective assistance claims, certiorari in this context is
particularly significant because the Supreme Court and lower courts have
consistently held that claims where counsel performed ineffectively should
typically be litigated in the post-conviction process, rather than in the trial
and direct appeal.399 In the test for assessing whether counsel has
performed defectively, the first prong of Strickland requires the petitioner
challenging counsel’s performance to demonstrate that counsel’s claimed
deficiency was objectively unreasonable.400 The Court explained:
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”401

Thus, in determining whether counsel’s performance met the
Sixth Amendment requirement for effective representation,402 the Court
directed that counsel’s decisions must be judged by the facts of the case
“viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”403 This means counsel’s
398. For instance, jury misconduct can occur when evidence excluded from trial is inadvertently
provided to jurors during deliberations and can contribute to an improper verdict. Larimore v. State,
833 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Ark. 1992).
399. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 500–01 (2003) (“When a claim is brought on
direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record that is not developed
precisely for, and is therefore often incomplete or inadequate for, the purpose of litigating or preserving
the claim.”). However, an ineffective assistance claim directed at trial counsel’s performance might be
litigated in the direct appeal process if initially presented in a motion for new trial, affording the parties
time to develop evidence relating to counsel’s performance in an evidentiary hearing. This provides a
record upon which the trial court can rule and the appellate court, on direct appeal, can review. See,
e.g., Missildine v. State, 863 S.W.2d 813, 818 (Ark. 1993) (“Although Rule 37 generally provides the
procedure for post-conviction relief due to ineffective counsel, this court has recognized such relief
may be awarded a defendant on direct appeal in limited circumstances.”). In Weaver v. Massachusetts, for
instance, the Court granted certiorari to review the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance based on
trial counsel’s failure to object to a violation of his public trial right. Weaver v. Massachusetts,
137 S. Ct. 1899, 1906–07 (2017). The claim had previously been raised in a motion for new trial and
rejected by the state trial court and Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Id. at 1907.
400. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.
401. Id. at 689.
402. The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is construed as the right to effective
assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
403. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
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effectiveness must be assessed retrospectively—after the conclusion of the
proceedings—otherwise, one cannot properly assess whether counsel’s
strategic decisions were successful.
1.

Certiorari: The Final Step in Federal Habeas Corpus Litigation

Consequently, the clear preference for post-conviction litigation of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims reflects the need for a complete
record, including counsel’s explanation for a particular course of action, in
order to correctly rule on the claim.404 Almost all ineffective assistance
claims will present federal constitutional issues.405 This warrants review in
both state and federal post-conviction proceedings, except for those arising
from arguably defective representation in discretionary or collateral
proceedings for which the Court’s decisions have recognized no protection
under the Sixth Amendment.406

404. Strickland involved the claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call witnesses
favorable to the defense at the defendant’s capital murder sentencing proceeding. Id. at 672–73.
Counsel explained that his strategy was to rely on Washington’s admission of culpability, rather than
character witnesses who would have added little to his defensive strategy. Id. at 699. This was found
to be reasonable in light of counsel recognizing the trial judge’s history of attaching particular
importance to the accused’s acceptance of responsibility for his actions. Id.
405. Arguably, some jurisdictions might apply a higher standard for counsel’s performance as a
matter of state constitutional law or practice so that a failure to perform effectively might be remedied
in state court proceedings, but would not state a federal constitutional claim affording the district court
jurisdiction in federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., infra notes 480, 482–94 (noting jurisdictions holding the
Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky requiring counsel to inform client of mandatory deportation
possibility would be applied retroactively under state law). But Strickland is the dominant, if not
universal, standard. E.g., Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (finding
Strickland standard consistent with prior state law and adopting Strickland); see also Luna v. Solem,
411 N.W.2d 656, 657–58 (S.D. 1987) (holding the higher standard for counsel’s performance
previously applicable would be abrogated with adoption of Strickland test for state prosecutions). In
Weaver v. Massachusetts, the Court held the state law ineffective assistance test, which provided that
counsel’s defective performance resulted in prejudice as a result of failure to challenge structural error,
would not relieve petitioner of the burden of demonstrating prejudice from violation of public trial
right as a matter of Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct.
1899, 1911 (2017).
406. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (holding there is no constitutional right to
assistance of counsel for indigent state court defendants sentenced to death); Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551, 555–56 (1987) (asserting there is no Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel for
an indigent litigant during a collateral attack of a conviction or sentence); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
618–19 (1974) (holding there is no Fourteenth Amendment violation when the state does not afford
an indigent defendant counsel for purposes of the state appellate process once counsel has provided
representation to the defendant in the initial appeal).
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There are two distinct routes for review by certiorari for claims initially
raised in post-conviction proceedings, following conclusion of the direct
appeal. In state post-conviction hearings, the petitioner raising claims
arising from federal constitutional protections may petition for review by
writ of certiorari once the claims have been fully exhausted in state
post-conviction appeal or the discretionary review process.407
Alternatively, federal and state court defendants who have petitioned
unsuccessfully for relief in proceedings under Sections 2255408 or 2254,409
respectively, may ultimately petition the Court for review by certiorari once
the relevant court of appeals has rejected their claims.410
Petitions to the courts of appeals are not a matter of right, however, and
federal and state court defendants are required to obtain leave to proceed
for review of district court determinations.411 Appellate review of an
adverse decision rendered by the district court in a Section 2255 proceeding
is dependent upon issuance of a certificate of appealability, as provided in
Section 2253(c):
(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an
appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention
complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which
specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).412

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See supra Part IV, especially notes 64–73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 42.
See supra notes 4 and 21.
See supra Part IV, especially notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2018).
Id. § 2253(c).
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The process for obtaining the necessary Certification of Appealability
(COA) is not precisely specified in the statute.413 The petitioner should
initially request issuance of the COA for those issues on which appeal is
sought, although often the district court—or magistrate judge, sitting in the
fact-finding process for the district judge—will include a ruling on the COA
in the order that will eventually be entered.414 If the district court enters an
order denying the COA in whole or part, the petitioner may then file for the
COA in the court of appeals.415 There is no process proscribed for filing
the request in the court of appeals; however, the Eighth Circuit, for instance,
explains such requests are treated as motions requiring compliance with
motion rules.416 Significantly, the COA may encompass all or only some
of the issues presented in the petition and decided adversely to the petitioner
and the order granting the COA must specify the issues upon which the
district court finds that the COA is appropriate.417
The COA issuance test was set by the Supreme Court in
Slack v. McDaniel,418 and requires the petitioner to show that “reasonable
jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented
were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”419 This
suggests there is some tension or overlap, in theory, between the test for
relief on the claim asserted in the federal habeas petition and the COA
test.420 In order to obtain relief in Section 2254, the petitioner must show
that the state court’s decision was unreasonable, not simply incorrect; as
such, if reasonable jurists disagree on the reasonableness of the state court
decision, the habeas court should defer to the state court’s determination of

413. Id.
414. 6 MARK S. RHODES, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, in ORFIELD’S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES app. C (2019).
415. Id.
416. See EIGHTH CIRCUIT APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL § 19.3F (8th ed. 2018) (asserting
the normally applicable motion rules outlined in the Motions Practice and Summary Disposition on
Appeal apply, including page limits, copies to be filed, and service of process).
417. See id. (“The certificate must specify the issue or issues that satisfy the showing . . . and the
court of appeals will limit its review to those issues on which appeal is granted.”).
418. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
419. Id. at 484 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
420. See id. at 484–85 (“Determining whether a COA should issue where the petition was
dismissed on procedural grounds has two components . . . . Section 2253 mandates that both
showings be made before the court of appeals may entertain the appeal.”).
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the legal issues.421 If either the district or circuit court grants a COA,
however, that determination indicates reasonable jurists disagree about the
habeas court’s denial of relief on the claim upon review of the state court
ruling.422
As the Court found in Hohn v. United States,423 if the circuit court denies
a COA, the statutory scheme permits the habeas petitioner to seek review
of the denial of appeal by application for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
In Hohn, the Court held that, because the district and circuit courts refused
to grant a COA, upon denial of appeal the Court could consider the denial
as a final order of the circuit court, subject to review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).424
The certiorari petition is, in a sense, a routine element of practice in
federal habeas corpus litigation because counsel appointed to represent
defendants in federal habeas actions are typically compensated for litigating
through certiorari.425 Federal public defenders represent indigent litigants,
with private counsel appointed when required by conflict of interest or
limited resource issues. Additionally, federal law provides for compensation
of counsel representing state court defendants sentenced to death,426 or in
non-death cases, when appointment of counsel is warranted by the
complexity of issues or potential for meritorious claims.427
421. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2018). But, if the district court has “grave doubt” about whether the
federal habeas petitioner has met the burden of proving a federal constitutional, relief must be granted.
O’Neal v. McAinich, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995) (“[W]hen a habeas court is in grave doubt as to the
harmlessness of an error that affects substantial rights, it should grant relief.”). O’Neal was issued prior
to amendment of Section 2254 with adoption of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and ultimately may not have survived the statutory amendments as a
controlling rule of law. See Harding v. Walls, 300 F.3d 824, 828 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002) (questioning the
continuing viability of O’Neal in light of AEDPA (citing Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 798, 898 n.3
(7th Cir. 2000))).
422. Slack, 529 U.S. at 483–84.
423. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 247–50 (1998). The Court noted the statutory
limitation on its jurisdiction to review decisions of the intermediate appellate courts denying leave for
the petitioner to file a successive petition by certiorari set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E). Id. at 249.
Because no comparable language precluded review of a denial of COA by certiorari, the Court
concluded that Congress had not intended to limit its jurisdiction in this respect. Id. at 250.
424. Id. at 253.
425. See supra note 18.
426. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2018) (including compensation for representation of defendants
challenging death sentences in proceedings under Sections 2255 or 2254); id. § 3599(g) (detailing the
fees afforded appointed attorneys).
427. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a).
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Because substantial federal habeas litigation involves challenges to
death sentences imposed in state court trials, certiorari is virtually a
mandatory step428 in the process of challenging the imposition of the
sentence429 or its execution.430 These cases also often resolve important
issues governing criminal prosecutions, generally addressing the process for
determining the accused’s guilt on the capital charge.
An example of the Court’s ability and willingness to expand upon existing
precedent in the review of an adverse decision rendered by an intermediate
court in the federal habeas process is provided in Kyles v. Whitley.431 After
an initial mistrial, Kyles was convicted and sentenced to death even though
there were numerous violations of the prosecutorial duty to disclose
evidence favorable to the defense, which Brady v. Maryland 432 held to be a
violation of due process.433 One eyewitness who testified at the first trial
428. Some capital defendants, however, elect to waive post-appeal challenges for discretionary
proceedings and may do so if competent to make the waiver decision. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 165–66 (1990) (rejecting next friend status for litigant seeking to intervene to prevent execution
of competent capital inmate waiving right to challenge death sentence).
429. E.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009). The petitioner challenged his death sentence
in a federal habeas corpus action, initially obtaining relief in the district court on his claim attacking
counsel’s representation in the capital sentencing process. Id. at 31. After the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and ordered relief, noting:
Unlike the evidence presented during Porter’s penalty hearing, which left the jury knowing hardly
anything about him other than the facts of his crimes, the new evidence described his abusive
childhood, his heroic military service and the trauma he suffered because of it, his long-term
substance abuse, and his impaired mental health and mental capacity.
Id. at 33; see also, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S 510, 534 (2003) (holding counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to investigate fully and offer mitigating evidence at a capital sentencing hearing).
430. In challenging the method of execution as violative of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court has recognized that such challenges may
be raised in civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ultimately reviewed by the Court
in the certiorari process. See, e.g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1129–30 (2019) (holding that a
death sentenced inmate challenging mode of execution used by state authorities as “cruel and unusual”
must offer an alternative mode of execution that could be used to carry out the execution “relatively
easily and reasonably quickly,” and also requiring that inmate to demonstrate that the alternative
method “would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.”).
431. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 458 (1995).
432. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
433. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 431–32; see also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004) (“We have held
that when the State suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence, the good or bad faith
of the prosecution is irrelevant: a due process violation occurs whenever such evidence is withheld.”).
Brady originally upheld the decision of the state court, finding a violation when the prosecutor failed to
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later recanted, claiming that she was influenced to identify Kyles by
prosecutors who assured her of his guilt and the necessity for her
testimony.434
Additionally, the prosecution failed to disclose a significant number of
individual items of evidence favorable to Kyles.435 The undisclosed
evidence in Kyles, alone, ran the gamut of evidence that might be
characterized as exculpatory with the exception of the confession to the crime
by another, as in Brady, or scientific evidence, such as DNA evidence,
essentially excluding the accused. It included non-disclosure of prior,
inconsistent statements by witnesses describing the suspect.436 It also
included evidence tending to exclude the defendant by impeaching a
conclusion drawn by police; here, a list of license plates of cars found at the
scene of the robbery and recorded by police did not include the plate from
Kyles’s car, undermining the police theory that he had driven to the
location.437
The police relied extensively on information supplied by an informant,
“Beanie,” who used different names in his discussions with police,438 and
whose credibility was possibly in doubt because of his romantic interest in
Kyles’s wife.439 “Beanie” provided information leading police to the
discovery of the murder weapon and the victim’s purse.440 Further,

disclose the co-defendant’s confession to the capital murder in which he admitted that he had actually
killed the victim, a fact that might have influenced jurors not to impose a death sentence in Brady’s
case. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. Brady petitioned for certiorari, challenging the remand ordered by the state
court was limited to resentencing only, rather than a new trial. The Court upheld the state court’s
limited remand, holding that the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence relevant to either the guilt or
sentencing phases of a case violates due process. Id. at 87.
434. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 431 n.6.
435. Id. at 431.
436. Id. at 423. The descriptions of the suspect given by the six eyewitnesses were inconsistent
as to age, height, build, facial hair and hair style. All six described the suspect as black. Id.
437. Id. at 423–24.
438. See id. at 424 n.3 (noting the witness’s use of “so many aliases” leading the majority to refer
to him as “Beanie” throughout its opinion).
439. See id. at 424 n.4 (noting Kyles was the common law husband of the sister of Beanie’s
roommate). The defense contended that Beanie’s romantic interest in Kyles’s common law wife gave
him a motive to implicate Kyles and remove him as an “impediment” to establishing a relationship
with her. Id. at 428.
440. Id. at 425. Beanie told police that if Kyles were “smart” he would discard the purse in his
garbage the following day. Perhaps not surprisingly, police recovered the victim’s purse from Kyles’s
garbage. Id. at 429.
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“Beanie” was a suspect in a similar crime,441 and admitted to officers that
he thought he might be suspected in the crime for which Kyles was later
prosecuted.442 Because of these significant factors potentially influencing
“Beanie” to implicate Kyles in order to exculpate himself in the commission
of the murder and theft of the victim’s automobile, the credibility of the
prosecution’s case at Kyles’s retrial was ultimately considered
questionable.443
In the Fifth Circuit,444 Judge King offered a thorough analysis of the
quantity and significance of evidence developed after the retrial, but not
disclosed to Kyles’s defense counsel, that undermined the credibility of the
prosecution’s case.445 Her review of the trial evidence in light of the
undisclosed evidence known to the prosecution, or members of the
prosecution team, led her to conclude:
With deference to my distinguished and able colleagues in the majority, I
dissent from their affirmance of the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas
corpus. For the first time in my fourteen years on this court—during which
I have participated in the decision of literally dozens of capital habeas cases—
I have serious reservations about whether the State has sentenced to death the
right man. My reservations are directly relevant to the two main constitutional
claims that Kyles has raised—an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and a
Brady claim.446

Her arguments proved persuasive for a majority of the Court on
certiorari. Yet, Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous dissent, complaining that the

441. Id.
442. Id. at 425. Beanie’s concern was apparently grounded in the fact that he had been driving
the car owned by the victim of the murder. He claimed that he had purchased the car from Kyles. Id.
443. Id. at 430.
444. Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1993).
445. Id. at 820–44 (King, J., dissenting).
446. Id. at 820. In concluding her dissent, Judge King reiterated her view that the constitutional
violations warranted reversal of Kyles’s conviction, while also expressing her concern about the
reliability of the prosecution’s case in charging him, leading her to note “Judge Learned Hand once
wrote that ‘[o]ur procedure has always been haunted by the ghost of an innocent man convicted. It is
an unreal dream.’ I fear that in this instance it is not simply a dream. I therefore dissent.” Id. at 844
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)).
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Court should not have granted certiorari for the purpose of correcting error
in the lower court.447
Although the Justices would generally agree with Justice Scalia’s view
concerning error correction in Kyles,448 his observation failed to address the
important development in Brady, the disclosure duty that characterized the
majority’s concern in granting review. The majority was concerned that the
cumulative effect of undisclosed evidence favorable to the defense
undermined the credibility of the capital conviction.449 The majority
pointed to the conclusions of the two Fifth Circuit panel members who
voted to uphold the conviction that individual items of undisclosed evidence
would not have been sufficient,450 alone, to meet the Brady test, which
requires a showing of a reasonable probability that, but for the

447. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 457–58 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent. He wrote:
The greatest puzzle of today’s decision in what could have caused this capital case to be singled
out for favored treatment. Perhaps it has been randomly selected as a symbol, to reassure America
that the United States Supreme Court is reviewing capital convictions to make sure no factual
error has been made. If so, it is a false symbol, for we assuredly do not do that. At, and during
the week preceding, our February 24 Conference, for example, we considered and disposed of
10 petitions in capital cases, from seven States. We carefully considered whether the convictions
and sentences in those cases had been obtained in reliance upon correct principles of federal law;
but if we had tried to consider, in addition, whether those correct principles had been applied,
not merely plausibly, but accurately, to the particular facts of each case, we would have done
nothing else for the week. The reality is that responsibility for factual accuracy, in capital cases as in other
cases, rests elsewhere—with trial judges and juries, state appellate courts, and the lower federal courts; we do nothing
but encourage foolish reliance to pretend otherwise.
Id. (emphasis added).
448. E.g., Overton v. Ohio, 534 U.S. 982, 982 (2001) (Breyer, J., statement respecting denial of
certiorari). Justice Breyer explained:
I consequently conclude that the City of Toledo clearly violated the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. Because the Court already has answered directly the basic legal question presented
in this case, I would not grant certiorari for the purpose of hearing that question argued once
again. I would, however, summarily reverse the decision below. I realize that we cannot act as a court
of simple error correction and that the unpublished intermediate court decision below lacks significant value as
precedent. Nonetheless, the matter has a general aspect. . . . [T]he clarity of the constitutional error
convinces me that the appropriate disposition of this case is a summary reversal.
Id. (emphasis added).
449. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421 (explaining the proper application of Brady disclosure obligation turns
on “cumulative effect” of undisclosed evidence).
450. Id. at 440.
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non-disclosure, “the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”451 The majority characterized their approach:
There is room to debate whether the two judges in the majority in the
Court of Appeals made an assessment of the cumulative effect of the
evidence. Although the majority’s Brady discussion concludes with the
statement that the court was not persuaded of the reasonable probability that
Kyles would have obtained a favorable verdict if the jury had been “exposed
to any or all of the undisclosed materials,” the opinion also contains repeated
references dismissing particular items of evidence as immaterial and so
suggesting that cumulative materiality was not the touchstone.452

Thus, the majority concluded: “The result reached by the Fifth Circuit
majority is compatible with a series of independent materiality evaluations,
rather than the cumulative evaluation required by Bagley[.]”453 It then
proceeded to explain why the cumulative effect of the individual items of
evidence favorable to the defense undermined the credibility of the
prosecution’s case.454
The majority’s refinement of the rule governing the prosecution’s duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence, that multiple non-disclosures must be
assessed cumulatively for probable prejudice to the defendant’s right to due
process and fair trial, reflected express recognition in the refinement—by
expansion—of the Brady disclosure principle.455 Justice Scalia’s complaint
simply ignored the fact that the majority’s approach in Kyles reflected more
than a simple correction of error. It resulted in an important expansion of
law governing the scope of review of multiple claims of Brady-disclosure
duty violations arising in a single criminal prosecution.456 Kyles
451. See id. at 433–34 (citing United States v. Bagley, 433 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)) (refining Brady
test for relief).
452. Id. at 440 (citation omitted).
453. Id. at 441.
454. Id. at 441–45.
455. Thus the Court’s decision in Kyles did not simply involve application of existing doctrine
to correct procedural error, but actually included formal articulation of a new principle governing
disposition of due process claims arising under Brady. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436–38 (stating the
prosecutor’s “responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level
of importance is inescapable.”).
456. Brady requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution to
the defense, regardless of whether the evidence was exculpatory on the question of the accused’s guilt,
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demonstrates the Court’s ability to use the certiorari process available at the
conclusion of the federal habeas corpus process to announce such a
refinement, if not a new rule, of constitutional criminal procedure.
2. Certiorari Following Conclusion of State Post-Conviction
Proceedings
Once the state court defendant has petitioned for post-conviction relief
and exhausted the state court remedies, the defendant has the option of
petitioning for review of his federal constitutional claim by writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court. The decision, or determination, rejecting the claim
by the “highest court of the state” that could have granted relief will
constitute a final order authorizing review by the Court pursuant to
§ 1257(a).457 Any doubt as to the Court’s supremacy with respect to
deference required of state courts to its authority in interpreting federal
constitutional protections was resolved in Montgomery v. Louisiana.458 There,
the Court held that state post-conviction courts are bound by its rulings, and
required Louisiana to apply Miller v. Alabama.459
Consequently, while state post-conviction courts considering federal
constitutional claims are required to properly comprehend Supreme Court
precedent, there is the possibility that state defendants will assert federal
constitutional challenges that have not yet been addressed by the Court. The
claims presented that are neither foreclosed, nor dictated by its precedent
may be particularly ripe issues for review by certiorari once they have been
fully exhausted in the state proceedings. Claims of ineffective assistance of
trial or appellate counsel are clearly within the scope of certiorari provided

or the sentence imposed. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963). Subsequently, in
United States v. Agurs, the Court held that disclosure was an affirmative obligation for prosecutors and
not dependent upon timely request for discovery by defense counsel. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 107 (1976). The Court expanded the scope of the disclosure duty in Bagley, holding that the duty
was not restricted to exculpatory evidence, but included material impeachment evidence. Bagley,
473 U.S. at 675–76. The Kyles holding was critical in directing reviewing courts to consider the
cumulative impact of multiple infractions under the test for establishing a due process violation;
whether there was a reasonable probability that but for the failure to disclose, the outcome would have
been different. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. It also resolved, finally, that disclosure was not limited to
evidence in the possession of the prosecutor, but covered evidence in the possession of law
enforcement investigators, as members of the prosecution team. Id. at 437–38.
457. See supra text accompanying note 47.
458. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
459. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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that they have been predicated on Sixth Amendment violations, but other
claims of federal constitutional violations may be cognizable as well.
Thus, in Yates v. Evatt (Yates IV),460 the Court engaged in a rather lengthy
battle461 with the South Carolina courts with respect to the claim that the
jury instructions given at petitioner’s state trial unconstitutionally shifted the
burden of proof to the accused.462 The Court reversed the state supreme
court, which had denied relief without issuing an opinion, and remanded.463
On remand, the state court found the jury instruction unconstitutional, but
concluded that the error was harmless,464 again leading the Court to grant
certiorari in Yates v. Aiken (Yates II),465 out of concern that the state court
had failed to consider the retroactive effect of Francis v. Franklin.466 The
Court held the result in Francis to be dictated by Sandstrom v. Montana,467 and
therefore, applicable in Yates’s state court proceeding.468
The Court granted certiorari for a third time,469 and again reversed the
state supreme court’s disposition on the federal due process claim.470 On
this final reversal, the Court did not remand for consideration of harm,
explaining: “Because this case has already been remanded twice, once for
460. Yates v. Evatt (Yates IV), 500 U.S. 391 (1991).
461. See id. at 393 (“This murder case comes before us for the third time, to review a
determination by the Supreme Court of South Carolina that instructions allowing the jury to apply
unconstitutional presumptions were harmless error. We hold that the State Supreme Court employed
a deficient standard of review, find that the errors were not harmless, and reverse.”). The Court had
previously denied certiorari following affirmance of the conviction by the state supreme court on direct
appeal. See Yates v. South Carolina (Yates I), 462 U.S. 1124, 1124 (1983) (denying certiorari before
Yates asserted his federal due process claim in state post-conviction proceedings).
462. The Court initially granted review on the claim that the jury instruction violated the due
process protection afforded by Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), and its decision in Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), which was issued while the state habeas corpus petition was pending.
Yates v. Aiken (Yates II), 474 U.S. 896 (1985).
463. Id.
464. State v. Yates, 391 S.E.2d 530, 531 (S.C. 1989).
465. Yates v. Aiken (Yates III), 484 U.S. 211, 214 (1988).
466. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); see Yates III, 484 U.S. at 212–13 (explaining that
while the state habeas petition was pending, they delivered an opinion on unconstitutional
burden-shifting jury instructions in Francis, which the state court failed to consider when it denied relief
without opinion).
467. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
468. Yates III, 484 U.S. at 214.
469. Yates IV, 500 U.S. 391, 400 (1991) (“Because the Supreme Court of South Carolina
appeared to have applied the wrong standard for determining whether the challenged instructions were
harmless error, and to have misread the record to which the standard was applied, we granted certiorari
to review this case a third time.”).
470. Id. at 411.
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harmless-error analysis, we think we would serve judicial economy best by
proceeding now to determine whether the burden-shifting jury instructions
were harmless.”471 Ironically, within just over six months, a majority
rejected the specific language used in Yates IV, respecting the test for
prejudice when reviewing a due process claim based on impermissible
burden-shifting to the defense.472
Yates represents the rare case where a federal constitutional claim that was
not resolved on direct appeal is reviewed by certiorari after being rejected in
the state post-conviction process. The more likely claim being raised in state
post-conviction proceedings is one addressing counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness. The requirement for exhaustion of federal claims in the trial
and appellate process through the highest state court as a predicate for
certiorari under Section 1257(a),473 combined with the policy preference
for development of ineffective assistance claims in post-conviction
proceedings,474 makes state post-conviction process a virtual necessity for
state court defendants challenging their convictions or sentences on federal
constitutional grounds. Consequently, review by certiorari following
rejection by state courts is critical when relief will require a creative response
by either imposing a new rule, or significantly expanding or refining existing
Supreme Court precedent.
The Court’s decisions in two cases where certiorari was granted after
denials of relief in state proceedings, Padilla v. Kentucky475 and
Hinton v. Alabama,476 demonstrate the potential significance for
development of ineffective assistance law. In both cases, the issues
addressed might have been raised on direct appeal had they been preserved

471. Id. at 407.
472. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991) (rejecting the test based on what a
“reasonable juror” “could” or “would have done” in light of a challenged jury instruction as referenced
in Yates, and instead focusing on “‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the
challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S.
370, 380 (1990))).
473. See supra text accompanying note 47.
474. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (“We hold that an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255,
whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal.”).
475. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
476. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014).
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by a motion for new trial, but the fact that they were not did not bar state
post-conviction review, or ultimately, review by the Court.477
In Padilla, the Court considered a claim of particularly important political
significance: whether trial counsel has a duty to advise an accused
non-citizen that the consequence of conviction would subject him to
immediate deportation.478 Padilla had been a legal resident of the
United States for forty years and served in the Vietnam War, but was
charged with trafficking marijuana.479 Padilla claimed his counsel advised
he “did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the
country so long,” and that he “relied on his counsel’s erroneous advice when
he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his deportation virtually
mandatory.”480
Padilla reflects the Court’s recognition of deportation as a “particularly
severe penalty”481 as a collateral consequence of conviction, though it does
not directly impact the sentencing options available to the court upon
conviction.482 With respect to this latter distinction, the majority carefully
limited the reach of its holding that counsel’s failure to admonish Padilla in
the circumstances of his case constituted ineffective assistance.483 The

477. See id. at 1083 (addressing whether “Hinton’s trial attorney rendered constitutionally
deficient performance.”); Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360 (determining whether Padilla’s counsel had an
obligation to advise him that his guilty plea would lead to deportation).
478. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359. Deportation consequences of criminal prosecutions are significant
because of the numbers of exposed undocumented individuals. Id. at 360.
479. Id. at 359
480. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)). The state
supreme court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for discretionary review and reversed the decision
of the appellate court, which remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing in the circuit court of
conviction sitting as the post-conviction court, pursuant to KY. R. CR. 11.42. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d
at 483.
481. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365.
482. The Court noted:
The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more
important. These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an
integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed
on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.
Id. at 364.
483. Id. at 366 (acknowledging how “deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction
is, . . . uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or collateral consequence[,]” and concluding that
advice regarding deportation does not fall outside the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
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majority explained that counsel’s representation was defective—the first
prong of Strickland 484—because:
Padilla’s counsel provided him false assurance that his conviction would not
result in his removal from this country. This is not a hard case in which to
find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be determined
from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively
mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was incorrect.485

Though the Court held counsel’s assistance to be ineffective, it
recognized that in less certain situations trial counsel’s duty to advise the
client might be satisfied by a warning that conviction might result in “a risk
of adverse immigration consequences.”486 However, the Court observed
that “when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case,
the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”487
Padilla reflected the unquestionable significance of the collateral
consequence of deportation after conviction and the Court’s decision
expanded counsel’s recognized obligations to advise such at-risk clients.
The Kentucky court found that counsel had no duty to advise the client of
the “collateral consequence” of deportation, holding that such advice was
“outside the scope of representation required by the Sixth Amendment,”
and thus not a basis for an ineffective assistance claim.488 Instead, the
majority concluded:
We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral
consequences to define the scope of constitutionally “reasonable professional
assistance” required under Strickland. Whether that distinction is appropriate
is a question we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature
of deportation.489

The direct/collateral consequence distinction is, thus, not necessarily
determinative of counsel’s duties in advising the client contemplating
484. The “first prong” is a showing that counsel’s performance was, in fact, defective, and not
the product of an objectively reasonable strategy undertaken by counsel in light of the circumstances
of the case. See supra notes 395–99 and accompanying text.
485. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368–69.
486. Id. at 369.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 365 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)).
489. Id. at 365 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
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entering of a guilty plea.490 The Court’s observation not only provides a
basis for expansion of counsel’s duty to advise the client when deportation
is a consequence of conviction, but also suggests that there could be other
consequences requiring counsel’s advice with respect to a client’s waiver of
trial and entry of a guilty plea.491 For example, jurisdictions are split over
whether trial counsel has a duty to advise a client with respect to mandatory
registration as a sex offender492 in the event of conviction on the accused’s
guilty plea to a qualifying offense.493 Some jurisdictions have held that
advice regarding registration is not required for effective representation
because it is a “collateral,” not “direct,” consequence of conviction.494
Others have followed the Court’s view in Padilla, rejecting the
direct/collateral distinction in characterization as necessarily determinative
of counsel’s duty to advise the client properly with respect to the waiver of
trial and entry of a guilty plea that will result in conviction.495
Padilla’s importance lies not only in its expansion of counsel’s duties in
advising the accused of deportation consequences of conviction from the
entry of a guilty plea, but also in petitioning for certiorari following
conclusion of the state post-conviction process. The Court’s holding
490. See id. at 366 (stating that the collateral versus direct distinction is ill-suited in evaluating a
Strickland claim concerning deportation).
491. Id. at 370 (rejecting to limit the holding to “affirmative misadvice”).
492. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2018) (criminalizing a knowing failure to register as a sex offender).
493. Some jurisdictions have held that counsel’s failure to properly advise a client facing
mandatory registration upon conviction fails to provide effective assistance, satisfying at least the
defective performance, or first prong of Strickland. See United States v. Shepherd, 880 F.3d 734, 742
(5th Cir. 2018) (concluding counsel’s failure to correctly assess defendant’s registration status under
Texas law based on out-of-state convictions constituted ineffective assistance); United States v. Riley,
72 M.J. 115, 121 (Mil. Ct. App. 2013) (holding military court should not accept guilty pleas requiring
registration without determining the accused has been advised of consequences of conviction);
Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. App. 2010) (ruling, prospectively, that counsel is required to
advise client of registration requirement upon conviction); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 548 S.W.3d
881, 892 (Ky. 2018) (rejecting direct/collateral differentiation in holding counsel must advise client of
registration consequence in order to provide effective representation); People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d
878, 890 (Mich. App. 2008) (discussing direct/collateral distinction in consequences of conviction of
guilty pleas and holding counsel’s assistance was ineffective on record where accused repeatedly
explained that he would not have entered a guilty plea had he been advised that he would be required
to register as sex offender upon his conviction).
494. Thompson, 548 S.W.3d at 890–91 (citing People v. Gravino, 928 N.E.2d 1048, 1049 (2010)).
495. See id. at 891–92 (citing Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 879 (Ky. 2018))
(reviewing discussions of direct/collateral consequence analysis in other jurisdictions and following
Padilla by rejecting the distinction as determinative with respect to sex offender registration and parole
eligibility consequences of conviction as a violent offender).
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reflects announcement of either a new rule, or the expansion of application
of existing precedent, that could not have been initiated in the federal habeas
corpus process. Following Padilla, with other significant changes in
constitutional criminal procedure,496 subsequent litigation focused on
whether the Padilla rule would be applied retroactively to cases finalized at
the conclusion of the direct appeal process.
When the argument for retroactive application was made in Chaidez v.
United States,497 the Court held that Padilla was not subject to retroactive
application, based on Teague.498 The Court granted certiorari to resolve
conflicts in decisions rendered by lower federal and state courts on the
issue.499 Interestingly, the issue of retroactive application arose in a petition
for coram nobis relief because the conviction on Chaidez’s guilty plea resulted
in imposition of a probated sentence, and she was not in custody on that
charge at the time the deportation proceedings were instituted.500 But, the
procedural distinction between habeas corpus and coram nobis had no bearing
on the determination that Padilla was not retroactive.501
Thus, while Padilla was able to successfully argue that counsel had a duty
to advise an accused with respect to immigration consequences of a
conviction in explaining waiver of the jury trial right on entry of a guilty plea,
he was only able to do so because he raised the federal constitutional claim
in state post-conviction proceedings. The Chaidez Court rejected her claim
for retroactive application of its holding in Padilla, finding that it had
announced a new rule in imposing this burden on defense counsel.502 The
496. E.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (holding Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004) was not retroactive).
497. Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013).
498. Id. at 344.
499. Id. at 347.
500. Id. at 345. The Court explained:
A petition for a writ of coram nobis provides a way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction for a
person, like Chaidez, who is no longer “in custody” and therefore cannot seek habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241 . . . . Chaidez and the Government agree that nothing in this case
turns on the difference between a coram nobis petition and a habeas petition, and we assume
without deciding that they are correct.
Id. at 345 n.1 (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507, 510–11 (1954).
501. Id. at 347.
502. Id. at 354. Following the decision, immigration lawyers sought to develop strategies for
application of Padilla’s ineffective assistance obligation retroactively in an effort to avoid the limitation
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lower federal courts could not have expanded counsel’s obligation in a
habeas action because only the Supreme Court can announce a new rule of
federal constitutional procedure,503 and federal habeas relief is only
available for review of a decision contrary to or reflecting an unreasonable
application of existing Supreme Court precedent.504
The Court’s explanation of the limitation imposed by Teague is particularly
important for petitioners who seek to expand upon existing ineffective
assistance law, such as recognition of a Sixth Amendment duty to advise an
accused of a mandatory duty to register as a sex offender upon conviction.
It explained that the application of an existing rule or principle to a different
set of facts will not necessarily amount to a new rule of constitutional criminal
procedure. Thus, within the framework of the effective representation duty,
defective performance may be assigned to factually novel circumstances not
previously addressed, but rather clearly included within the general duty
recognized under Strickland.505
Padilla also illustrates another option for state court defendants whose
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may rest precariously on whether
the Supreme Court would view the consequences of conviction as direct or
collateral. Direct consequences will require counsel’s accurate advice in
order to ensure that a client pleading guilty understands the ramifications of
the conviction that will be imposed. But collateral consequences, even on
such important matters as parole eligibility,506 may not fall within the ambit
imposed in Chaidez. See Seeking Post-Conviction Relief Under Padilla v. Kentucky After Chaidez v. U.S.,
IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT (Feb. 28, 2013), https://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/Chaidez-advisory-FINAL-201302281.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPC5-9BZS] (laying
out strategies to seek post-conviction relief for clients unaware of immigration consequences of a guilty
plea). This strategy was published and available online within eight days of issuance of the decision of
Chaidez on February 20, 2013. See id. (“On February 20, 2013 . . . the Court held . . . that Padilla is a
‘new rule’ that does not apply retroactively to Ms. Chaidez’s case.”).
503. Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120–21 (1995); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396–97
(1994).
504. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2018). Section 2254(d)(1) expressly provides that relief may be
granted only when the state court ruling on a federal constitutional claim has “resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
505. Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 348 (2013) (“[G]arden-variety applications of the
test in Strickland, for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not produce new rules”).
506. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). The Court held that the petitioner who failed to
allege prejudice resulting from counsel’s error in incorrectly advising him of the parole eligibility rules
upon conviction failed to demonstrate ineffectiveness, but did so without resolving the issue of
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of effective assistance expected of counsel, though deportation clearly
illustrated the lack of satisfaction with the dichotomy leading the Padilla
Court to impose the duty to advise clients with immigration consequences
in accordance with applicable law. But Padilla also serves to remind counsel
that another potentially important option in state post-conviction argument
that trial or appellate counsel failed to perform effectively lies in arguing the
claim as a matter of state law.
Thus, even though Chaidez concluded that Padilla had announced a new
rule not retroactive in federal habeas litigation, this limitation did not
foreclose some jurisdictions from holding to the contrary. Exercising
independent jurisdiction under state law, following the Court’s holding in
Danforth v. Minnesota,507 Massachusetts508 and New Mexico courts509 have
held that as a matter of effective assistance under state law, failure to
properly advise clients facing immigration consequences from guilty pleas
leading to conviction constituted ineffective assistance that could be
asserted even after their cases became final.510
In contrast to the widespread application of the duty imposed in Padilla,
the Hinton Court’s decision to review a capital conviction where the death
sentence was imposed addressed ineffectiveness in a far more limited factual

whether counsel’s failure to accurately advise the client of parole eligibility upon conviction would fall
within the ambit of obligation under the Sixth Amendment. The Chaidez Court admitted that it had
not addressed the issue directly. Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 349–50.
507. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
508. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 907 (Mass. 2011) (holding Padilla “is
to be retroactively applied to convictions obtained on or after April 1, 1997”).
509. See Ramirez v. State, 333 P.3d 240, 241, 244–45 (N.M. 2014) (explaining that counsel in
New Mexico prosecutions had been required to inform clients of immigration consequences of
conviction on guilty pleas, specifically including compliance with NMRA Form 9-406 (9), adopted in
1990). This form requires the trial court to find that an accused pleading guilty or no contest be warned
about potential immigration consequences of conviction, providing: “That the defendant understands
that a conviction may have an effect upon the defendant’s immigration or naturalization status[,]” and
that, if the defendant is represented by counsel, the defendant has been advised by counsel of the
immigration consequences of the plea. Id. at 245. The court found that the record did not support
compliance with Form 9-406 with respect to Ramirez’s guilty plea entered in 1997 and, as a result,
recognized his option to proceed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on remand. Id. at 247.
In a pre-Padilla decision, State v. Paradez, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that counsel had an
affirmative duty to properly advise the client on immigration consequences of a conviction, noting the
general contrary authority, but pointing to established decisions holding that counsel’s
misrepresentation of deportation consequences had been found to demonstrate defective performance.
State v. Paradez, 101 P.3d 799, 804–05 (N.M. 2004).
510. Ramirez, 333 P.3d at 241, 247; Paradez, 101 P.3d at 804–05.
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scenario.511 The Court reviewed an ineffective assistance claim, initially
raised in state post-conviction proceedings, where the prosecution’s case
was based upon an eyewitness identification of Hinton by the survivor of a
similar robbery-shooting.512 Two similar crimes were committed in the
span of a few months, where the assailant fired twice during each
robbery.513 Police recovered a .38 caliber revolver from Hinton’s
residence, which ballistics testing linked to the bullets recovered from the
three robberies.514
The ballistics evidence was not only critical to the prosecution’s theory,
but to the defense as well.515 The trial court, concerned about the need for
expert testimony, offered to provide funds beyond the erroneously cited
statutory limit of $500 for defense counsel to retain a qualified expert, but
counsel declined the offer.516 The Court noted the misunderstanding,
stating “[t]he attorney failed to do so because he was himself unaware that
Alabama law no longer imposed a specific limit and instead allowed
reimbursement for ‘any expenses reasonably incurred.’”517 Instead, defense
counsel retained an individual whose expertise the lawyer himself believed
to be inadequate because he could not find a more qualified expert with the
limited funds.518 He admitted he failed to hire an expert capable of
providing a credible expert opinion, explaining at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing “it was my failure, my inability under the statute to obtain any
more funding for the purpose of hiring qualified experts.”519
However, the evidence at the hearing actually showed that trial counsel
refused the trial court’s offer to provide additional funding for the defense
to obtain the assistance of a qualified ballistics expert.520 Three highly
qualified experts testified that the unqualified “expert” called at trial
failed to properly contest the prosecution’s theory of defendant’s
involvement in the capital murder, and was thoroughly discredited on
511. Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 270–72 (2014).
512. Id. at 264–65.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. See id. at 265 (stating the six bullets and the revolver were the only physical pieces of
evidence that could be used to identify the perpetrator).
516. Id. at 266–67.
517. Id. at 267.
518. Id. at 267–68.
519. Id. at 268.
520. Id. at 273.
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cross-examination.521 In contrast, the three experts who testified at the
post-conviction evidentiary hearing had significant experience as experts in
toolmark identification—one had served as chief of the FBI’s “toolmark
unit” before his retirement—and none found that the prosecution’s expert
testimony linking the bullets recovered from the robberies to Hinton’s gun
was accurate.522
Based on the post-conviction evidence, the Hinton Court found that trial
counsel’s decision to not accept the funding offered by the trial court was
unreasonable considering all the circumstances.523 It concluded that under
the Strickland standard for performance by counsel “it was unreasonable for
Hinton’s lawyer to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert where that
failure was based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that
available funding was capped at $1,000.”524
But, in ordering relief, the Court carefully limited its holding to the precise
factual context in which Hinton’s claim arose, rather than imposing a new
rule to defense counsel’s exercise of professional judgment in employing
expert witnesses in support of a defensive theory for trial.525 It explained:
We wish to be clear that the inadequate assistance of counsel we find in this
case does not consist of the hiring of an expert who, though qualified, was
not qualified enough. The selection of an expert witness is a paradigmatic
example of the type of “strategic choic[e]” that, when made “after thorough
investigation of [the] law and facts,” is “virtually unchallengeable.” We do not
today launch federal courts into examination of the relative qualifications of experts hired
and experts that might have been hired. The only inadequate assistance of counsel here was
the inexcusable mistake of law—the unreasonable failure to understand the resources that

521. Id. at 269–70. The witness who testified as a defense expert at trial had a degree in civil
engineering, and his only experience “was in military ordnance, not firearms and toolmark
identification.” Id. at 269. This was stressed by the prosecutor in closing argument, who compared
the defense expert’s conclusion that the bullets in the three robberies were not fired from the same
weapon, with testimony from two highly qualified experts called by the State who opined that all six
recovered bullets from the three robberies had been fired from the same weapon. Id. Moreover, on
cross-examination, the defense expert admitted he had only testified twice with respect to toolmark
identification in the preceding eight years, he had experienced difficulty in using the microscope at the
crime lab, and he only has one eye. Id.
522. Id. at 270.
523. Id. at 274.
524. Id. at 273.
525. Id. at 274–75.
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state law made available to him—that caused counsel to employ an expert that he himself
deemed inadequate.526

The Court thus emphasized that the error in Hinton was based on the
critical fact that counsel—he himself (emphasis in original)—recognized that
the “expert” he retained was critical to its disposition.527 No broad
pronouncement concerning duties of counsel with respect to retaining
expert witnesses or ensuring the quality of their opinions or testimony was
under scrutiny in the case.528 Instead, the peculiar facts leading to Hinton’s
convictions and death sentence were key to the holding that counsel’s
representation was defective and probably prejudicial in light of the expert
testimony developed at the post-conviction hearing.529
While the Court held that its decision in Padilla announced a new rule not
subjective to retroactive application, as it later held in Chaidez,530 the
disposition in Hinton raises the question of whether the finding of
ineffectiveness warranting relief under the Sixth Amendment and Strickland
could have been announced in the federal habeas process. Hinton involved
nothing more than the application of Strickland to novel facts and, therefore,
did not announce a new rule.531 In this context, the Chaidez Court explained
that “Padilla would not have created a new rule had it only applied
Strickland’s general standard to yet another factual situation—that is, had
Padilla merely made clear that a lawyer who neglects to inform a client about
the risk of deportation is professionally incompetent.”532 But there, the
Court found that Padilla involved more than a mere application of Strickland
to a novel set of facts; instead, it asked whether Strickland would apply to the
failure to advise the client of immigration consequences upon conviction at
all.533
526. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
690 (1984)).
527. Id.
528. Id. at 274.
529. Id. at 274–75.
530. In Chaidez, the Court explained: “when all we do is apply a general standard to the kind of
factual circumstances it was meant to address, we will rarely state a new rule for Teague purposes.”
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 348 (2013).
531. The Court explained: “This case calls for a straightforward application of our
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel precedents, beginning with Strickland v. Washington.” Hinton, 571 U.S.
at 272.
532. Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 348–49.
533. Id. at 349.
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So, would one expect a federal habeas court to apply Strickland to these
peculiar facts? If so, because the Hinton Court itself admonished that it was
not developing a new doctrinal test governing defense counsel’s duties
regarding the use of expert testimony at trial, it clearly did not intend its
decision to be taken as an announcement of a new rule to be applied
prospectively for ineffective assistance claims based on arguably defective
use of expert evaluation or testimony. If the factual scenario presented by
Hinton were so obviously subject to relief on the merits based on application
of Strickland, then why did the Court grant certiorari, vacate the judgment of
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, and remand for consideration of
probable prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s deficient performance?534
Why not simply assume that the issue would be addressed in the federal
habeas litigation and resolved in the same way the Court did?
The problem may well lie in the statutory requirement that implicitly
requires federal habeas courts defer to state court decision-making, even
when the state court’s decision is wrong.535 The statute does not afford
federal habeas relief on the basis of a wrongly decided state court
disposition, but requires more deviation from the norm, an “unreasonable
application” of Supreme Court precedent.536 Hinton’s counsel’s defective
performance might reflect simply a “garden variety” application of
Strickland, but if so, why did the Court grant certiorari and issue its per
curiam order reversing? If resolution of the claim was simplistic, in that it
turned only on the essential fact that trial counsel rejected the trial court’s
offer of additional funds for the hiring of a more highly qualified expert on
ballistics, why did Hinton’s claim satisfy the Court’s general test for
“certworthiness?”537 Pursuant to RULE 10, while the Court reserves the
right to review cases that do not fit within its general criteria for

534. Hinton, 571 U.S. at 276.
535. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2018) (providing a guideline for evaluating whether review of a
state law may take place); see also supra text accompanying note 4.
536. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). “Under
§ 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision
applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be
unreasonable.” Id. at 411.
537. See SUP. CT. R. 10(b) (“[A] state court of last resort has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United
States court of appeals[.]”)
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certiorari,538
the
best
explanation
might
be
that
the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals decision was simply so beyond reason
that summary reversal by per curiam was deemed necessary.539
Kyles, Padilla, and Hinton reflect different contexts where the certiorari
petition following denial of relief in post-conviction litigation is particularly
significant. Kyles demonstrates the Court’s willingness to articulate a
refinement in existing precedent that addresses an important issue—
assessment of Brady violations cumulatively to determine whether the
defense has probably been impaired by failure to disclose favorable
evidence—when that refinement might have been beyond the appellate
court’s perceived authority or need to do so. It signals that the last step in
federal habeas may be essential to obtaining relief on a proposition that
lower courts might have disregarded, or that Justice Scalia would regard as
error correction and unworthy of the Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction to grant
the writ.
Padilla and Hinton both reflect dispositions that might never have gained
the attention of federal habeas courts because they appeared to deviate too
greatly from Strickland’s core holding to be considered “garden variety”
application of the test for ineffectiveness in counsel’s representation. Padilla
demonstrates the value of petitioning for certiorari following denial of relief
in state post-conviction proceedings in order to argue for a broadening of
counsel’s duty to advise the accused of immigration consequences of a
conviction on entry of a guilty plea. Hinton, by contrast, reflects error
correction necessitated by egregious facts that demand correction
appropriately through per curiam disposition, highlighting the fact that the
holding is limited to the unique factual scenario before the Court.

538. See id. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The
following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the
reasons the Court considers . . . .”).
539. Similarly, in Youngblood v. West Virginia, the Court ordered relief by per curiam based on a
Brady violation committed when a state trooper ordered destruction of a note purportedly written by
one of the victims of sexual assault, for which Youngblood was convicted, taunting him and indicating
sensual-sex, which directly contradicted the prosecution’s theory. Youngblood v. West Virginia,
547 U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006), rev’g 618 S.E.2d 544 (2005). On appeal, the convictions were upheld by
the state, the Supreme Court noted: “A bare majority of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia affirmed.” Id. at 869.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The importance of certiorari for criminal defendants is reflected in the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, which supports the provision of
counsel for this step in the post-trial process:
Counsel should be provided at every stage of the proceedings, including
sentencing, appeal, certiorari and postconviction review. In capital cases,
counsel also should be provided in clemency proceedings. Counsel initially
provided should continue to represent the defendant throughout the trial
court proceedings and should preserve the defendant’s right to appeal, if
necessary.540

Because the Court drew the line of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel at the end of the first level of appeal from conviction
in Ross v. Moffitt,541 there is no constitutional right for indigent defendants
to obtain counsel’s assistance in petitioning the Supreme Court for
certiorari. Consequently, counsel’s decision not to file a certiorari petition,
which might otherwise reflect an objectively reasonable strategic decision,
will not constitute ineffective assistance requiring relief from that decision,
even if it is not the product of reasonable strategy.542
Even experienced appellate lawyers may decide not to pursue certiorari
as an option for clients who have lost on federal constitutional claims in
state courts or lower federal courts. The financial expense associated with
petitioning for certiorari are not insubstantial in light of the filing fee and
cost of printing the petition and briefs, in the event the petition is granted,
quite apart from the substantial fee that may reasonably be charged by
retained counsel undertaking work requiring this level of professional
excellence.543 In fact, the sheer expense involved might itself reasonably
540. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-6.2
(AM. BAR. ASS’N 1992).
541. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
542. See Steele v. United States, 518 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding defendant had no
constitutional right to assistance of counsel in petitioning for writ of certiorari even though Circuit
policy might have required counsel to proceed). In Steele, the defendant could not demonstrate
probable prejudice from her counsel’s decision not to petition for writ of certiorari, even though her
co-defendant brother’s certiorari petition had been granted, his sentence vacated and the case
remanded for reconsideration in light of Booker v. United States, because he had obtained no relief from
the sentence previously imposed when the case was remanded. Id. at 989.
543. This is not to suggest that counsel should not routinely exert the highest degree of
professionalism in their work in trial or lower appellate courts, of course.
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deter clients able to afford representation before the Court from absorbing
the cost given the unlikely prospect that any single certiorari petition will be
granted. Nevertheless, it would be foolish not to recognize the need to put
forward the best possible arguments, supported by exhaustive research,
when petitioning the Court to reach a decision that will have national
implications for the practice of criminal law.544
Indigent petitioners, of course, will typically be excused from paying the
filing fee and printing requirements. However, when considering the very
high level of work required in crafting the question presented and body of
the petition, inadequate compensation—or complete lack thereof—may
discourage counsel from preparing and filing the petition.
Beyond concern for the cost of petitioning the Court for review, many
lawyers and petitioners may well view the infrequency with which petitions
are granted in the context of shifting realities of the Court’s judicial makeup.
Appointment of political conservatives whose histories reflect more
conservative judicial philosophy, like Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh,
almost necessarily suggest that the prospects for relief urged by petitioners
attacking convictions and sentences imposed in criminal prosecutions will
be so unfavorable as to depress interest in petitioning for certiorari. This
view is not unrealistic.
However, even conservative justices are not necessarily blind to valid
claims for justice and procedural fairness. This is one of the realities of
judicial decision-making that continue to make practice particularly
rewarding to lawyers who have been educated during a period of Supreme
Court activism; and has guaranteed continuing interest in making sound
arguments on behalf of clients who have been convicted of committing
crimes. Even the more conservative lineup suggested by the recent
appointments made by President Trump does not necessarily mean that the
Court will lead to frustration of counsel offering novel, interesting, or
well-crafted arguments that call for review of precedent or announcement
of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure in the certiorari
process.545
544. See Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120–21 (1995) (showing Branch’s argument on the
Teague exception to convince the court that would set new implications on criminal law and have a
nationwide affect).
545. Nor do predictions about behavior of individual justices warrant the conclusion that
so-called liberal and conservative blocks will necessarily align to dominate the direction of the Court’s
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Decisions rendered during the 2019 Term support the view that while the
Court may exhibit a more conservative posture on broad issues of public or
social policy, its decisions will continue to focus on well-argued claims
challenging existing doctrine or precedent.
A split court issued
546
with Justice Gorsuch joining four liberals in
United States v. Davis,
rejecting the use of the residual clause as a substitute for precise definition
of the conduct constituting a criminal offense.547 The majority relied on
the earlier decision in Johnson v. United States,548 in which Justice Scalia wrote
for the majority in holding that the Residual Clause in the Armed Career
Criminal Act of 1984549 was unconstitutionally vague.550
Justice Kavanaugh dissented in Davis, suggesting that fear of a monolithic
conservative bloc on the Court may be premature.551
decision-making. For instance, in Stuart v. Alabama, the Court declined to grant certiorari in a case
involving the basic holding of Crawford v. Washington, and subsequent decision in Bullcoming v. New
Mexico. Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36 (2018); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011);
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). In the latter case, the majority extended Crawford’s
constitutional requirement for cross-examination of testimonial hearsay to include the laboratory
technician’s conclusions regarding the results of a test the technician had personally performed.
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 665. The Alabama court held that admission of the test result through the
testimony of another analyst who had not performed the test did not violate the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her. Stuart, 139 S. Ct. at 36. Both the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals’s initial opinion and order denying review are unpublished. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 1, Stuart, 139 S. Ct. at 36 (No. 17-1676). Justice Gorsuch, joined by
Justice Sotomayor, dissented from the denial of certiorari, blaming the lack of consensus within the
Court in its prior decision in Williams v. Illinois, for suggesting a departure from the bright-line rule
adopted in Crawford and Bullcoming, despite the lack of any acceptance of Alabama’s position on the part
of the four Justices writing opinions in Williams. Stuart, 139 S. Ct. at 37–38; Williams v. Illinois,
567 U.S. 50 (2012). Justice Gorsuch was also joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from denial of
certiorari in Hester v. United States, another Sixth Amendment case in which the issue involved whether
the amount of restitution ordered in a criminal prosecution should be subject to jury determination.
Hester v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 509, 509 (2019).
546. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)
unconstitutionally vague).
547. Id. at 2324.
548. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
549. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2018).
550. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
551. See, e.g., Leah Litman, Opinion Analysis: Vagueness Doctrine As a Shield for Criminal Defendants,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysis-vaguenessdoctrine-as-a-shield-for-criminal-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/5EL7-MA8S] (“The opinion in Davis
underscores an important jurisprudential difference in criminal cases between the two most recent
nominees to the Supreme Court, Kavanaugh and Gorsuch. The tone of the majority opinion—and its
concern about judges’ broadening already expansive criminal statutes—is very different from the tone
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Decisions rendered in this term reflect the Court’s recent history, with
unexpected coalitions advancing differing positions that might seem
ideologically inconsistent. For instance, in Byrd v. United States,552 the Court
concluded that a driver in lawful possession of a rental car had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the vehicle in appropriate circumstances, even
though his name was not listed on the rental agreement,553 abrogating prior
circuit decisions to the contrary.554 While the majority’s opinion left open
additional questions for future litigation,555 it foreclosed the Government’s
position that the unlisted driver lawfully operating the rental car lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy affording him protection under the
Fourth Amendment based on violation of the terms of the rental agreement,
with the majority explaining:
[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes there is no meaningful difference between
the authorized-driver provision and the other provisions the Government
agrees do not eliminate an expectation of privacy, all of which concern risk
allocation between private parties—violators might pay additional fees, lose
insurance coverage, or assume liability for damage resulting from the breach.
But that risk allocation has little to do with whether one would have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car if, for example, he or she
otherwise has lawful possession of and control over the car.556

But, in answering the question of the unlisted driver’s privacy expectation
in addressing his standing to challenge the search, the majority offered
appellate lawyers the promise of further litigation, the heart of the appellate
lawyer’s practice. It explained:

of Kavanaugh’s dissent. The dissent opens with the claim that ‘crime and firearms form a dangerous
mix,’ and it then proceeds to discuss various statistics about violent crime. Against this backdrop, the
dissent finds ways to interpret Section 924(c) that would save the statute, perhaps to rescue us from
that ‘dangerous mix’ of ‘crime and firearms.’”).
552. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018).
553. Id. at 1528.
554. Id. at 1526 (“This Court granted Byrd’s petition for a writ of certiorari to address the
conflict among the Courts of Appeals over whether an unauthorized driver has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a rental car.” (citing Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.))).
555. In fact, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, explained hesitance in reading too
much into the disposition in the majority opinion, a view shared by Justice Alito, who also concurred
in the Court’s opinion. Id. at 1531–32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
556. Id. at 1529.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020

105

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2020], No. 3, Art. 2

690

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:585

Though new, the fact pattern here continues a well-traveled path in this
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Those cases support the
proposition, and the Court now holds, that the mere fact that a driver in lawful
possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will
not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court
leaves for remand two of the Government’s arguments: that one who
intentionally uses a third party to procure a rental car by a fraudulent scheme
for the purpose of committing a crime is no better situated than a car thief;
and that probable cause justified the search in any event.
The
Court of Appeals has discretion as to the order in which these questions are
best addressed.557

Counsel, skeptical about prospects for success in seeking development of
new constitutional doctrine involving criminal procedural protections, or
refinement of existing doctrine, or, vigorous enforcement of existing
precedent, should be reminded that the evidence suggests that the Court
may always be receptive to well-reasoned arguments brought in good faith
“for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”558 Consider
Justice Gorsuch’s key vote and opinion for the plurality in
United States v. Haymond,559 holding that the defendant whose probation,
ordered as a convicted sex offender, is being revoked for imposition of a
mandatory minimum sentence is entitled to a jury trial on the question of
his guilt on the offense on which revocation of his probation is based.560
Justice Gorsuch wrote:
[I]n this case a congressional statute compelled a federal judge to send a man
to prison for a minimum of five years without empaneling a jury of his peers
or requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As
applied here, we do not hesitate to hold that the statute violates the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.561

Similarly, consider Justice Kavanaugh’s strong opinion for the Court in
Flowers v. Mississippi,562 reversing the capital conviction and death sentence

557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.

Id. at 1531.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019).
Id. at 2382.
Id. at 2373 (emphasis added).
Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
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imposed in a sixth trial based on the prosecutor’s violation of Batson.563
Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh pointed to the fact that the
same prosecutor served as lead counsel in all six trials and used the State’s
peremptory challenges “to strike 41 of the 42 black prospective jurors that
it could have struck—a statistic that the State acknowledged at oral
argument in this Court.”564 Although there is likely great concern over his
conservative views, particularly in light of the contentious confirmation
hearing,565 his opinion for the majority demonstrates a willingness to
enforce existing precedent favorable to criminal defendants, including
capital defendants sentenced to death.566 And, much like Hinton, the
majority opinion very carefully explained:
All that we need to decide, and all that we do decide, is that all of the relevant
facts and circumstances taken together establish that the trial court at Flowers’
sixth trial committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory
strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not motivated in
substantial part by discriminatory intent. In reaching that conclusion, we break

563. Id. at 2234–35.
564. Id. at 2235.
565. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn In after Close Confirmation Vote in Senate,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-su
preme-court.html [https://perma.cc/MJ3A-PRD3] (characterizing confirmation fight as “bitter”).
566. Perhaps somewhat ironically in light of the positive comments with respect to
Justice Gorsuch in these conclusions, Justice Gorsuch, in fact, dissented in Flowers, joining
Justice Thomas’s dissent, except with respect to Part IV, in which Justice Thomas affirmed his
long-standing dispute with Batson and its underlying principles, arguing:
Much of the Court’s opinion is a paean to Batson v. Kentucky, which requires that a duly convicted
criminal go free because a juror was arguably deprived of his right to serve on the jury. That rule
was suspect when it was announced, and I am even less confident of it today. Batson has led the
Court to disregard Article III’s limitations on standing by giving a windfall to a convicted criminal
who, even under Batson’s logic, suffered no injury. It has forced equal protection principles onto
a procedure designed to give parties absolute discretion in making individual strikes. And it has
blinded the Court to the reality that racial prejudice exists and can affect the fairness of trials.
Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2269 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Of course, the Court’s decision
vacating the conviction and remanding the case did not “require[] that a duly convicted criminal go
free,” at all, this expression by Justice Thomas of his continuing hostility toward Batson rests on a
misrepresentation of the disposition. Id.
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no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce Batson by applying it to
the extraordinary facts of this case.567

Thus, as in Hinton, the Court’s function in the certiorari process was not
the development of new criminal procedure doctrine, but the correction of
an obvious and persistent flaw in the lack of fidelity to existing precedent,
particularly in the Alabama trial court. The Court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction drew the same criticism for its action in correcting error that led
Justice Scalia to attack the grant of certiorari in Kyles,568 a dissent in which
Justice Thomas joined.
For criminal defendants, the current composition of the Supreme Court
could hardly be viewed as favorable, but not simply because it may be
dominated by ideological conservatives or Republican judicial appointees.
For lawyers involved in criminal trial, appellate, and post-conviction
representation, the prospects might similarly be viewed as rather dim, but
this view should be tempered by two realities. First, the major portion of
the work necessary for developing the promise of federal criminal
procedural protection has been accomplished over the past six decades,
largely through the selective incorporation of protections afforded by the
First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and recently Second Amendments to state court
proceedings through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the

567. Id. at 2251. Justice Alito emphasized the same point, explaining his alignment with the
majority:
But this is not an ordinary case, and the jury selection process cannot be analyzed as if it were. In light of all
that had gone before, it was risky for the case to be tried once again by the same prosecutor in
Montgomery County. Were it not for the unique combinations of circumstances present here, I
would have no trouble affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, which
conscientiously applied the legal standards applicable in less unusual cases. But viewing the
totality of the circumstances present here, I agree with the Court that petitioner’s capital
conviction cannot stand.
Id. at 2252 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Alito had earlier written the majority
opinion in Snyder v. Louisiana. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 473 (2008). In Snyder, the reversal
was based on one of the circumstances addressed also by the Flowers Court—pointedly disparate
questioning of majority and minority jurors during the voir dire examination. Id. at 483–84.
Justice Alito’s vote in Flowers was consistent with his position in Snyder. Although a solid conservative
vote on the Court, his willingness to enforce Batson is apparent.
568. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 456 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Fourteenth Amendment.569 Second, despite the Court’s own skepticism
about the possibility of recognition of “watershed” rules of criminal
procedure expressed in Teague,570 the Court continues to grant certiorari to
consider new rules,571 application of existing precedent in novel

569. With the exception of Hurtado v. California, in which the Court held that the
Fifth Amendment right to trial on an indictment returned by a grand jury did not apply to state
prosecutions, the procedural rights recognized for criminal defendants in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and
Eighth Amendments have been held to apply in state proceedings through the guarantee of due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884).
The quickly accomplished “selective incorporation” process included major decisions: Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (applying protection against double jeopardy to state proceedings);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (applying Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
in state proceedings); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to require
suppression of physical evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment to state court prosecutions).
The important rights secured by the Sixth Amendment were made applicable in state proceedings in a
series of important cases, including the right to a jury trial in Duncan v. Louisiana; the right to a speedy
trial in Klopfer v. North Carolina; the right to confrontation in Pointer v. Texas; the right to compulsory
process to obtain testimony and develop a defense in Washington v. Texas; and the right to assistance of
counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 (1968);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403–04 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
More recently, the Court relied on the right to notice in the accusation as a basis for requiring
charging of factual allegations used for sentencing enhancement in the charging instrument in state
proceedings. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). In 1972, the Court applied the
Eighth Amendment in voiding existing state death penalty statutes in Furman v. Georgia, finding that the
lack of effective standards or criteria for capital sentencing resulted in an unconstitutional application
of the death penalty. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972). Thus, by the mid-1970’s,
application of virtually every protection afforded by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments
had been applied to state court proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Similarly, the Court has held that the Second Amendment generally includes the right of an individual
“to keep and bear arms.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010).
Significant judicial and scholarly comment has focused on the doctrine of “selective
incorporation.” See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on “Incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748 (1965). For discussion of the
“selective incorporation” doctrine in the Supreme Court’s opinions, including the differing views, note
the separate opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Black in Adamson v. California. Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 59, 63–65, 68, 71–90 (1947), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The
Adamson majority concluded that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination did not
apply to a California capital prosecution. Id. at 54–55. Adamson was overruled in Malloy v. Hogan.
Malloy, 378 U.S. at 11.
570. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
571. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010); see supra notes 475–506 and accompanying
text.
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situations,572 refinement of existing precedent,573 and rigorous
enforcement of precedent.574 The continuing development of precedent
suggests that while there is pessimism with respect to philosophical leanings
of the Justices, which may often prove less than consistent or even contrary
to expectation, it should not foreclose recourse through certiorari with
respect to federal constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants
because, certiorari is not simply the last, best option for relief, it is the only
option.
The Court’s most recent decision offering hope to litigants of the value
in asking the Court to reconsider existing precedent in terms of
constitutional criminal procedure protections lies in its oddly fragmented
composition of Justices in Ramos v. Louisiana.575 There, in a majority
opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, the Court overruled its decisions in
Apodaca v. Oregon576 and Johnson v. Louisiana577 in which the Court had
upheld non-unanimous verdicts in state criminal trials in a similarly
fragmented series of opinions in 1972,578 rejecting unanimity as a necessary
572. Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 272 (2014); see supra notes 511–39 and accompanying
text.
573. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995); see supra notes 431–56 and accompanying text.
574. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019); see supra notes 562–67 and
accompanying text.
575. Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020). Justice Gorsuch was joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined with respect to Parts II-B, IV-B-2, and V; and
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined with respect to Part IV-A. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion
concurring as to all but Part IV-A. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part.
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Chief Justice Roberts joined and in which Justice Kagan joined as to all but Part III-D.
576. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding state verdict requirement of 10–2 jury
vote to convict or acquit accused in criminal trial), overturned by Ramos, No. 18-5924, slip op.
577. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 352 (1972) (upholding state verdict requirement of 9–3 jury
vote to convict or acquit accused in criminal trial), overturned by Ramos, No. 18-5924, slip op.
578. Justice Gorsuch observed:
Ultimately, the Court could do no more than issue a badly fractured set of opinions. Four
dissenting Justices would not have hesitated to strike down the States’ laws, recognizing that the
Sixth Amendment requires unanimity and that this guarantee is fully applicable against the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment. But a four-Justice plurality took a very different view of the
Sixth Amendment. These Justices declared that the real question before them was whether
unanimity serves an important “function” in “contemporary society.” Then, having reframed the
question, the plurality wasted few words before concluding that unanimity’s costs outweigh its
benefits in the modern era, so the Sixth Amendment should not stand in the way of Louisiana or
Oregon.
Ramos, slip op. at 8 (footnote omitted).
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element of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to jury trial.579
The revised view of protection afforded by the right to a fair trial suggests
that some Justices are willing to charter a different course in considering the
interplay between traditional notions of protection and the likelihood that
racial discrimination has continued to compromise the credibility of the
criminal trial process. The Ramos majority explained:
Why do Louisiana and Oregon allow nonunanimous convictions? Though
it’s hard to say why these laws persist, their origins are clear. Louisiana first
endorsed nonunanimous verdicts for serious crimes at a constitutional
convention in 1898. According to one committee chairman, the avowed
purpose of that convention was to “establish the supremacy of the white
race,” and the resulting document included many of the trappings of the
Jim Crow era: a poll tax, a combined literacy and property ownership test, and
a grandfather clause that in practice exempted white residents from the most
onerous of these requirements.
.....
Adopted in the 1930s, Oregon’s rule permitting nonunanimous verdicts
can be similarly traced to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and efforts to dilute
“the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon juries.” In
fact, no one before us contests any of this; courts in both Louisiana and
Oregon have frankly acknowledged that race was a motivating factor in the
adoption of their States’ respective nonunanimity rules.580

Like the Court’s reasoning for vacating the death sentence imposed on
an African–American capital defendant in Flowers,581 the unquestionable
influence of racial discrimination in tainting the criminal process in
non-unanimous verdict schemes proved critical in Ramos. The history the
majority could cite with confidence in attacking the motivation for choosing
an approach to the jury trial so inconsistent with the practice in place at the
time of adoption of the Sixth Amendment,582 demanded review and
579. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, providing, in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”
580. Ramos, slip op. at 1–3.
581. See supra notes 580–84 and accompanying text.
582. In describing the jury trial as it was known at the time of adoption of the
Sixth Amendment, the majority concluded:
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reconsideration. Similarly, the Court’s traditional departure from the
insulation of jury verdicts from review on testimony regarding the internal
process of the jury’s deliberation583 reflected in Pena-Rodriguez,584 arose in
the context of concern for racial discrimination in the decision-making
process. Evidence of racial animus directed at the accused by a member of
his jury undermines the verdict’s credibility and could very likely result in
actual prejudice resulting from a conviction grounded in stereotyping, rather
than evidence.585 These recent decisions from the Court, often reflecting
what might appear to be odd alliances of justices considered conservative or
One of these requirements was unanimity. Wherever we might look to determine what the term
“trial by an impartial jury trial” meant at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption—whether
it’s the common law, state practices in the founding era, or opinions and treatises written soon
afterward—the answer is unmistakable. A jury must reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
583. See supra note 288, particularly the discussion on Tanner v. United States.
584. See supra notes 289–93 and accompanying text.
585. But, in an earlier capital case, evidence of a juror’s apparent racial bias toward African–
Americans did not warrant relief from the death sentence imposed by an all-white jury. In Sterling v.
Dretke, Sterling, a black man, had been charged with the murder of a white man in a rural Texas county
and eventually was tried and sentenced to death by an all-white jury. Sterling v. Dretke, 117 F. App’x
328 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal of Sterling’s federal habeas
claim that trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance at his capital trial when counsel failed to
voir dire prospective jurors concerning their attitudes about race. Id. at 329. In Turner v. Murray, the
Court had held that defendants charged with cross-racial capital crimes facing the death penalty had a
right to question prospective jurors about racial animus. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986). In
the state postconviction process, a juror from Sterling’s trial admitted during testimony that he
routinely used a racial slur in reference to African–Americans but denied that he was prejudiced against
blacks. Trial counsel testified that he was aware of the juror’s likely racial attitudes, having previously
represented the juror in another matter, but did not believe inquiring about bias would have proved
successful, while also opining that the juror was probably “a middle of the road for Navarro County.”
Sterling, 117 F. App’x at 332. In rejecting the ineffective assistance claim, the Fifth Circuit addressed
the juror’s use of the racial slur: “Sterling bases this contention on a post-trial affidavit where Walther
referenced the criminal behavior of ‘some nig**rs who live a couple of blocks over.’ At the state habeas
hearing, Walther testified that he likely used that term at the time of Sterling’s trial.” Id. at 331. Despite
the Fifth Circuit’s own inability to use the racial slur, as completely spelled, in its analysis, it held that
Sterling had failed to show that counsel failed to provide effective assistance in not questioning the
jury, including his former client, about potential racial bias that could have affected the fairness of the
death sentence the jury ultimately imposed. Id. at 333. It further concealed its concern for the
incomplete spelling by not publishing its opinion. Id. at 329 n.*. The Supreme Court denied Sterling’s
petition for certiorari. Sterling v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 1053 (2005). The Court also denied his application
for stay of execution, with Justices Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissenting from
the denial of the stay application. Sterling v. Texas, 545 U.S. 1157, 1157 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting). For additional discussion of the Sterling case, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Lethal Discrimination,
26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 69 (2010).
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liberal, certainly suggest that—at least when confronted by the continuing
realities of racial discrimination that plague the criminal justice system—
certiorari will remain the critical process for addressing and remedying these
concerns.586
Counsel practicing in criminal courts, particularly in appellate and
post-conviction practice, should always bear in mind that courts are likely
to be only as good as the lawyers who practice before them. And practicing
criminal attorneys should be reminded of Justice Hays’s admonition in the
Vermont Supreme Court in State v. Jewett587: “The imaginative lawyer is still
the fountainhead of our finest jurisprudence.”588

586. The Ramos dissenters expressed their concern that the majority’s holding would open the
door to review and reconsideration of non-unanimous verdicts which would disrupt long-standing
convictions through collateral review. The majority responded to this concern:
But again the worries outstrip the facts. Under Teague v. Lane, newly recognized rules of criminal
procedure do not normally apply in collateral review. True, Teague left open the possibility of an
exception for “watershed rules” “implicat[ing] the fundamental fairness [and accuracy] of the
trial.” But, as this language suggests, Teague’s test is a demanding one, so much so that this Court
has yet to announce a new rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it. And the test is
demanding by design, expressly calibrated to address the reliance interests States have in the
finality of their criminal judgments.
Ramos, slip op. at 13. For discussion on the Court’s observation in Teague that it could not identify an
additional watershed rule of criminal procedure that would require retroactive application in the future,
see supra note 155.
587. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985).
588. Id. at 237.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020

113

